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There is a growing body of literature across disciplines emphasising the way in
which emotions are not straightforwardly opposed to reason, as was once typically
supposed. In particular, it is often argued that emotions give us evaluative inform-
ation about the world around us and that they are crucial for the good-functioning
of our rational decision-making capacities. Despite this enhanced understanding of
the functional role of emotions, however, the extent to which it has implications for
our conception of rational agency has yet to be comprehensively addressed. This
thesis fills some of that gap.
Part of our conception of ourselves as rational agents is that we guide our ac-
tions by reasons, and part of our conception of rational action is that it is action done
in light of reasons. In this thesis, I examine what implications an enhanced under-
standing of emotion has on our conception of rational agency and argue that we can
act rationally when acting on the basis of an emotional experience. By examining
our concept of ‘emotion’ and how we explain action via emotion, I argue for four
main claims. First, by looking at the role of emotions in explanations of action, I
argue that there is conceptual space for emotions to be involved in rational action.
Second, I argue that emotions provide access to reasons which could be the reasons
in light of which an agent acts and, third, the agent can indeed act in light of them
and guide her action when acting on the basis of an emotional experience. Finally, I
argue that such action is reasonable, understood as being subjectively rational. My
arguments contribute towards a robust conception of rational agency, one which ac-
knowledges our emotional nature and which is able to incorporate emotions into an
account of how we do indeed act in many of the cases when we act rationally.
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That there is no more miserable Slave than he who suffers to be guided
by his passions.
This is how Jean Senault titles the Third Discourse in his The Use of the Passions
(1649). What follows is an extended metaphor comparing the passions to the worst
kind of slave owner and ourselves to the suffering slaves. Being enslaved and de-
prived of freedom, Senault tells us, is ‘not comparable to that which the tyranny of
the Passions causeth in us’ (95). Nevertheless, he goes on to argue, the Passions
contain the seeds for both virtue and vice and he concludes that ‘there is no Passion
in our Soul, which may not profitably be husbanded by Reason and by Grace’ (510).
Senault, and others who oppose emotion to reason, are too heavy-handed in
their treatment of emotions. Our understanding of emotion in both psychology and
philosophy has increased substantially in the past century and it now seems by no
means clear, or correct, that the most ‘miserable Slave’ is ‘he who suffers to be
guided by his passions’. It is by no means clear, or correct, that being guided by our
emotions necessarily deprives us of acting in line with our reasons if our emotions
are not ‘husbanded by Reason’. In this thesis, by focusing on explanations of action,
I argue that we can act rationally when acting on the basis of an emotion, in the
emotion’s own right. We are not miserable slaves to our emotions.
In the paper ‘Quick and Smart? Modularity and the Pro-Emotion Consensus’
(2008), Karen Jones gives the label ‘the pro-emotion consensus’ to the school of
views in both psychology and philosophy which rejects the opposition of emotion
to reason. Those who form part of the pro-emotion consensus reject the claim that
emotions are ‘at best arational, if not outright irrational’ (Jones 2008, 3), needing to
be ‘husbanded by Reason’ as Senault puts it. They instead see emotions ‘as evolved
capacities that are integral to our practical rationality’ (3), and which can even ‘key
us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations’ (Jones 2003,
181), considerations constituted by how the agent’s interests and concerns are af-
fected in a given situation. As Jones writes:
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8Pro-emotion theorists also think that their position has revisionary im-
plications, perhaps even radical ones. There is a tendency within philo-
sophical and commonsense thinking to disparage the emotions and to
suppose that wise deliberation and objective inquiry are dispassionate.
But if emotions contribute positively to ecologically situated rationality,
then commonsense and philosophical norms of rationality that embed
false assumptions about their disruptiveness may need to be revised.
(Jones 2008, 4)
While Jones classes herself as a pro-emotion theorist, she does warn that the
revisionary implications of the pro-emotion school need careful defence.1 I too
place myself amongst the pro-emotion consensus and my aim in this thesis is to
provide some of that defence. My focus is on the questions: if emotions are crucial
to our functional rationality, and if emotions are intentional states which provide us
with information, how should we understand their contribution to our capacity as
rational agents who act for reasons? And what kind of explanation can we give of
action performed because of an emotion?
Two key developments in particular form the backbone of the pro-emotion con-
sensus school of views and cast doubt on the traditional emotion-reason opposi-
tion. These are: first, the idea that emotions are not simply affective states which
only play a motivating role in action; they also give us information about the world
around us. Second, emotions are crucial for the good-functioning of our rational
decision-making capacities.
The first development is the idea that emotions provide us with information, and
has been developed in both psychology and philosophy as the claim that emotions
are intentional states and are about things other than our bodies.2 In particular,
emotions are said to represent and be elicited by evaluative properties relating to
how we stand in our environment. This gives rise to the challenge of explaining how
emotions represent and are elicited by such properties without themselves being
composed of beliefs, judgements, or other cognitively complex states. Assuming
that such a challenge can be met, it seems that emotions are prima facie states
which give us evaluative information about how things are, and we can plausibly
ask whether someone can act rationally from an emotion and, by extension, what
role an emotion can play in an explanation of rational action.
1Jones’ own focus is on whether emotions, as adaptive mechanisms of the mind, ‘are capable of
coming to be directed towards new objects in virtue of a cognitively modifiable range of triggering
properties’ (Jones 2008, 4).
2For instance, appraisal theories in psychology develop the idea that emotions involve appraisals
or dimensions of appraisals relating to the subject and her environment. See Agnes Moors (2014)
for a concise description of different appraisal theories.
9The second key development is the idea that emotions are crucial for the good-
functioning of our decision-making capacities. Emotions facilitate planning by
helping to organise goals, and they assist deliberation by giving certain consider-
ations salience, thereby ensuring that we can function as rational agents, capable
of deliberation, decision-making, and acting. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio
(1994), for example, famously proposes a somatic-marker hypothesis for the role
of emotion in decision-making. The somatic marker hypothesis is the hypothesis
that emotions, as bodily states, affectively mark aspects of a situation or potential
outcomes as positive or negative. This allows the agent to efficiently assess the pros
and cons of the potential outcomes, both enabling decision-making and, via a feed-
back loop, ensuring that a person can decide quickly without always having to go
through slower, deliberate processing.3
We also find dual-process theories of mind, made especially popular with Daniel
Kahnemann’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) and recently defen-
ded by Jonathan Evans and Keith Stanovich (2013). These theories distinguish
between rapid autonomous processes (Type 1), which would include emotions, and
higher order reasoning processes (Type 2), and often make the further claim that
we use Type 1 processing more than we think. As Kahnemann writes, ‘the intuitive
[Type] 1 is more influential than your experience tells you, and it is the secret author
of many of the choices and judgements you make’ (Kahnemann 2011, 13).4 This
has been applied to philosophical topics, for example by Jonathan Haidt in a pa-
per titled ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail’ (2001), who argues that moral
judgements are generally the result of quick, automatic intuitions and not the result
of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning, he argues, is post hoc. Drawing on Haidt’s
work amongst others, the psychologist Joshua Greene argues that our characteristic-
ally deontological moral judgements are driven by automatic emotional responses,
whereas our characteristically utilitarian moral judgements, which require more re-
flection, are driven by more controlled cognitive processes (Greene 2007).
3How far the somatic marker hypothesis can be used to argue for a central role of emotion in
decision-making has been challenged. For example, Stefan Linquist and Jordan Bartol (2013) argue
that the evidence only supports emotions having a peripheral role, either ‘in notifying the subject
that a decision-point has been reached’, or ‘at the terminal stage, in motivating the subject to execute
a decision’ (2013, 2). Nevertheless, the evidence is still sufficient to suggest that emotions can notify
the subject of information and motivate her to act in a way independent of conscious deliberation.
As Linquist and Bartol are happy to concede, more cognitively complex models of emotion could
play a more central role in decision-making.
4See Magda Osman (2013) for a critique of dual-process theories. Osman argues that the evid-
ence is ambiguous and could support a quantitative rather than qualitative distinction between Type
1 and Type 2, so that ‘the same reasoning process generates accurate responses to easier tasks and
generates inaccurate responses to harder tasks’ (Osman 2013, 251).
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Whether or not such interpretations and applications to moral reasoning are
successful, there is still sufficient evidence that emotions assist with reasoning by
focussing attention and speeding up decision-making, as well as providing an al-
ternative route for coming to a decision, a route that bypasses more deliberative
reasoning.
In their contribution to the functioning of human reasoning, emotion and delib-
eration need not be in opposition, where the latter is usually what is understood as
reason. Nevertheless, how the underlying processes work need not have a direct
bearing on our conception of rational action. To see this, compare goal-directed
behaviour with rational action. Goal-directed behaviour is, quite simply, behaviour
that is aimed at achieving some goal. Examples would include my going to the
shops to buy milk for my cereal, a dog’s scratching of the cupboard door to get
food, and, arguably, even a sunflower’s turning its head towards the sun. Emotions
undeniably play a role in goal-directed behaviour: they function as a mechanism
through which we decide and act timeously in order to achieve our goals.
Rational action is something quite different. I want milk for my cereal and so
I go to the shop in order to buy milk. This is a clear example of rational action.
It is controversial whether animal goal-directed behaviour is also rational, but it is
uncontroversial that the sunflower does not act, let alone act rationally. Rational
action is thus not straightforwardly the same as goal-directed behaviour. Emotions
may assist with goal-directed behaviour by contributing to the functioning of ra-
tional decision-making, but it does not follow that they thereby have a crucial role
to play in our conception of rational action. That emotions can contribute to the
good-functioning of rational decision-making is therefore not enough to establish
what role they have, if any, in our conception of rational action.
The significance of my thesis is that it bridges part of the gap between our un-
derstanding of the functional role of emotions and our conception of rational action.
I focus on explanations of action because explaining an action as rational involves
showing that it is rational, so focusing on explanations of action allows us to exam-
ine our conception of what rational action is. By examining our concept of emotion
and how we explain action via emotion, I argue that, because emotions provide ac-
cess to reasons in light of which we can act, we can act in light of a reason, hence
act rationally, when acting on the basis of an emotion. If I am right, then we end
up with a robust conception of rational action which is able to incorporate emotions
into an account of how we often do act rationally. Even if we do sometimes guide




In order to argue for the view that we can act in light of a reason when acting on
the basis of an emotional experience, my thesis is divided into three parts. In Part
I, chapters 1-3, I argue that there is conceptual space for emotions to have a reason-
providing role in action and in explanations of action. In Part II, chapters 4-5, I give
necessary background for formulating the kind of cases in which I am interested
as well articulating the view I shall develop. In Part III, chapter 6-7, I develop the
details of the view.
The overarching argument of Part I is to take two uncontroversial claims and,
by showing how they interact, motivate the case for the much more controversial
thesis that acting on the basis of an emotional experience can be acting in light of a
reason.
The first claim that I develop in Chapter 1 is that our concept of emotion is rich.
We refer to a diversity of different mental states or attitudes as emotions or by using
emotion words, such as referring to short-term agitations, occurrent emotion states,
long-term attitudes, even moods. It is also rich because our concept of emotion is
of something that is both intentional and has a specific phenomenology. In Chapter
1, I emphasise the intentional nature of emotions and introduce the concept of the
formal object of an emotion, a concept which will play a crucial part in developing
the view that emotions provide access to reasons. The formal object is the property
in virtue of which a particular emotion is elicited and is the emotion that it is. For
example, if I am afraid of the dog, the dog has the property of being dangerous or
frightening, a property in virtue of which my emotion is elicited and is fear. The
formal object is often said to be what the emotion is about; in this example, my fear
would be about the dangerous or frightening dog.
The second claim that I develop in Chapter 2 is that we can give a range of
explanations of action involving emotions, and the role of the emotion in the ex-
planation need not be the same. I describe five categories of different roles that the
emotion could play in an explanation and give examples to illustrate each category.
The examples start with those where the role of the emotion is tangential to the ac-
tion qua rational. Gradually, the emotion’s involvement with the action qua rational
increases, ending with examples where the emotion is plausibly the agent’s reason
and examples where the emotion plausibly provides access to the agent’s reason for
acting through its intentional nature.
An emotion could play a role in an explanation of action in virtue of being an
agitation, an occurrent state, an attitude or a mood; it could play a role in virtue
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of its phenomenology or in virtue of its intentional nature; it could even play more
than one role. We therefore see that, even if an emotion plays one kind of role in
one kind of explanation, it need not play the same role in all explanations. Des-
pite this, emotions have traditionally been relegated to only one or perhaps two
roles. In Chapter 3, I show this by presenting representative themes of historical
approaches to emotions and action, and by focusing on two twentieth-century ac-
counts of emotions in action and explanations of action in more detail, those of
Gilbert Ryle and Anthony Kenny. Both Ryle and Kenny argue that emotions have
one or two roles in action and action explanations: either as causes or as motives.
I argue that their accounts are not satisfactory because they cannot accommodate
the differences between the categories of examples that I introduced in Chapter 2.
They either do not adequately incorporate the intentional nature of emotion into
their account, as in the case of Ryle, or they do not consider the full impact of the
intentional nature, as in the case of Kenny. I conclude that, if we properly embrace
the intentional nature of emotions, one of the roles available to emotion in an ex-
planation of action could be in virtue of its giving the agent’s reason for acting as
she did, and the conceptual space for acting in light of a reason when acting on the
basis of an emotion is opened up. This brings the first part of my thesis to a close.
In Part II, I cover important background for articulating a basis from which I
can develop my positive view that we can act in light of a reason when acting on
the basis of an emotional experience. The view turns heavily on our conception of
emotions as intentional states. So, in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 6, I examine
emotions and their intentional nature in more detail. In Chapter 4, I focus my atten-
tion on occurrent emotion states and address what an adequate account of emotion
must look like if it is to capture accurately their intentional nature. I examine two
main groups of accounts of emotions, non-cognitive and cognitive accounts. I ar-
gue that non-cognitive accounts are unable to accommodate the intentional nature
in a way which does not undermine their core claims, and that cognitive accounts
which analyse emotions as involving beliefs of judgements fare no better as they
either over-intellectualise emotions or are trivial. I therefore propose that we should
adopt a weak cognitive account, such as the currently popular perceptual models of
emotion. On such accounts, emotions are understood as intentional states that are
about the formal objects, yet are not cognitively complex.
A final bit of background work is required, which is to lay out what rational
action is and what an explanation of rational action qua rational action requires. I
argue that acting rationally is acting in light of a motivating reason, where a motivat-
ing reason is a fact. I then argue that we can explain an agent’s action by identifying
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the motivating reason and argue for a distinction between explaining an action as
rational, or done for a reason, and explaining it as reasonable. Both acting ration-
ally and acting reasonably are important for our conception of ourselves as rational
agents. I end by describing more formally what the differences between the cat-
egories of explanation in Chapter 2 are, and stating more precisely how, because of
their intentional nature, emotions could plausibly provide access to the agent’s mo-
tivating reason and how an explanation citing an emotion could be an explanation
of the action as reasonable.
In Part III, I develop the details of the view that we can act in light of a reason
when acting on the basis of an emotional experience. In Chapter 6, I return to
emotion’s intentional nature in order to establish what, exactly, the agent’s reason
could be by examining the concept of the formal object, which I first introduced
in Chapter 1. I argue that our concept of the formal object is a response-dependent
concept where one of the elements is a relational property and another element is the
subject as actively caring. For example, the formal object of fear is the property of
being frightening and being frightening is to merit fear. Part of being frightening is
being dangerous and it is in virtue of the subject having the active cares that she does
that the property of being dangerous elicits fear. While an emotional experience as
a whole will represent the formal object, I argue, an emotion itself need not be
explicitly about the formal object. So, my fear of the dog represents the formal
object of the dog’s being frightening, but my fear may only be about the dog as
dangerous. From this, I propose that there are three options for the agent’s reason:
the fact of how things seem to the agent, e.g. the frightening dog (to me); the fact
of how things are, as in what response is merited, e.g. the frightening dog; and the
fact of how things are, as in what relation holds, e.g. the dangerous dog.
In Chapter 7, I expand on my positive view by responding to two brands of
objection. The first brand is that we cannot act in light of a reason when acting
solely on the basis of an emotion because we need to act on the basis of a belief or
judgement. By drawing on the concept of the formal object as response-dependent,
I argue that, through being emotionally committed to how things appear, we are
in the right kind of state to act in light of the reasons which emotions provide.
The second brand is that we cannot act reasonably when acting solely on the basis
of an emotional experience. By referring to the three options for reasons that I
identified in Chapter 6, I argue that we can act reasonably because emotions do
provide evidence of how things are, albeit of different strength depending on the
reason for which it is evidence, and that we have a prima facie entitlement to act on
the basis of an emotional experience. I therefore conclude that we can act in light
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of a reason when acting on the basis of an emotional experience and that we can
explain an action as reasonable by citing an emotion.
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS
The significance of this thesis can be seen in three of the important contributions it
makes which arise from my specific focus on explanations of action.
The first important contribution is that I provide a comprehensive analysis of a
range of roles that emotions can play in an explanation, from being independent of
explaining the action qua rational through to being fundamental to the explanation
of the action qua rational. The role of emotions in explanations in the existing liter-
ature has been addressed piecemeal, by looking at particular kinds of explanations
such as explanations of expressive action, or proposals that argue that emotions
play only one or perhaps two roles. In contrast, my argument turns on identifying a
range of roles and comparing them to each other in order to draw out both what our
concept of emotion and what our concept of rational action require. This contribu-
tion is important because it creates order amongst different ways in which emotion
can be involved with rational action, but also because it can potentially be drawn
on to resolve debates about the epistemic status of reasons for belief, a contentious
topic in the philosophy of emotion. This is because one lesson from my thesis is
that emotions can be involved with reasons for action in a number of ways, and the
same may be true for reasons for belief.
The second important contribution is that I examine emotions and action using
the framework of reasons as facts, where acting in light of a reason is acting in light
of a fact. Examinations of emotions and action have tended to use the framework
of reasons as mental states. Using an alternative framework not only fills a lacuna
in the topics surrounding emotions and action, it also brings out distinctions which
might otherwise be overlooked, such as a distinction between acting on the basis of
an emotional experience where the emotion, as an experience, is the reason in light
of which the agent acts, and acting in light of the reason an emotion provides access
to. This enriches our understanding of the emotional landscape.
The third important contribution is that I argue that we can act in light of a
reason when acting on the basis of an emotion without requiring a mediating belief
or judgement. Much work has been done on the epistemic status of emotions as
being or providing reasons for belief or knowledge. Rather than basing the reason-
providing potential of emotions on their epistemic role pertaining to beliefs, I ad-
dress straight-on emotion’s role in action. This is an important contribution because
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it addresses action directly and, while arguments against the reason-providing role
of emotions for belief may also count against my view, they do not do so automat-
ically. Examining how the arguments apply could potentially feed into other areas
of inquiry, such as the relation of reasons for belief to reasons for action.
There are other contributions which my thesis makes, but they are related to
specific arguments or claims I develop, and how I see further research in light of
these arguments and claims. I shall therefore rather say something about these
contributions in my conclusion once those arguments and claims are familiar.
So, I now turn to the first part of my thesis and argue that there is conceptual




THE RICHNESS OF THE EMOTION CONCEPT
Our concept of ‘emotion’ is rich: we use emotion words to refer to a diversity of
things. We might think an occurrent instance of fear is an emotion, but also a long-
term attitude of love, or even a sad mood. We might think of an occurrent state
as fear, but we also sometimes think that someone can be fearful or act out of fear
even when she is not in a state of fear at the time. In terms of this diversity, the
concept of ‘emotion’ is perhaps similar to our concept of ‘object’, which we also
use to refer to a diversity of things, including physical items as well as abstract
‘objects’ of thoughts. But then, just like we might argue over whether something
really is an object and worry about the concept of ‘object’, we might argue over
whether something really is an emotion and worry about the concept of ‘emotion’.
We might worry, that is, that our concept is confused rather than rich.
My aim in this chapter is to show that the concept is rich. In section 1.1, I be-
gin by introducing examples of emotions, illustrating ways in which they vary and
pointing out how there is a lack of consistency even in what theorists use the very
word ‘emotion’ to refer to. I therefore need to show that the concept of emotion
is not confused as well as define how I shall be using terminology. This is what I
do in section 1.2. I distinguish between agitations, occurrent emotion states, emo-
tional attitudes and moods. Despite their differences, I show that they are relevantly
similar because they share two main features to greater and lesser degrees. These
features are: (i) that emotions have an intentional nature that is evaluative; and (ii)
that emotions have an affective nature including an intentional quality, a distinctive
phenomenology based on their evaluative intentional nature. These two features are
what the diversity of things we refer to as emotions have in common and they are
what make the concept rich rather than confused.
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1.1 ‘EMOTION’: RICH OR CONFUSED?
What are emotions? Despite our personal familiarity with emotions, defining what
emotions are is a difficult and controversial task. Indeed, even amongst the special-
ists investigating emotions in a field like psychology, there is a notorious lack of
consensus.1 It might be best to start with some examples.
Love, happiness, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, guilt, jealousy, joy, sur-
prise. These are just some of the things we think of as emotions. Even within this
list, there is variety. The kind of object of the emotion varies, for example. You may
love your partner or you may love an ideal; you may fear the intruder or you may
fear the uncertainty of the future. In these cases, the first of the pair is love or fear
of a concrete object while the latter is love or fear of something abstract.
Emotions also vary in complexity, in what they require in terms of human devel-
opment or in terms of their internal structure. For instance, fear, anger, sadness and
disgust are examples of the so-called ‘basic emotions’. These are emotions which
are claimed to characteristically occur universally across human cultures, appear
early on in human development, and result from an innate capacity. They are also
often claimed to be modular, processing information regarding a single domain.2
Other emotions, like jealousy and pride, appear later on in human development be-
cause, in order to be jealous of another or proud of oneself, the person needs to have
developed a sense of self as well as a ‘theory of mind’, which is required in order
to attribute mental states to oneself and to others.3 Some theorists even propose
that non-basic emotions arise out of or are blends of basic emotions with additional
1In Emotion Review’s (2010) special section on ‘Defining Emotion’, the psychologist Carroll
Izard presents a survey he did of 35 emotion scientists asking them questions about definitions. His
conclusion: ‘there is still no consensus on a definition of “emotion”, and theorists and researchers
use “emotion” in ways that reflect different meanings and functions’ (Izard 2010, 363).
2The psychologist Paul Ekman’s original list of basic emotions, devised on supposedly universal
facial expressions and used extensively in psychological research on the expression of emotions, in-
cludes fear, anger, sadness and disgust as well as happiness and surprise. He later considers adding
contempt, shame, guilt, embarrassment and awe to the list (Ekman 1992). For a useful table sum-
marising a sample of theorists defending basic emotions, what emotions they include and on what
basis, see Andrew Ortony and Terence Turner’s ‘What’s Basic About Basic Emotions?’ (1990, 316).
Ortony and Turner take the lack of agreement as a starting point to argue that there is no coherent
and non-trivial notion of a basic emotion.
3Michael Lewis, for example, has worked on the emergence of a sense of self in infants and
shown that, before children have a sense of self against which they can evaluate how they meet some
standard, they feel happiness in response to successfully achieving a goal. Once they develop a sense
of self, they are more likely to feel pride (Lewis 2010, 307).
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beliefs or evaluations.4
What we refer to when we speak about individual emotions also varies. For
example, walking happily down a dark and empty street, I round a corner and come
face-to-face with a figure holding a knife. My fear is immediate, occurrent and
embodied. In contrast, my fear may be more mood-like as when, after watching
a zombie film and walking down the same dark street, I am jittery and see every
shadow as a potential threat, my heart racing in fearful anticipation.5 My fear could
even be a standing attitude. Someone with a fear of flying, for instance, is afraid
of flying even if she does not feel the occurrent fear which I feel as I walk down
the street. Her fear may become apparent in the kinds of things she says and does,
such as expressing dismay at the prospect of flying and choosing alternative means
of travel. Despite these differences, we do describe the occurrent state, the mood
and the standing attitude with reference to the same emotion, fear.
In all of these cases, the emotion is conscious, but we can also make sense of
unconscious emotions. You may consciously feel anger on being cut-off in traffic
but you may ignore it, bottling it up. Someone undergoing psychotherapy may
discover that she has a deep-seated fear generated from an unpleasant and forgotten
event in her childhood which influences her actions and attitudes.
These variations in complexity and variations in individual cases of emotion
might influence what we call an emotion. For example, the psychologist Paul Ek-
man defines emotions as the basic emotions, mentioned above, and argues that emo-
tions only last a couple of seconds. He distinguishes emotions from emotional atti-
tudes and emotional plots. An attitude, he writes, is ‘more sustained, and typically
involves more than one emotion’ (Ekman 1992, 194). If you have an attitude of
love, say, you may experience the basic emotions of happiness and fear. Emotional
plots are even more complex and ‘involve settings and stories in which emotions oc-
cur’ (194). Things like grief or jealousy are examples of plots. Grief, for instance,
describes the context in which one feels the emotion of sadness, namely a context
in which someone has died and not merely one where there has been a loss. Ekman
also distinguishes attitudes and plots from emotional traits, such as being hostile or
melancholic, and from emotional disorders, like depression or mania. Emotional
traits and disorders resemble the kinds of things we often refer to as moods.
4Robert Plutchik (2001) proposes the hypothesis of non-basic emotions as blends of basic emo-
tions, and Keith Oatley and Philip Johnson-Laird (1987, 44-47) discuss remorse as arising out of
sadness, together with an evaluation of having lost some sense of self.
5We also refer to character traits with emotion words. If I am always taking fright, for example,
we may refer to my character as being a fearful (or cowardly) one. I shall not be concerned with
character traits in this thesis.
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The philosopher Peter Goldie has a completely different set of distinctions and
labelling. In The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (2000), he distinguishes
between an emotion and an emotional episode. An emotional episode involves dif-
ferent elements, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings and bodily changes. For
Goldie, an emotional episode is a particular experience of an emotion, and an emo-
tion is something that is more enduring than a particular episode. It is typically
complex, episodic, dynamic and structured. It is complex because it involves many
things, such as the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and bodily changes that make up
a particular episode. It is complex because it also includes past experiences and
dispositions to have emotional experiences, or to have other thoughts and feelings,
or to behave in certain ways. An emotion is episodic and dynamic because the dif-
ferent elements come and go over time. It is structured because what holds all of
these elements together as one emotion is that they are embedded within a narrative
which provides structure to the experiences.
There is therefore a great diversity amongst what we label as emotions. Just
comparing Ekman and Goldie, we also see a lack of consistency in how even the
word ‘emotion’ is used. For Ekman, ‘emotion’ refers to a short episode while for
Goldie it refers to an enduring collection of episodes, more like Ekman’s attitudes
and plots. This diversity and lack of consensus could lead us to reject the idea of
emotion as a natural kind (Griffiths 1997) or the concept of ‘emotion’ as a unit-
ary concept (Izard 2010). For the purposes of scientific study, these differences
can relevantly change the target of research. However, I am not investigating what
emotions ‘really’ are but what role they play in action and explanations of action.
Even accepting that there are fundamental differences amongst the things we class
as emotions, my interest is in why we still refer to them as emotions at all, and
whether these different things we think of as emotions play similar or different roles
in action and action explanation.6 My task in this chapter, then, is to identify why
we do refer to them as emotions of one kind or another and to bring some clarity to
what the concept of an emotion involves.
1.2 WHAT MAKES AN EMOTION
In the rest of this chapter, I examine what is shared by the diversity of things which
we refer to as emotions, as well as define how I shall be using terminology. I begin
6Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni also explore the diversity and unity of emotions and, as they
suggest, ‘understanding the thoughts, actions and feelings of others’ may even ‘require . . . the intro-
duction of categories that do not correspond to natural kinds’ (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 23).
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by looking at some examples which compare emotions with non-emotions, and
identify what makes the emotion different from the non-emotion. I shall conclude
that the key differences are the kinds of feeling involved in an emotion and the way
an emotion is about something. I then elaborate on these identifying features by
examining variations within emotions and variations across emotions, as well as
using the features to identify differences between emotions and moods.
To start, take three sets of examples comparing emotions with non-emotions:
EMOTION VS. NON-EMOTION:
1. A. Jesse apologises because he feels guilty.
B. Jesse apologises because his mother told him he must.
2. A. Jo has a flushed burning face and feels angry.
B. Jo has a flushed burning face and feels sunburnt.
3. A. Nat is compulsively tapping her fingers because she is excited.
B. Nat is compulsively tapping her fingers because the scientist is inducing a
reaction in her brain.
Probably the most common understanding of emotions is as feelings. You feel
angry, afraid, happy, sad, affectionate. Without saying anything further about what
these feelings are, we can already see that the difference between 1A and 1B is that
Jesse apologises because he feels a certain way in 1A but we have no idea whether
he feels anything at all in 1B.
But we do need to say more about what the relevant feelings are. Some emo-
tions involve strong bodily sensations, like feeling your heart race out of love or
your palms sweat out of fear. Others do not, like having a long-term fear of flying.
Even for those emotions which do have strong bodily sensations, the bodily sen-
sation does not exhaust the way the emotion feels. Jo, for example, has the same
bodily sensation of a flushed burning face in both 2A and 2B, but in 2A that bodily
sensation does not exhaust her feeling of anger.7 Emotions have a phenomenology
that goes beyond bodily sensations.
One of the particular features of the way emotions feel is that they character-
istically have a distinct valence to the way they feel and we often divide emotions
7I shall provide support for this claim in Chapter 4 when I critically examine accounts of emotion
which hold that emotions are just feelings of bodily changes.
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according to whether they are ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. Examples of positive emo-
tions would be love, pride, admiration. Examples of negative emotions would be
fear, anger, regret. As Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni describe, talk of valence
tends to be cashed out in one of two main ways (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 12-14).
The first is in terms of ‘hedonic’ quality and what the emotional experience is like.
The second is in terms of conative states, like motivational tendencies or desires.
They conclude later in their book that there is a variety of ways in which an attitude
or state could be classed as positive or negative, something which Robert Solomon
(2003) also argues, and we need to beware of forcing emotion-types and emotion-
tokens into one valence and one valence only. Self-righteous anger, for example,
can be hedonically pleasant and positive, but can also be unpleasant and negat-
ive. Nevertheless, emotional experiences tend to have certain positive and negative
feelings to them, regardless of how those feelings arise or whether we can classify
emotions on the basis of distinct valences.
What does seem to be the case, however, is that whether something is pleasant
or not, or what desires and motivations one has, will be related to what an emotion is
about. When we say that Jo feels angry, we are alluding to the way that her feeling
is about something beyond the way her body has changed. Anger is not simply a
burning face and the feeling of anger is not just of the bodily sensation. Returning
to the valence, we see that her anger is negative partly because it is about something
that has caused her anger, something that has caused her offence in some way. In the
case of self-righteous anger, in contrast, what seems pleasant, enjoyable or positive
about being in such a state is that one sees oneself as superior. What is unpleasant,
not enjoyable or negative is that something is nevertheless offensive.
The idea that emotions feel a certain way and are about something also helps us
to identify a difference between 3A and 3B. We do not understand that Nat taps her
fingers in 3A simply as the result of some neurochemical change, although it may
very well be the case as well. What we understand is that she is tapping her fingers
out of excitement, that she feels excited and that there is something she is excited
about. In 3B, there is no such implicit reference.
Much more needs to be said about what emotions are about and how this relates
to their phenomenology, which I shall do by introducing four more sets of examples




4. A. Alex ruffles his daughter’s hair because he feels a surge of love.
B. Alex always makes sure he is home early from work in order to spend
time with his daughter because he loves her.
5. A. Kim fears the figure with a knife.
B. Kim fears his next Actuary exam.
VARIATION ACROSS EMOTIONS:
6. A. Sasha hurried home because she feared the rottweiler.
B. Sasha hurried home because she loved the rottweiler.
EMOTION AND MOOD:
7. A. Sam was sad about the death of her cat.
B. Sam was generally feeling sad and low.
Peter Hacker’s framework in ‘The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation
of Emotions’ (2004) is useful here for fleshing out the differences illustrated by
these examples.8 Hacker distinguishes between agitations, emotions and moods
and argues that they lie along a continuum. I shall adopt his framework and, by
discussing how these differ from each other, also expand on what emotions are
about and the kind of feelings that they have.
Agitations, for Hacker, are ‘short term affective disturbances, typically caused
by something unexpected’ that we perceive, learn or realise (Hacker 2004, 201).9
Agitations are fundamentally reactive and are things like feeling excited, thrilled,
shocked, revolted, disgusted. They have bodily manifestations and, in this sense,
are bodily events with associated sensations. Agitations lie on one extreme of the
continuum. Next are emotions.
Within emotions, Hacker distinguishes between occurrent emotion states, what
he calls ‘perturbations’, and emotional attitudes. Occurrent emotions are closer to
agitations than are attitudes but, because they fall along a continuum, there is not
8Hacker does not aim to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what an emotion is;
rather, he aims to tidy up our concept and provide a framework that picks out some of the important
conceptual similarities and differences. This is exactly what I aim to do in this chapter and so it is a
useful framework to draw on.
9In terms of their length, Hacker’s ‘agitations’ correspond roughly to Ekman’s ‘emotions’.
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a clear distinction between occurrent emotions and agitations. Like agitations, oc-
current emotions have a strong affective element often made up of the sensation of
some bodily manifestation. Like agitations, occurrent emotions can result in ex-
pressive behaviour, such as blushing. They can also affect the manner in which we
act, such as a tone of voice. Unlike agitations, however, they can result in motivated
action such as retreating out of fear rather than reactively jumping backwards.
To illustrate the difference between agitations and occurrent emotions, let us ex-
pand on example 5A where Kim feels fear when coming face-to-face with a figure
brandishing a knife. Suppose he reacts in fear and jumps, but very quickly real-
ises that the figure is actually his friend with an umbrella. His agitation dissipates
and has no lasting effect on his action choices. If he reacts in fear and jumps, but
continues to feel perturbations and is afraid, then he is in an occurrent state of fear
which could affect the kinds of things he chooses to do, such as to continue retreat-
ing backwards. We could also see Jo’s flushed burning face in 2A as an example of
an agitation, but 3A, 4A, 6A and 6B as examples of occurrent emotions.
Next along the continuum are emotional attitudes. Examples of attitudes would
be feeling long-term love for a person, ideological hatred for the political opposi-
tion, or fear of flying. Agitations and occurrent states are similar in terms of being
reactions and involving bodily changes; they both characteristically involve bodily
sensations. Attitudes, in contrast, do not necessarily have bodily manifestations and
associated sensations; neither are they necessarily dispositions to have such mani-
festations or to experience the corresponding occurrent emotion state.
To see this, consider love for one’s parents. I love my parents right now as I
write and have done so my whole life. However, I am not in a permanent phys-
ical state that corresponds to the occurrent state of love or affection. Neither am I
disposed to experience the occurrent emotion of love with its accompanying bodily
manifestations in response to them. When I am with them, I do not feel my heart ra-
cing or feel agitated exuberance, feelings of the occurrent state of love. If anything,
I am disposed to feel a range of other emotions: pride when they do something
admirable, anger when they do something silly, distress when they are in danger.
Being disposed to feel occurrent states of love does not exhaust why I can truthfully
say that I love my parents, or why I love them even when I am angry, or even why
my love disposes me to anger.
Instead of being dispositions to have occurrent emotions of love, the attitude
of love is, as Hacker insightfully writes, ‘a lasting concern for the object of love, a
standing motive for action beneficial to the beloved, a desire for shared experiences,
and a persistent colouring of thought, imagination and fantasy’ (Hacker 2004, 203,
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my emphases). I have a lasting concern for my parents: amongst other things, I
worry about them when they are sick or when I have not heard from them; I get
angry when I think that they have been offended in some way. I have a standing
motive for action beneficial to them: I carefully pick out birthday presents and pick
up the groceries when I realise that they will not have a chance to do so themselves.
I desire to be with them: I miss them when I am away and try to go home to see
them as often as possible; I get upset when I feel that they are not doing the same for
me. My thoughts are persistently coloured with their value to me: even when angry,
I see them as worth being angry with, I make decisions about where to live with
them featuring as considerations to weigh up, and I get distressed if I imagine a life
without them. In this way, Hacker’s attitudes are like Ekman’s attitudes and plots,
and also like Goldie’s emotion. They should not be understood as a discrete attitude
so much as a collection of behavioural tendencies, attitudes, occurrent emotions,
etc., held together by an overarching theme of what would make it love or fear or
anger.
Many emotions are standing attitudes rather than occurrent states. The person
who is afraid of flying and avoids flying altogether, for example, may be disposed
to experience occurrent fear but, because she never flies, that fear is never made
manifest. She may even be disposed to feel excitement whenever her colleagues
organise alternative means of travel for business trips. Yet, she does genuinely fear
flying. Amongst other things, this is seen in her decision to give up flying: she
has a lasting negative and fearful attitude towards the prospect of flying, a standing
motivation to travel by any other means, and a persistent colouring of her thoughts
of flying. We can now distinguish between 4A and 4B. Example 4A is of Alex’s
occurrent state of love and 4B is of Alex’s long-term attitude of love. His love
affects his choices and he strives to spend time with the person he values.
If attitudes and occurrent emotion states are so different in terms of bodily mani-
festations, what makes them both emotions? There is a point of similarity which is
that both occurrent states and attitudes are about something. They are intentional.
‘Intentional’ is a term of art in philosophy. I take ‘intentionality’ to relate to how
a mental state is about, directed or targeted at objects, and how it represents those
objects as being certain ways. Intentional states or attitudes have an intentional
object, which is what it is about or targeted or directed at, and an intentional content,
which is how the object is represented as being. A typical intentional state is a
belief. If I believe that my notebook is green, I have a belief about my notebook: that
it is green. The intentional object of my belief is the notebook and the intentional
content is the proposition that my notebook is green. I accept, however, that a
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mental state can be intentional without representing its object propositionally.10 So,
when I look at the notebook, my perceptual state is also intentional even if it does
not represent the object propositionally like with belief. My perception is of the
notebook, representing it as green, and we could say that the intentional content is
a green notebook. To say that both occurrent emotions and attitudes are intentional,
then, is to say that they are about or directed or targeted at something and represent
that thing in some way. They have an intentional object and content.
Following convention, let us call what an emotion is about or directed or targeted
at, the particular object of an emotion. As we saw in the examples in section 1.1,
the particular object varies quite substantially. Love, for instance, can be about a
concrete object or an abstract ideal: I love my parents but I also love Justice. Fear,
too, can be about a concrete object or something more abstract such as an imagined
but unlikely state of affairs. I fear the figure on the street but I also fear the prospect
of ending up in a small backwards Karoo town raising sheep for the rest of my life.
Kim in 5A fears an actual figure with a knife, a present concrete object, but he also
fears something in the future, his Actuary exam in 5B. We see, then, that 5A and
5B illustrate the variety of particular objects that emotions can take.
While emotions have particular objects, we have not yet picked out their full
intentional nature. In examples 6A and 6B, the particular object of Sasha’s fear and
the particular object of her love are both the rottweiler. What is it that makes an
emotion one of love rather than one of fear? Why is my love for my parents the
same kind of thing as my love for Justice?
In the emotion literature, emotions are said to have formal objects which emo-
tions of the same type share and which differ across emotion types (Deonna and
Teroni 2012, 41). A formal object of a mental state is a medieval notion that was re-
vived by Anthony Kenny in Action, Emotion and the Will, first published in 1963.11
The formal object of an intentional state, as Kenny reintroduced it, is the descrip-
tion which must apply to the material object if it is to be the object of the state it is
(Kenny 1976, 189). The material object is what is feared, loved, found offensive or
10There is debate in the philosophy of mind about what intentionality is, whether all mental states
are intentional, and what intentional content is. I cannot do more here than stipulate what I take
intentionality to be. My reading is influenced by Tim Crane, who provides a useful discussion of how
intentional representational content need not be propositional. See Crane (1998), but also the section
of essays about intentionality in Crane (2014). Crane distinguishes between the intentional object
and the intentional content (and also the intentional mode, which I do not discuss here but which
undoubtedly influences my view of emotions). He argues that the defining feature of psychological
states is that they have intentional objects at which they are directed. Whether or not he is correct in
this further claim, it is useful to distinguish between the object and content.
11From here on, I refer to the 1976 edition.
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surprising, etc., and is what is seen to have the formal object. Nowadays, people talk
about the formal object as a property rather than as a description (Tappolet 2005,
229, fn 1). So, the formal object is some property which must apply to the material
object in order for the material object to be the particular object of an emotion.12
This is usually interpreted as the idea that an emotion is about the formal object;
that is, the particular object is represented in a way as being [the formal object]. In
this way, the formal object features in the intentional content.
One way of thinking about the formal object of an emotion is as an evaluative
property (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 41; Teroni 2007, 396). Fear, for instance, is
about something as (having the property of being) dangerous, love is about some-
thing as (having the property of being) affection-inspiring, anger is about something
as (having the property of being) offensive, sadness about something as (having the
property of being) a loss, etc.13 But in order to be dangerous, affection-inspiring,
offensive, a loss, etc., that thing must stand in relation to someone or something. A
cliff-face is not dangerous to an eagle which can fly, for example, but it is dangerous
to a ground-bound human. Similarly, something which is offensive for me may not
be offensive for you. And Kim may fear his Actuary exam but not his Dutch exam,
because the Actuary exam poses a danger to his Actuary career but his Dutch exam
is no real threat to the success of his hobby of learning Dutch. The formal object is
thus also relational.
We can identify five important roles which the concept of the formal object plays
in our understanding of emotions. I shall discuss these five roles in more detail in
Chapter 6.
First, the formal object is what all instances of an emotion type share. Sasha’s
fear is elicted by the rottweiler as dangerous and Kim’s fear is elicited by the Actu-
12The particular object of an emotion need not be the material object. For instance, I may be
wrong about the source of my anger but there is still nevertheless something offensive which elicits
my anger. That is, the particular object of my anger, what my anger is about or directed at, is not the
material object which has the formal object and in fact elicits my emotion.
13Amongst ‘first flavour’ appraisal theories in psychology, a similar notion to the formal object is
discussed as the ‘core relational theme’ (see Moors 2014 for the two ‘flavours’). Richard Lazarus is
one of the pioneers. See Lazarus (1991), but also Lazarus (2001, 64) for a useful summary and table
of core relational themes, including:
Anger A demeaning offence against me and mine.
Fright An immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger.
Guilt Having transgressed a moral imperative.
Sadness Having experienced an irrevocable loss.
Jealousy Resenting a third party for loss / threat to another’s affection / favour.
Love Desiring / participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated.
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ary exam as dangerous. Both Kim’s fear and Sasha’s fear are elicited by and about
something as dangerous.
Second, an extension of the first role, the formal object is what individuates
emotions (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 41)14 or defines an emotion type (de Sousa
1987, 126). It is because Kim’s and Sasha’s emotions are elicited by something as
dangerous that they are fear and not love or sadness.
Third, because the formal object is what all instances of an emotion type share,
it is a property that a particular object must be seen to have in order for the emotion
to be intelligible.15 If a rottweiler is feared, for example, it must be elicited by
something experienced as dangerous. If it is not elicited by something experienced
as dangerous, then the fear is not intelligible.
Fourth, the formal object determines whether an emotion is correct or incorrect
in the way it represents things as being. Only if there is something dangerous, is
fear correct.
Fifth, the formal object determines whether an emotion is appropriate. An emo-
tion can be inappropriate even if it is correct, perhaps for moral or prudential reas-
ons. For example, it may be representationally correct to fear a member of an ethnic
group because that person really is dangerous, but inappropriate to fear her because
of a moral commitment not to be susceptible to stereotypes.
We can now see what the difference between cases 6A and 6B is. While Sasha’s
emotions have the same particular object, the rottweiler, in each example her emo-
tion is elicited by the dog as having a different formal object. In 6A where Sasha
fears the rottweiler, she experiences it as dangerous or frightening. In 6B where
Sasha loves the rottweiler, she experiences it as valuable and affection-inspiring.
Perhaps in the former, it is the dog’s sharp teeth and gruff bark which ground why
she experiences it as dangerous; in the latter, it is perhaps the dog’s gentle nature
and a shared childhood which make her experience it as valuable and affection-
inspiring.
We can also now answer the question of why occurrent emotions and emotional
attitudes are both emotions. Alex’s love for his daughter, whether a state like in
4A or an attitude in 4B, involves regarding her as valuable and affection-inspiring.
I love my parents even when I am angry with them because I still regard them as
14Teroni (2007) argues that formal objects do not individuate between emotions. Even if the
formal object does not individuate, the kind of evaluative nature of emotion that the notion captures
is still fundamental to our concept of emotion. I shall discuss Teroni’s argument in Chapter 6.
15As Ronald de Sousa writes, it ‘is a property implicitly ascribed by the emotion to its target,
focus or propositional object, in virtue of which the emotion can be seen as intelligible’ (de Sousa
2014).
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valuable in my life, and the person who fears flying regards flying as dangerous,
whether or not she is actually in an occurrent state or not.
Because of the involvement of the formal object, emotions, both states and atti-
tudes, are evaluative and Hacker’s evocative phrase that attitudes involve a ‘persist-
ent colouring of thought, imagination and fantasy’ captures how emotions involve
seeing things in evaluatively loaded ways. While it is by no means clear to me that
agitations are richly intentional rather than simply reactions, they are at the least eli-
cited by states of affairs which potentially instantiate certain evaluative properties,
like getting a fright from something dangerous or feeling disgust on sniffing rotting
food waste, and are plausibly about these evaluative properties as well.
This finally puts us in a position to be more precise about the affective nature of
emotion. I proposed that their valence is linked to what an emotion is about, and we
now see that emotions have an intentional nature that is evaluative.16 So, while an
emotion may involve certain bodily manifestations and sensations, the emotional
feeling also has a distinct quality directly related to the evaluative nature of the
emotion. I shall talk of this aspect of an emotion’s phenomenology as the ‘inten-
tional quality’ of an emotion.17 While occurrent emotions tend also to have a bodily
manifestation, both occurrent emotions and attitudes have this intentional quality.
If I love my parents, then I do think of them with a positive feeling of warmth and
comfort and the person who is afraid of flying does have negative feelings when
thinking about the prospect of flying, even if they are not strictly sensations.
This leaves the final set of examples to examine, examples comparing emotion
and mood. Being in a mood is not like being in a persistent emotional state, either a
persistent occurrent state like growing nervousness for an upcoming interview, or an
emotional attitude, such as love for one’s parents. Unlike an emotion, a mood is not
tied to a specific particular object. For example, one may be in a fretful mood which
has no immediate object but which involves a general sense of worry and worrying.
In such a mood, I worry about the threat of ISIS in the Middle East; I worry about
forgetting to turn off the water before I go away on holiday; I worry about the
email I sent a friend, in good faith, but which now seems in poor taste; I worry
about eating the parsnips at the bottom of my fridge before they go off; I worry
16While it is widely accepted that emotions have an evaluative content, some argue that the content
is not evaluative; rather, it is the attitude. See, for example, Deonna and Teroni (2012) developing
ideas found in Goldie (2000). I choose to talk about the ‘intentional nature’ in order to remain neutral
on the disagreements, at this stage at least.
17I am only focusing on the feeling as it relates to the content because this is pertinent to my
interests. However, as we saw with the brief introduction of valence, emotions are also taken to
involve desires and motivational tendencies and elements to the way an emotion feels could also be
cashed out in those terms.
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about the glancing look someone just gave me at the coffee shop. In such a mood,
everything is potentially troublesome and the particular object of my worry swaps
and changes. Sam in 7A has a particular object to her sadness, the loss of her cat,
but in 7B where she is in a gloomy mood, she does not. This distinction between
emotions and moods might lead us to say that moods are not emotions (Hacker
2004) or to say that moods are a variation of emotion (Prinz 2004). Nevertheless,
both emotions and moods can be agreed to have a formal object but moods lack a
consistent particular object.
We therefore see that we can create some order to the things which we refer
to with ‘emotion’ and the individual emotion words. Emotions are intentional and
have both a particular and a formal object. The formal object is evaluative and emo-
tions thus have an evaluative intentional nature. In light of this, emotions are not
simply bodily sensations but have an affective nature with a particular phenomeno-
logy related to being evaluative, what I have called their intentional quality. Finally,
the idea of a continuum with agitations on one end and moods on the other allows
us to pinpoint similarities the two extremes share with the more typical emotions,
even while having substantial differences.18 Occurrent emotion states, lying in the
middle, are the paradigm emotions.
1.3 CONCLUSION
Our concept of emotion picks out a range of different things: agitated reactions,
occurrent emotion states, emotional attitudes, moods. Nevertheless, by examining
sets of examples contrasting emotions with non-emotions and variations within and
across emotions, I have shown that this range still shares two important features.
They have an intentional nature that is evaluative, and they have an affective nature
with an intentional quality.
In terms of their intentional nature, emotions have a particular object and a
formal object. The particular object is what an individual emotion is about and
that at which the emotion is targeted; it varies across individual instances of emo-
tion. The formal object is the property in virtue of which a particular object is the
object of a specific type of emotion; it is what individuates between emotion types,
whether an occurrent state or attitude. The formal object is evaluative in nature.
18My focus has necessarily been limited on two features that are shared across attitudes and oc-
current states. I do not mean to say that these are the only key features to emotions. Paradigmatic
emotions might include other important features such as: action tendencies, bodily change, valence
cashed out in different terms.
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Moods, like emotions, share an evaluative nature with a formal object but are unlike
emotions in not having particular objects at which they are targeted.
In terms of their affective nature, while the paradigmatic occurrent emotions
involve bodily changes, the way an emotion feels is more general than the feelings
of those bodily changes. It includes the phenomenology of being in a particular
evaluative state or of having a certain attitude which is evaluative, what may be
called its ‘intentional quality’. The affective nature is thus closely linked to the
intentional nature.
In spite of these common features, it may still be the case that ‘emotion’ is not a
natural kind or even a unitary concept. However, it does not follow that the concept
of emotion is confused or incoherent. In fact, it is a concept of a diverse range of
things which share important features. It is a rich concept.
But just like an abstract object will have different roles from those of a physical
object, despite both being ‘objects’, the different forms of emotions could have quite
different roles in action and explanations of action. Given that we refer to such a
range of things as emotions, explaining an action in terms of an emotion could be
explaining it in terms of an agitation, an occurrent state, an attitude, a mood, or
in terms of how the emotion manifests bodily, what it is about, or in terms of its
intentional quality. Perhaps some of these explanations will not be rationalising
explanations. But perhaps others of them will. In the following chapter, I present
examples of different ways in which we explain action with reference to an emotion
and, in Chapter 3, I argue that there is conceptual room for an emotion to provide
the agent’s reason for acting, and for an explanation in terms of an emotion to be
one which explains the action as being done in light of a reason.
CHAPTER 2
EMOTIONS IN EXPLANATIONS OF ACTION
Emotion is often involved in action. Sometimes emotions are at odds with our
perception of ourselves as acting rationally: they can warp our judgement, not al-
ways respond to our considered judgements, even lead us to act against our better
judgements. But sometimes emotions are fully compatible with our perception of
ourselves as acting rationally: they can be aligned with or bolster our judgement,
motivate us to act timeously, and they can even give us insight into our real values
or information about how things are around us. An explanation of action in terms
of an emotion could pick up on any of these and we can refer to emotions to explain
action that the agent intentionally performs, as well as many instances of behaviour
where the subject is not acting in her capacity as an agent.
As we saw in the previous chapter, our concept of emotion is of something
rich and refers to a diversity of different things—from agitations, occurrent emotion
states and emotional attitudes through to moods, and from bodily sensations through
to intentional states. An emotion under different guises could be involved in the
different actions and action explanations.
In this chapter, I introduce a range of examples of emotions in explanations of
action. I have divided them into five categorises based on what kind of role the
emotion plays in the explanation, starting with those where the role of the emotion
is tangential to the action qua rational and increasing the emotion’s involvement
with the action qua rational, ending with examples where the emotion is crucial to
providing the agent’s reason—or so I shall ultimately argue. In Chapter 5, I say
more about what it means for the agent to have a reason and what rationalising an
action involves. For the purposes of this current chapter, it is enough to just point
out that paradigmatic rational action involves the agent acting for a reason and in
order to achieve something. A rationalising explanation is one which shows that the
agent acted or took herself to be acting in light of a reason.
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2.1 EXAMPLES OF EMOTIONS IN EXPLANATIONS OF ACTION
I have divided the examples into five categories, A through to E. The categories are
divided up in this way to illustrate the variety of actions which can be explained by
an emotion, to identify patterns that are recurring, and to have to hand distinctions
which can help us contrast and evaluate the explanatory potential of emotion. They
need not be mutually exclusive; an action could fall under one or many, or the
categories could even be reducible to only one. There may also be more categories.
Nevertheless, there is a prima facie variety of roles for emotion in an explanation.1
CATEGORY A. THE EMOTION AS A MANIFESTATION NOT LINKED TO ACTION
In this category, the emotion provides an explanation because of the way it is mani-
fested. The way it is manifested is independent of whether the agent is acting for a
reason, or acting at all, and the explanation is not a rationalising one.
Categories A0 and A1 involve emotion in the same way. Emotions manifest
themselves in different ways which can influence how we behave and act, where not
all behaviour is action. Even when there is action, some manifestations of emotion
do not contribute to an action as rational other than by affecting the way in which the
action is performed, or by making it easier or harder to perform the chosen action.
Agitations, as defined in Chapter 1, affect action in this way.
Category A0 is not a case of action or behaviour but it sets up a contrast with
A1. Both involve physical manifestations of fear but in A0 the manifestation does
not affect the agent’s chosen action and the action is not what is being explained
by the emotion. In A1, it does affect the chosen action. However, in the latter, the
manifestation is ultimately irrelevant for explaining the action as rational. Category
A2 illustrates how emotions can influence the manner of acting. Again, however,
the way the emotion manifests is tangential to understanding the action as rational.
1In the examples that follow, I draw loosely on characters from a range of sources. Hawkeye,
McIntyre and Frank are from M*A*S*H. Sissy Jupe is from Charles Dickens, Hard Times (first
published in 1854, using 1905 edition). Huck Finn and Jim are from Mark Twain, The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn (1885). Alice is from Patricia Greenspan, ‘Craving the Right: Emotions and
moral reasons’ (2011). Begbie is from Irvine Welsh, Trainspotting (1993). Natasha, Pierre, Rostov,
Dolokhov and Prince Andrey are from Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace (first published in English in
1886, using 2001 edition). Othello and Desdemona are from William Shakespeare, Othello (first
performed around 1604, using 1997 edition). Emily is from Nomi Arpaly, ‘On Acting Rationally
Against One’s Best Judgment’ (2000). Claire is discussed on the NHS website (NHS 2011). Where
I stick directly to the source and do not manipulate or interpret the characters, I give the direct
reference.
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A0. WHERE THE MANIFESTATION OF THE EMOTION IS ‘INERT’
• Hawkeye sweats because he is afraid. —While Hawkeye performs intricate
surgery on a wounded soldier, he sweats from fear. He is a professional and
competent surgeon, however, and, other than a damp brow, his fear is not
evident. It does not affect his carefully executed movements.
A1. WHERE THE MANIFESTATION AFFECTS THE EXECUTION OF AN ACTION
• Hawkeye drops the spanner because of his fear / out of fear. —While Hawkeye
defuses an unexploded bomb in the middle of the campsite, he sweats from
fear. Out of his comfort zone, his hands also start shaking.
A2. WHERE THE EMOTION IS MANIFESTED IN PARTICULAR MANNERS OF BEHAVIOUR
• Frank has a sharp manner because he is angry. —When Frank gets angry
with Hawkeye and McIntyre, he stamps his feet when he walks and slams his
food tray down on the table with more force than if he were not angry. He
speaks louder and snaps brief answers. While in surgery, his anger does not
affect his choices or his skill and the only way you would know he was angry
is from his sharply toned voice and snappy answers.
• Sissy Jupe cowers out of fear. —Picked on by Thomas Gradgrind to define a
horse, Sissy Jupe is overwhelmed by fear. She blushes, curtsies and cowers
out of fear.
• Kim jumps out of fright. —Rounding a corner late at night, Kim gets a fright
when he comes face-to-face with a figure holding a knife-shaped item.
CATEGORY B. THE EMOTION AS EXPLANATION OF, OR ALLUDING TO, OTHER
MENTAL STATES
In this category, the emotion provides a context where the agent has certain beliefs,
desires or attitudes. As I argue in Chapter 4, emotions are not constituted by beliefs
or judgements. Nevertheless, emotions can and do lead to associated beliefs and
desires, lead us to judge in certain ways, or influence the kinds of beliefs and desires
that we form. This is because of the way they have intentional content, as I argue in
Chapter 3. In the examples here, the emotion is an attitude or an occurrent emotion
state, but it is the subsequent mental states—or, strictly speaking, the contents of
those mental states—which would play a rationalising role in the explanation of the
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action. The emotion is informative in explaining why the agent has those mental
states in the first place, or in explaining why the agent has the attitude towards her
surroundings that she does.
B1. WHERE THE EMOTION IS CLOSELY LINKED TO OTHER BELIEFS AND DESIRES,
PERHAPS BY CAUSING THE BELIEFS AND DESIRES
• Huck Finn failed to turn Jim over to the authorities because of his compassion
for Jim. —Despite believing that he should turn the escaped slave Jim over to
the authorities, Huck Finn fails to do so because he feels compassion for Jim.
His compassion leads Huck to believe that Jim is a good and dear human
being and to desire to protect him. When we say that Huck acted out of
compassion, we are alluding to these further beliefs and desires to make sense
of why he did what he did.
• Alice challenged her boss out of moral indignation. —Alice challenges her
boss’ decision to block a deserved pay rise for a colleague because she feels
moral indignation. She finds herself feeling indignant and comes to believe
that she ought to challenge the injustice.
B2. WHERE THE EMOTION AFFECTS HOW WE SEE A SITUATION, IN TURN AFFECTING
WHAT ACTION THE AGENT PERFORMS OR HOW THE AGENT BEHAVES
• Begbie beats up the man because he is angry. —Begbie is losing at pool
and getting increasingly angry. After a particularly bad shot, he beats up a
young man at the bar because, he says, he was put off by the man’s looking
at him. We explain his action as being done because he is angry, where the
anger leads Begbie to see the man as offensive regardless of whether the man
is offensive or not.
• Frank kicks up a fuss because he is angry with Hawkeye and McIntyre. —
Frank finds everything that Hawkeye and McIntyre do offensive and believes
that they are out to get him. This makes him quite angry. It just so happens
that they are really out to get him most of the time; nevertheless, Frank cannot
tell between cases where the two are really doing something just to spite him
or where they have not done anything wrong at all. Regardless, his anger
makes him extra-sensitive to everything that Hawkeye and McIntyre do and
he sees all of their actions as offensive.
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• Pierre gives alms to the poor because of his overwhelming love. —Married
to Natasha, Pierre’s ‘heart was now overflowing with love, and by loving
people without cause he discovered indubitable causes for loving them’ (Tol-
stoy 2001, 971). Pierre does not need to look for good qualities in people; his
love makes him see good qualities everywhere. Because of this, he chooses
to do things that benefit others.
B3. WHERE THE EMOTION IS THE AGENT’S MOTIVE FOR ACTING
• Frank reports Hawkeye and McIntyre to the commander out of anger. —
Thoroughly fed up with being picked on, Frank reports the troublemakers to
the captain. A bit later when he has cooled down and is asked why he reported
Hawkeye and McIntyre, he responds that he did so out of anger and he would
do so again because they deserve to be punished. Frank acts out of the motive
of anger even if he need not be in an occurrent angry state at the time.
• Othello kills Desdemona out of jealousy. —Othello comes to believe that his
wife Desdemona has been unfaithful. He sees her guilt in her proclamations
of innocence and kills her out of the motive of jealousy. We could also say
that he killed her out of love, as Othello himself identifies. He loved her
‘not wisely but too well’ (Shakespeare Othello, Act V scene 2) and could not
handle losing her to another.
CATEGORY C. THE EMOTION AS THAT WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN PURELY EX-
PRESSIVE ACTION
Unlike the examples in Category B, the next three categories provide examples of
cases where the relevant state playing a role in the action is the emotion itself.
In this third category, the action is an expression of an occurrent emotion. The
examples are specifically of pure expressive action which Rosalind Hursthouse
characterises as action where ‘I φ-ed because I was so frightened (or happy, ex-
cited, ashamed . . . so overwhelmed by hatred or affection or . . . ) that I just wanted
to, or felt I had to’ (Hursthouse 1991, 58). Hursthouse identifies three conditions for
this kind of action to meet: the action must be intentional; the agent did not do it for
a reason ‘in the sense that there is a true description of action of the form “X did it
(in order to). . . ” or “X was trying to. . . ”’; and the agent would not have performed
the action if she were not in the grip of an emotion (59).
Sometimes, one might express an emotion in order to achieve some goal such as
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to communicate one’s frustration or release pent-up energy, examples which would
fall under the next category. But the case of interest here is where we are just
expressing the emotional state we are in for no purpose other than that we can and
we want to. It is controversial whether the agent is acting for a reason at all in these
cases. I will address expressive action in Chapter 5.
• In a wave of hatred, Jane tears at Joan’s eyes in a photograph (Hursthouse
1991, 59). —Jane is not trying to communicate her anger nor relieve her
pent-up energy. She acts purely because she is angry.
• Having lost his much-loved wife, the man rolls around and buries his face in
her clothes (Hursthouse 1991, 58). —Like Jane, he is not communicating his
grief or relieving his emotion; he is simply expressing it.
CATEGORY D. THE EMOTION PROVIDES THE AGENT’S REASON AS A STATE TO
BE ADDRESSED
The last two categories I shall introduce examples of different ways in which an
emotion could be or provide the agent’s reason and thus potentially play a ration-
alising role in an explanation. The examples I describe are primarily of occurrent
emotion states (except Dolokhov’s mood in example D1(a) and Natasha’s attitude
in E) and in discussing these categories in the following chapter, I will focus on
occurrent states. In this category, D, the emotional experience is the agent’s reason
for acting in order to avoid, alleviate or encourage the emotional experience in some
way.
D1(A). ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS OF THE FEELING OR MANIFESTATION OF THE
EMOTION
• The violinist took a sedative because she was nervous. —When I was playing
in an amateur orchestra, the conductor used to ask people who could not con-
trol their nerves during performances to take a light-weight sedative before-
hand. These people took the medication in order to alleviate the symptoms of
their nervous fear, such as shaking.
• Begbie picks fights because he enjoys being angry. —Begbie enjoys getting
angry and beating people up. One evening while sitting upstairs at the pub,
he throws a glass over the bannister which hits a woman on the head. He then
goes downstairs and picks a fight in order to get the person who harmed the
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woman to own up, knowing full-well that he is the culprit. Invigorated by his
anger, he seeks ways to encourage it.
D1(B). ADDRESSING THE WAY THE EMOTION IS MANIFESTED IN BEHAVIOUR
• Claire avoids open spaces out of fear. —Claire has been diagnosed with
agoraphobia. She is afraid of open spaces. After a panic attack in her local
high street, she believed that the location was behind her inexplicable exper-
ience and began shopping elsewhere. However, she had similar attacks in
other locations. In order to avoid the panic attacks, she chose to leave her job
and spend all her time indoors.
• Dolokhov challenges Rostov to gamble away money he does not have out of
cruelty. —‘Beneath his smile Rostov saw in him [Dolokhov] the mood he had
shown at the club dinner and at other times, when as tired of everyday life he
had felt a need to escape from it by some strange, and usually cruel, action’
(Tolstoy 2001, 287). Dolokhov suffers from apathetic and depressive moods.
These are objectless and he attempts to alleviate them by performing strange
and cruel actions.
There is nothing particularly special to emotion in these two cases. For instance,
in the first example in D1(a), what is being addressed is the shaking. Because it is
shaking brought on by fear and not, say, a nervous disorder, a light-weight sedative
is the right kind of thing to deal with it. The emotion causes the shaking, and the
kind of cause thus opens up what kind of things could allow the person to address
it, much like the cause of a sore throat will determine what treatment is best. In
the first example in D1(b), we can imagine an analogous scenario where Claire is
violently sick after eating mussels. She chooses to avoid the restaurant where she
had them, believing that the location was behind her sudden sickness. On eating
mussels elsewhere and becoming sick again, she now might choose to avoid mussels
altogether. In both the agoraphobia case and the mussel case, the emotion and the
sickness are unpleasant negative states which the agent acts to address. One just so
happens to be an emotion.
Category D2, in contrast, involves the emotion as more than a feeling or mani-
festation. The agent acts because of the emotional experience as a whole, including
the intentional element.
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D2. NOT JUST ADDRESSING THE FEELING OR MANIFESTATION
• Jackson throws out his ex-partner’s belongings out of grief. —Struggling
with a horrible break-up and feeling debilitating grief over his loss, Jackson
eventually goes to see a counsellor. The counsellor recommends that he col-
lect all of his former partner’s belongings and take them to the junk shop. At
first, Jackson is dubious and begins only because the counsellor told him to do
so. However, he finds the whole process incredibly cathartic. As he continues
to gather the items, he no longer does so only because the counsellor told him
what to do but also because he gets relief from his anguish. He only gets that
relief because they are his former partner’s belongings and he associates them
with his loss. He does not get the same relief from helping his parents with
their spring-cleaning.
• Alice challenges her boss because she is indignant. —Alice is indignant about
her boss’s treatment of her colleague. She is all a-flutter, which leads her to
act spontaneously and immediately in challenging her boss.
CATEGORY E. THE EMOTION PROVIDES THE AGENT’S REASON, BUT IS NOT
THAT REASON ITSELF BY BEING A STATE TO BE ADDRESSED
In this last category, E, the agent acts because of the emotion but not in order to
address a positive or negative state or to express it. Rather, she acts in light of a
reason provided by the intentional nature of an emotion.
• Richard bought flowers for Katherine because he loved her. —Buying flowers
for a loved one need not be an expression of caring for that person, nor a
means to encourage the love. Rather, buying flowers is part of actually caring
for and loving that person.
• Natasha pulls her life together out of love for her mother. —Natasha is dis-
traught over the death of Prince Andrey. She becomes ill and loses all purpose
to her life. However, her love for her mother ‘unexpectedly showed her that
the essence of life—love—was still active within her’ (Tolstoy 2001, 933).
Through her love for her mother, Natasha starts to pull her life together. She
is neither avoiding or encouraging the state, nor expressing it. Yet, it is true
to say that she acts as she does because she loves her mother, where the love
explains more than that she has a particular attitude, as Pierre’s love does in
example B2.
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• Huck Finn does not turn Jim over to the authorities because he feels compas-
sion for Jim. —Unlike in B1, Huck Finn does not form other beliefs about
Jim or what he ought to do, he simply acts out of his compassion.
• Coming across a rhinkals in the path, John backs away out of fear. —John
does not jump backwards out of fright like Kim in A2, but he also does not
deliberate about what to do. He backs away slowly.
• Alice challenges her boss because she is morally indignant at the injustice. —
Unlike in D2 where Alice challenges her boss because she is all a-flutter and
acts spontaneously, Alice challenges her boss because of what she is morally
indignant about.
• Emily quits the PhD programme because she is sad and ill-motivated. —
Emily, a PhD student in chemistry, finds herself feeling sad and ill-motivated
in her endeavours, despite having always believed that she should pursue a
PhD. She sees the feelings that make her want to leave the programme as
groundless even though, unknown to her, they are triggered by factors that
would be good reasons not to be doing the PhD. She eventually leaves the
programme on an emotional impulse and judges herself to be acting irration-
ally. When she looks back years later, however, she views her persistence as
irrational and takes as her reasons for acting the reasons behind her emotional
state (Arpaly 2000, 504).
The following table summarises the examples:
A Manifestation A1. Symptoms of manifestation
A2. Manifestation in behaviour
B Other intentional states B1. Beliefs and desires
B2. ‘Seeing’
B3. Motives
C Pure expression C. Expressing an emotion
D As a reason: D1. Avoiding, alleviating, encouraging:
addressing a state (a) Symptoms of manifestation
(b) Manifestation in behaviour
D2. Avoiding, alleviating, encouraging the
emotion, not just the manifestation




The examples in this chapter illustrate the ways in which we can give an explanation
with reference to an emotion. I shall refine the examples to illustrate what role, ex-
actly, the emotion plays in Chapter 3 (Categories A, B and D), Chapter 5 (Category
C), and Chapters 6 and 7 (Category E). For now, however, the examples are enough
to illustrate the variety of roles. Drawing this together with the first claim, that our
emotion concept is rich and diverse, we now see that, even if an emotion does not
play a rationalising role in one kind of explanation, it need not follow that it does
not play a rationalising role in another kind. This is because an emotion could play
a role in virtue of being an agitation, an occurrent state, an attitude or a mood, or in
virtue of how it feels, what it is about, or both together. And, moreover, if it plays
one kind of role in one kind of explanation, it need not play the same role in all
explanations.
Despite this, there has been a tendency in the history of philosophy to treat
emotions as having only one or at most two kinds of role in action, and a tendency to
think that their role in an explanation will not be a rationalising one. I shall examine
this tradition in the next chapter. I argue that developments in the twentieth century
which highlight the intentional nature of emotion as well as distinguish between the
agent’s reason for acting and the cause of the action are steps in the right direction,
but that our conception of the potential explanatory role of emotion can be enriched
further following increased understanding of what emotions are.
CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EMOTIONS AND ACTION
We have seen how rich and diverse our concept of ‘emotion’ is, and how differ-
ent the ways emotions can potentially explain action are. In this chapter, I give a
brief overview of various historical themes to the treatment of emotions and action,
and argue that historical treatments of emotion in action and explanations of action
involving emotion have been too heavy-handed.
I begin in section 3.1 by identifying three general trends that have dominated
pre-twentieth-century thought about emotions and action.1 These are: (i) the emo-
tions, as passions, were seen to be passive and opposed to activity, like perceptions;
(ii) the emotions were seen as states that straddle both the mind and body; and (iii)
the emotions were given a motivating role in action. While emotions have often
been opposed to reason or said to operate tangentially to reason, I shall suggest that
these themes taken abstractly from their historical contexts need not be at odds with
the pro-emotion consensus, the school of contemporary views endorsing the claim
that emotions are compatible with reason. In particular, if emotions are passive in a
way like perception, can emotions not play a role in action much like that of percep-
tion? If emotions are not just states of the body and involve some kind of thought
or perception which has content, can they play a role beyond simply motivating
action?
In section 3.2, I turn to some twentieth century developments and focus primar-
ily on the accounts of emotion and action put forward by Gilbert Ryle and An-
thony Kenny. Using the categories of examples introduced in Chapter 2, I argue
that Ryle’s account of emotion and action is unable to deal with examples like the
pure expressive action in Category C. The failure arises because of his inadequate
conception of emotion which does not treat emotions as intentional states. Kenny
1I am indebted to Susan James’ informative book about the emotions in seventeenth-century
philosophy and their historic influences, Passion and Action (1997).
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substantially improves Ryle’s account because he introduces the formal object of
an emotion and the idea that emotions have targets which they are about. I shall
argue, however, that his account also fails with regards to Category C, and that it
is too general, thereby remaining vague on important differences between the ex-
planations in categories B and D. This is despite his important insight that emotions
are intentional. I shall suggest that, if we push Kenny’s conclusions a little further,
a whole range of other options open up for emotion in action and explanations of
action. I therefore end the chapter by concluding that there is conceptual space for
emotions to have a reason-providing role in action and in explanations of action.
3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
For we see reason is disturbed . . . by passion or affection . . . And as in
negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity,
and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are un-
dermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions
or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of
man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have
force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it. For . . . the
end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to
invade it. (Bacon 1893, 68)
Though this evil [slavery] be so tedious, and the good [freedom] it de-
prives us so pleasing, it is not comparable to that which the tyranny of
the Passions causeth in us. And it must be granted, that of as many
slaves as are in the world, there is none more unhappy, than those who
obey such cruel Masters. (Senault 1649, 95)
If we examine carefully why people usually adopt one view rather than
another, we will find that it is not the penetration of truth or the force
of reason, but some connection to self-love, interest, or passion. This
is what carries weight and what causes most of our doubts. It both
unsettles our judgements and fixes us most firmly to them. We judge
things not by what they are in themselves, but by what they are in re-
lation to us. For us truth and utility are the same thing. (Arnauld and
Nicole 1996, 204)
We can see from these quotations the way in which emotions have historically been
opposed to reason: emotions disturb reason; they need to be constrained; they af-
fect how we see the world but are not themselves necessarily connected to the truth.
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Emotions have therefore not always been viewed favourably in the way that those
forming the pro-emotion consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind and psy-
chology view them: not in conflict with reason, and as fundamental to our capacity
to operate as rational agents and even as providing us with information about how
things are.
In this short first section, I draw attention to three themes that have been central
in historic understandings of the emotions and propose that we can find variations
of them in contemporary discussions of emotions. In doing so, I aim to show how
we need not be forced into the negative views expressed in the quotations above,
where emotion acts tangentially, at best, or contrary, at worse, to reason.
The first theme is that emotions, understood as passions, are passive and op-
posed to activity, like perceptions. As Susan James (1997, 30) notes in her compre-
hensive discussion of emotions in seventeenth-century philosophy, Aristotle’s no-
tions of activity and passivity were influential amongst seventeenth-century philo-
sophers. Aristotle holds that the emotions, like other passions,2 are passive. This
is because emotions, for Aristotle and his followers, were seen as not having active
powers to effect transformations. They were rather seen as a capacity to be affected
by things around us (41).
James favours interpreting Aristotle as saying that emotions are similar to sens-
ory perception. Like sensory perception, emotions were seen as ‘responses that
have to be invoked in us by external things and as states that we suffer. We do
not have the power to experience passions unaided, but must wait on circumstances
to excite them’ (James 1997, 42). The Aristotelian idea of emotions as passive in
some way gets picked up by others, such as by St Thomas Aquinas in the Summa
Theologiæ Volume XIX and by Rene´ Descartes, who writes in The Passions of the
Soul that the passions are ‘perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul’ (Article
27). Emotions, on this understanding, are things that happen to us.
The second theme is that emotions were seen as straddling both the mind and
the body. Aristotle, for example, writes that emotions are:
. . . those things through which, by undergoing change, people come
to differ in their judgements and which are accompanied by pain and
pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their
opposites. (Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1378a 20-23)
2The use of ‘passions’ is not co-extensive with contemporary use of ‘passions’ or of ‘emotions’.
For one thing, Aristotle includes appetite amongst the passions, and we often find desire included as
well (James 1997, 40-41).
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In On the Soul, we find:
Do the conditions of the soul belong as well to the body or is there
one that belongs only to the soul itself? We encounter this difficulty
here, and it is a difficulty neither avoidable nor easily treated. It seems
that most of the soul’s conditions—anger, courage, desire, and any
sensation—neither act nor are activated without the body. (Aristotle,
On the Soul, 403a 2)
Aquinas argues that, while emotions are seated in the soul, they are seated in the
sensory or orectic aspect. This is because, for Aquinas, the passions involve being
drawn to something good or bad; something is good or bad in itself; and being
drawn to things as they are in themselves requires physical modification. He writes:
The term ‘passion’ implies, as we have said, that the patient is drawn to
something in the agent. But the soul is drawn to things by its orectic,
rather than its cognitive, faculties. For through its orectic faculties the
soul is drawn towards things as they are in themselves: as Aristotle
says, good or bad (the objects of the orectic faculties) are in themselves.
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, 22.3)
Later, Descartes distinguishes between the body and the soul, placing the emotions
in the soul but emphasising that they are influenced by the ‘animal spirits’ of the
body. He writes:
. . . the passions of the soul are perceptions, sentiments, and emotions of
the soul, which are referred particularly to the soul itself, and which are
caused, entertained, and strengthened by some movement of the animal
spirits. (Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Article 27)
Baruch Spinoza, unlike Descartes, identifies the mind with the body and argues
that the passions function to promote our whole self (James 1997, 147). They are
responses to the world around us, as it affects our whole being, body and soul.
These are just some examples of how emotions have been understood as strad-
dling the mind and the body.
The third key theme is that emotions have a motivating role in action. Aristotle,
for instance, defines an emotion like anger as a desire for vengeance, where a desire
motivates us to act. For Aquinas, while emotions are passive, they still involve
movement towards the good and, ideally, we must align our emotions with our
conceptions of the good. For Descartes, the passions involve ‘some movement of
the animal spirits’ (The Passions of the Soul, Article 27) and:
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. . . it is requisite to notice that the principle effect of all the passions in
men is that they incite and dispose their soul to desire those things for
which they prepare their body, so that the feeling of fear incites it to
desire to fly, that of courage to desire to fight, and so on. (Descartes,
The Passions of the Soul, Article 40)
Descartes keeps perceptions and volitions distinct, but Spinoza argues that they
are part of the same thing, thereby allowing that being moved to act can be part
of a perception such as an emotion. Finally, as we saw in the quotations at the
beginning of this section, emotions were often seen to have a disruptive effect on
reason and judgement. We can interpret philosophers who endorse such views as
acknowledging the motivating role of emotions, else the emotions would not cause
us to do what we do, but denying that the emotions have a further connection to
reasons. For instance, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole in Logic or the Art of
Thinking, first published anonymously in 1662, argue that taking our passions and
interests as a motive to act or believe is a fallacy common in everyday life, where a
motive, for them, is used synonymously with a reason.3 They write:
The most [our passion or interest] can do is make us pay more attention
to the reasons that could reveal the truth to us about what we want to
be true. But we should be persuaded only by this truth, which must
be found in the thing itself independently of our desires. (Arnauld and
Nicole 1996, 204)
I wish to draw attention to these three themes because of the way in which, ab-
stracted from their historical contexts, they show up in contemporary discussions
of emotion. First, emotions are analysed in similar terms to sensory perception
even today. As I shall discuss in Chapter 4, a popular contemporary philosophical
account of emotion models emotion after perception. The important idea that is
explored in contemporary discussions but not so much in historical ones is that, if
emotions are passive in a way like perception, then can we gain information about
how things are through emotions? If we can be ‘acted on’ by the things around
us then, through our experiences, we could plausibly form beliefs and knowledge
about what is acting on us.
Second, emotions involve both the body and the mind. As I have already men-
tioned in Chapter 1 and shall discuss further in Chapter 4, our concept of emotion is
fundamentally of something which is intentional but which also has a distinct feel-
ing which is often a bodily sensation. If emotions are partly of the mind and have
3Contemporary usage of ‘motive’ is of something distinct to a reason. I shall say more about
motives in the following section.
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an intentional nature, then they could perhaps play a role in action in virtue of what
they are about rather than simply how they feel in the body.
Finally, emotions may be intrinsically motivating, perhaps like volition or de-
sire. However, if we take the first two features seriously—that emotions are like
perception and can give us information about how things are, and that emotions
have an intentional nature—then there could be more to emotions than simply as
motivators. There is conceptual space for our acting in light of what emotions are
about and not only because of how they feel.
3.2 TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
The ideas which extend the three historical themes and with which I closed the
previous section begin to be explored in the twentieth century. These were the ideas
that: (a) if emotions are like perception, they could give us information about how
things are; (b) emotions have an intentional nature and are both in body and mind;
and (c) there is conceptual space for them to be involved in action more than just as
motivating states. Two important developments in particular help to open up a new
understanding of emotion and action and both relate to causes.
The first distinction is between the cause of an emotion and the object of an
emotion, a distinction which Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), Anthony Kenny (1976)
and Ronald de Sousa (1987) influentially make, but which is by no means limited
to them. We find Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations writing:
We should distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear.
Thus a face which inspires fear or delight (the object of fear or delight),
is not on that account its cause, but—one might say—its target. (Wit-
tgenstein 1958, §475)
By making this distinction, Wittgenstein opens up for discussion how emotions
are intentional states that have targets at which they are directed, but where the
targets need not be their cause. In being targeted at something, emotions are mental
states with direction and which are about their target. This allows that emotions
could be caused by one thing—perhaps we are passively acted on—but they could
nevertheless be targeted at or about something else.
The second is a distinction between the cause of an action and the reason for
or intention behind the action, a distinction which both Wittgenstein and Elizabeth
Anscombe (1957) make.
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In conversation with Friedrich Waismann, Wittgenstein, for example, distin-
guishes between the cause of an action and a reason:
Let us suppose a train driver sees a red signal flashing and brings the
train to a stop. In response to the question: ‘Why did you stop?’ he an-
swers perhaps: ‘Because the signal says to stop here’. One wrongly
regards this statement as the statement of a cause whereas it is the
statement of a reason. The cause may have been that he was long ac-
customed to reacting to the red signal in such-and-such a way or that
in his nervous system permanent connections of pathways developed
such that the action follows the stimulus in the manner of a reflex or yet
something else. The cause need not be known to him. By contrast, the
reason is what he states it is. (Wittgenstein and Waismann 2003, 111)
Anscombe also distinguishes between the cause of an action and the reason,
motive or intention for which it is done. For instance, if the answer to the question
‘Why did you kill him?’ is ‘He killed my father’, Anscombe writes, this ‘is surely
a reason rather than a cause’ (Anscombe 1957, 10) and goes on to elaborate the
difference between a mental cause, a reason, motive and an intention. Donald Dav-
idson later opposes the distinction made by Wittgenstein and Anscombe and their
followers, and argues that reasons are causes (see, in particular, Davidson 1963).
Much of recent philosophy of action has focused on whether reasons are causes or
not, and the question is still not conclusively settled.4
This distinction between cause and reason is important in two ways. First, if the
cause of an action need not be the same as the agent’s reason for that action, then
we can accept that emotions cause us to act but allow that they could also provide
the agent’s reason in some way. So, even if emotions are motivating states which
sometimes cause us to act against our reasons, it does not follow that this is the
only role emotions could play in action or action explanations. Second, if emotions
do have a motivating role in action, which they surely do, we can ask whether that
motivating role is in virtue of causing the action or in virtue of providing the agent’s
reason in some way, perhaps by being the reason or providing access to the reason.
Again, even if it is sometimes the former, it is possible that it can also be the latter.
By distinguishing between the cause and the reason for an action, we imme-
diately allow at least two ways an emotion could be involved with action. The
emotion could cause an action or it could otherwise be involved in providing the
agent with a reason. One way in which it could be involved in providing the agent
4See section 3 in Wilson and Shpall (2012) for some of the key positions and arguments, such as
distinguishing between causal and teleological reasons.
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with a reason is by being a motive, where a motive is not a reason but is still distinct
from the cause. In the rest of section 3.2, I shall address two versions of accounts
specifically addressing emotions which distinguish between the cause of an action
and an agent’s motives, those of Ryle and Kenny who both argue that emotions
function either as causes or as motives in an explanation. If they are right, then the
only roles available to emotion in action explanations will be like those in Category
A, as cause, or Category B, as motive. I argue that Ryle’s account fails because of
his limited conception of emotion. Kenny’s account, however, starts to take us in
the right direction because he introduces the formal object of an emotion as what an
emotion is about and this opens up the possibility of a connection between emotions
and reasons. I shall argue, however, that the idea can take us further than Kenny
allows. This is because he gives a too-general pattern for acting from a motive,
thereby obscuring ways in which we could also act for a reason when acting from
an emotion.
3.2.1 RYLE ON CAUSES AND MOTIVES
In The Concept of Mind, first published in 1949, Ryle writes:
There are two quite different senses of ‘emotion’, in which we explain
people’s behaviour by reference to emotions. In the first sense we are
referring to the motives or inclinations from which more or less intelli-
gent actions are done. In the second sense we are referring to moods,
including the agitations or perturbations of which some aimless move-
ments are signs. (Ryle 1990, 110)
As we can see in this quotation, Ryle identifies two roles for emotion in explanations
of behaviour and action, one as motives and the other as moods with causal powers.
He even identifies a third sense of emotion, the ‘pangs and twinges that are feelings
of emotion’, but denies that this sense has any fundamental role in an explanation of
behaviour. These emotions ‘are not, save per accidens, things by reference to which
we explain behaviour’ (Ryle 1990, 110). All explanations of action with reference
to emotion will thus be in terms of either motives or as causes.
Ryle uses his own terminology which needs explicating. For him, ‘emotion’
refers to motives (or inclinations), moods, agitations, or feelings. Motives are dis-
positions of the person to act. Moods are temporary conditions that ‘collect oc-
currences’ (Ryle 1990, 81); being in a sad mood, for example, means that one is
liable to experience various occurrences over a length of time, such as to have cer-
tain feelings, or to have certain motives or agitations. Agitations (or commotions)
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are propensities or liabilities to undergo a disturbance resulting in symptoms such
as cowering or shivering or sweating (92-94); and feelings are ‘the sorts of things
which people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches,
prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions,
gnawings and shocks’ (81). Ryle argues that only feelings are occurrent states of
the agent; the rest are propensities.
For Ryle, an agitation is a liability to undergo a disturbance, and is the con-
junction of a general inclination or propensity to behave in a certain way and an
inhibition of some kind upon such behaviour. What results is expressive behaviour,
or signs of the agitation. In this way, the emotion provides a causal explanation:
a general inclination to do x together with an inhibition to do x causes the subject
to do y or exhibit certain manifestations z. The examples in Category A illustrate
this idea well. Frank’s anger makes him snap answers in a sharply toned voice. His
angry mood is a collection of agitations: he is agitated and disposed to undergo
a disturbance, such as to lash out. He is, however, inhibited from doing so, and
the result is his sharp tone of voice, a sign of the disturbance. Hawkeye’s sweat and
shaky hands are signs of his agitation of fear as he defuses a bomb, as is Sissy Jupe’s
cowering in the face of the terrifying Gradgrind. The emotions in Category A thus
fall under Ryle’s second sense of emotion as mood or a collection of occurrences,
including agitations. The emotion in these kinds of explanations function as a cause
that is not the agent’s reason and does not explain an action qua rational.
Unlike agitations, explaining action with reference to a motive is showing that
the behaviour, or action, was performed for a purpose or a reason, and so deals
with ‘more or less intelligent actions’. Ryle argues that an explanation making use
of inclinations or motives is one which draws on tendencies or propensities of the
agent to behave in certain ways; these are dispositional properties (Ryle 1990, 83).
He writes that ‘[t]o say that he did something from that motive is to say that this
action, done in its particular circumstances was just the sort of thing that that was
an inclination to do’ (90). Together with a general disposition, we have the circum-
stances at a particular time that led to the action. In such an explanation, we would
be explaining with reference to an emotion by picking out both the disposition and
the emotion-context in which the disposition is actualised. Saying that someone
acted out of fear is thus saying that this action, done in these circumstances, is just
the sort of thing she was inclined to do.5
5Anscombe objects that, on Ryle’s analysis, we can not act from a motive only once but this is
blatantly false (Anscombe 1957, 20-21).
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We can extend Ryle’s dispositional analysis to beliefs and attitudes. In this way,
we can see how the explanations in Category B could fall under Ryle’s motives:
in this situation, having this motive, forming these beliefs or seeing things in this
kind of way is just the kind of thing the agent is inclined to do. In categories D and
E where the emotion is the agent’s reason, we could similarly make sense of the
examples as picking out inclinations of the agent to behave in certain ways.
Category C, containing examples where the agent acts purely expressively, how-
ever, is not compatible with either causal or motive explanations, and looking at it
highlights the insufficiency of Ryle’s account of the nature of emotion explanations
tout court.
Category C contains examples of pure expressive action, such as Jane’s tearing
at the eyes in a photograph out of rage and the man’s rolling around in his dead
wife’s clothes out of grief. For Ryle, expressive behaviour is the sign of an agitation
and the result of being unable to behave in the way to which one is inclined. In the
cases in C, however, the person is acting intentionally and doing exactly what she
wants: Jane is behaving exactly in the way to which she is inclined. Her tearing
at the photograph is not expressive and the sign of an agitation in the same way as
Sissy Jupe’s cowering. Explanations of pure expressive action thus do not make use
of an emotion as an agitation, and so we must see how they fare with the emotion
as a motive.
Explaining by reference to a motive, for Ryle, picks out the disposition and the
context. In order for the explanation to be satisfactory, there must be some illu-
minating connection between the particular circumstances of the context and the
relevant disposition. The circumstances must be what is occurrent which, crucially,
for Ryle are only the feelings. This, however, does not provide a satisfactory ex-
planation.
Consider the example of the man who rolls around in his dead wife’s clothes
because he is grieving for her. On Ryle’s account, when we explain the man’s
action by citing his grief, we are saying that, in this particular circumstance, rolling
around in the clothes is just the sort of thing he was inclined to do. In this particular
circumstance that we have identified as grief, he is experiencing the feelings that
we label ‘grief’, perhaps things like having a tight chest and an overwhelming urge
to cry, and is disposed to act in a grief-like way, such as to try to be close to the
lost loved one. However, there is nothing about the feelings of grief that provide a
base for the disposition to roll around in the dead wife’s clothes. As I shall discuss
in more detail in Chapter 4, the feelings of an emotion are not always enough to
distinguish one emotion from another, and different emotions with similar or the
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same feelings might involve quite different dispositions to act. For example, I may
feel the racing heart of anger and be disposed to approach and attack my opponent. I
may also feel the racing heart of fear and be disposed to get away as fast as possible.
Sometimes I even confuse my fear for anger, as when I think I am angry with my
innocuous passenger just for being there as I drive through a dangerous part of town.
One can also have the same feelings but no disposition to act in a way particular to
the emotion-feelings. Why is the grieving man not disposed to roll around in clothes
when he has the same tight chest and teary eyes as when he has a frustrating debate
at work or when he is chopping onions with a chest cold? What is it about the
feelings we refer to with the emotion word which dispose someone to act in a way
so typical? The feelings, alone, are not enough to account for the disposition. We
have not yet got to the bottom of the role of the emotion in the explanation of the
action.
If we can say what it is about emotion feelings that makes them different to
other bodily feelings, we can begin to grasp a connection between the feelings and
the disposition. And Ryle does distinguish between emotion feelings and bodily
feelings. For him, the difference is something we learn through observing our and
others’ feelings (Ryle 1990, 101-102).
Observing a difference, however, is not enough to provide a satisfactory explan-
ation of expressive action. Merely observing a difference does not pinpoint what it
is that we are observing or what it is about feelings in one context that makes them
emotion feelings and in another context mere bodily feelings. Neither does it pin-
point what it is about feelings in one context that lead to actions of a certain kind,
like fighting, and in another context lead to other actions, like running away. It is
not enough to say that in one context, but not another, the feelings are accompanied
by a disposition to act in a certain way, because that accompaniment is what we
are trying to understand. When we explain by referring to an emotion, even if the
emotion picks out a disposition to behave in a certain way, the explanation only gets
off the ground because we know what the connection between the context and the
disposition is, beyond their co-occurring. We are drawing on more than just how
the emotion feels, which is the only thing that Ryle allows as an occurrent emotion.
This criticism of motives does not just show that Ryle’s account fails to make
sense of expressive action in C, but also that the motive explanation as a whole is
ultimately unsatisfactory. The key problem with Ryle’s account is that he identifies
the occurrent state as only a feeling. As I noted in Chapter 1, and shall develop fur-
ther in Chapter 4, emotions are also intentional, something which Ryle overlooks
entirely. Sticking to Ryle’s limited characterisation of an emotion, we are no clearer
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on what role the emotion is playing in motive explanations and why emotions in-
volve the propensities to act in the way that they do.
3.2.2 KENNY ON MOTIVE PATTERNS
Seeking to improve Ryle’s proposals, Kenny also aims to address all explanations of
action by emotion by distinguishing between behaviour that expresses an emotion
and action that is motivated by an emotion, where being motivated by an emotion
is having a motive.
In this subsection, I present Kenny’s account and emphasise the importance of
his contribution of reintroducing the notion of the formal object to our understand-
ing of the intentional nature of emotion. I shall, however, raise an initial problem
with his account which is that, like Ryle’s account, it cannot accommodate the pure
expressive action of Category C.
Similar to Ryle’s account, on Kenny’s account the role of the emotion in Cat-
egory A comes out as giving a causal explanation of a manifestation or symptom of
an emotion that is an expression of emotion. Without necessarily accepting the de-
tails of how emotions manifest themselves, something which must be left to empir-
ical sciences and not to hypothesising about inclinations and inhibitions, Ryle and
Kenny are surely correct in identifying the causal role of emotion in Category A.
This is so long as we understand ‘cause’ in a fairly loose sense in order to keep open
the possibility that the manifestation just is the emotion rather than being strictly
caused by it. In any event, the explanation in Category A is one where the emo-
tion is behind or causes some physical manifestation and does not play a role in the
action qua rational.
Kenny, however, has an alternative proposal for acting from a motive, which he
develops from ideas found in Anscombe (1957). Anscombe distinguishes between
three kinds of motives: forward-looking motives, which she also identifies as inten-
tions; backward-looking motives like remorse, pity and revenge; and interpretative
motives or ‘motives-in-general’ like love and fear. While Kenny acknowledges that
her distinctions are valuable, he complains that we are still left with the question of
‘how do motives explain actions?’ (Kenny 1976, 85). Kenny writes:
The difficulty in giving an account of the concept of motive arises
partly from a vagueness in the concept itself. What words count as
motive-words? Several answers, equally plausible, suggest themselves.
A motive-word, we may say, is a word which is an appropriate comple-
tion of the following sentence frames: “He acted out of . . . ”, “. . . made
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him do such-and-such”, “He did such-and-such because he was. . . ”,
“His motive in doing such-and-such was. . . ”. Unfortunately, the use
of these sentence-frames to define motives produces four lists of words
which by no means coincide. (Kenny 1976, 85)
Kenny thus seeks to improve both Ryle’s and Anscombe’s accounts of explan-
ations of action in terms of motives. He contrasts motives with intentions and pro-
poses that acting from either is an exemplification of a pattern where there is a state
the agent dislikes, she does something, and ends up in a state she prefers (Kenny
1989, 62). When we give an explanation, we could give it in terms of the initial
disliked state of affairs, the preferred state of affairs which is taken to be the upshot
of the action, or some combination of the two.
Acting from an intention is one exemplification of the pattern. When acting
from an intention, one is acting from a forward-looking reason, and acting in order
to achieve something. Reporting an agent’s intention is referring to that forward-
looking reason. For example, the man flatters the Prime Minister in order to become
a bishop. His intention is to become a bishop and he is acting to move from one
state of affairs where he is not a bishop to a preferred state of affairs where he is
one.
Acting from a motive is another exemplification of this pattern. Unlike a report
of an intention which gives the forward-looking reason, a report of a motive ‘may
either give a backward-looking reason, or exhibit the action as falling under some
specific scheme of this general pattern’ (Kenny 1989, 63). For example, if I killed
the man out of revenge, my motive of revenge refers to my backward-looking reason
that the man killed my father. Or, if I roll up my car window because I am afraid of
the people milling around at the traffic lights, then my motive of fear exhibits my
action as one where I am acting to change the state of affairs where I feel unsafe
to something more preferable, feeling safe. I am not necessarily acting with the
intention of feeling safe, however.
The agent need not be aware of what motive she is acting from, but she must be
aware of the features which make the pattern applicable (Kenny 1989, 63). Othello,
for instance, may not be aware that he is acting out of jealousy even if his motive is
jealousy. He is, however, aware of himself as acting because his wife Desdemona
has apparently betrayed him, a backward-looking reason, or he is aware of his un-
pleasant feelings and is acting to change them, thus he is aware of a general pattern
to his actions.
In this way, Kenny meets the challenge he raises for Anscombe about how
motives explain action. Motives explain by showing how an action was an exem-
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plification of a certain pattern. Motive words which fill in for ‘He acted out of. . . ’,
‘. . . made him do such-and-such’, ‘He did such-and-such because he was. . . ’, ‘His
motive in doing such-and-such was. . . ’ could easily form four different lists, but
they would have something in common in that they describe the action as falling
under the motive pattern.
We might still worry, however, that Kenny’s proposal is not much of an improve-
ment on Ryle’s account. The problem that I raised for Ryle was that his account of
emotions was unsatisfactory in distinguishing between bodily feelings and emo-
tional feelings and, as a result, I found it explanatorily wanting. In a similar vein,
we could ask of Kenny: what is it about emotions which makes them motives? Is
it simply how they feel? If so, then his account is no more satisfying than Ryle’s.
Luckily, Kenny does have more to say about emotions and, in particular, about their
intentional nature.
We have already seen that the way in which emotions straddle the mind and
the body is a key theme in the history of philosophy and that the Wittgensteinian
distinction between the cause and object of an emotion calls for a nuanced treatment
of emotions. Yet full appreciation of the way emotions are mental states that are
about particular objects which may be distinct from their causes can often seem to
be lacking. For example, in Ethics, Spinoza gives a limited characterisation of what
emotions are about. He writes that ‘[l]ove is nothing else but pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing but pain accompanied by the idea
of an external cause’ (Spinoza 1984, 75). David Hume, in A Treatise of Human
Nature, also gave a rather limited definition of emotions as sensations of agitations
plus belief. For Hume, the belief and not the emotion has an object which it is about.
But, as Kenny argues, this entails that the connection between what the emotion is
about and the emotion is contingent when it is in fact a logical one. Kenny writes:
One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything what-
soever. If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools,
we want to ask him more: does he believe that money corrupts, or does
he expect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or
what? If we can elicit from him only descriptions of the good aspects
of the situation, then we cannot understand why he reports his emotion
as fear and not as hope. (Kenny 1976, 192)
The logical connection is not between the emotion and its particular object, how-
ever, but between the emotion and its formal object. The formal object of a mental
state, as noted in Chapter 1, is a medieval notion that Kenny influentially rein-
troduced into contemporary theorising about emotions. For Kenny, ‘[t]he formal
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object of φing is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is to
be possible to φ it’ (Kenny 1976, 189) and ‘[e]motional attitudes, like other mental
attitudes, have formal objects’ (191).
An emotion like love is thus not just pleasure accompanied by the idea of an
external cause, a` la Spinoza. It is a mental state whose object is such that there is a
description which must apply to it if it is to be the object of love. The external cause,
as the emotion’s object, must be loveable, affection-inspiring, etc., just like winning
£10,000 in the pools must be dangerous, threatening, etc., if it is to be feared.
While the intentional nature of emotions has not been completely overlooked
historically—for instance, as Kenny himself notes, Aristotle already defined what
would be the formal objects of emotions in On Rhetoric, such as when he defines
anger ‘as a distressed desire for conspicuous vengeance in return for a conspicu-
ous and unjustifiable contempt of one’s person or friends’ (Aristotle, On Rhetoric,
1378a)—crystallising the idea of emotions as having formal objects, as well as the
idea that the connection between the formal object and the emotion is a logical one,
is an important step in our understanding of emotion as intentional. And because
emotions are intentional, an emotion could be a motive because of more than how
it feels. If Othello acts out of jealousy, for instance, we know that he does not only
have unpleasant sensations, he also sees a threat to Desdemona’s affections for him.
While this is an improvement on Ryle’s proposal because it introduces the in-
tentional nature of an emotion, Kenny’s account faces three problems. The first it
shares with Ryle’s proposal, which is that it cannot accommodate the pure express-
ive action of Category C.
When acting purely expressively, such as tearing at the photograph of one’s rival
or rolling around in the clothes of a lost loved one, the agent is not going from a
disliked state of affairs to a preferred state of affairs; nor is she necessarily aware of
her action as following this pattern. She does not have a backward-looking reason,
although she acts because of something contemporaneous with the action, namely
her emotion, and she does not act to change how things are. Yet, she is acting
intentionally and the emotion is not simply causing her movements or behaviour
in the way it does in Category A. Category C does not fall under either of the
explanatory roles Kenny describes for emotion.
The second problem is that the motive pattern, by being too general, misses
important differences between ways we can act from an emotion. The third problem
is related, which is that by being too general, the motive pattern in fact also misses
an important explanatory element of motives. I shall address these two problems
together in the next section.
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3.2.3 DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN ACT FROM AN EMOTION
Kenny proposes a pattern of acting-to-change which is supposed to capture what is
going on when an agent acts from a motive. An explanation in terms of a motive
either reports that there was some backward-looking reason or shows how the action
was an exemplification of the motive action pattern. For Kenny, motives include
more than those typical motives for which a motive word springs to mind, like
revenge or jealousy. He writes:
‘I’m coming indoors because it’s too cold out here’ ‘They sacked him
because he turned up drunk three days running’ ‘He bought a new suit
because the old one was too small’. These sentences obviously have
something in common with ‘I killed him because he killed my father’.
Yet there is no motive-word which occurs naturally in connection with
the first three sentences as ‘revenge’ does with the fourth. (Kenny 1989,
62)
What they have in common, for Kenny, is that they are reports of backward-looking
reasons, the action follows the pattern of acting to effect a change from one state of
affairs to a more preferable one, and the agent is aware of herself as acting in this
way (Kenny 1989, 62). Kenny goes on to say:
Which backward-looking reasons we will naturally call ‘motives’ de-
pend on the comparatively trivial circumstances of whether or not we
have a name for the specific scheme exemplified. Where we have a
common type of undesirability in the pre-action state of affairs, or a
common type of desirability in the post-action state of affairs, we as-
sign names to the particular pattern of action, and speak of action out
of—for instance—fear, jealousy, or ambition. (Kenny 1989, 64)
If having a name is the only difference between the two kinds of cases, then
an account of the nature of motive explanations need not make a fuss over the dif-
ference, and a general schema like Kenny’s is sufficient. Unfortunately, this is not
the only difference. Motive-proper explanations, ones which involve motives like
‘revenge’, provide fundamentally different explanations to simply describing a pat-
tern according to which an agent acts or reporting that there were backward-looking
reasons.
To see this, we must distinguish between at least three ways we can understand
action undertaken because of an emotion which fall under Kenny’s motive pattern.
In the first way, we are acting out of that emotion. For example, Othello murders
Desdemona out of jealousy. There is a common type of undesirability to the pre-
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action state of affairs when someone acts out of jealousy, which is that one sees
oneself as losing someone’s affections to another. There is also a common type of
desirability to the post-action state of affairs, which is that one is no longer losing
that affection or is somehow regaining it. Or, take Frank who reports Hawkeye and
McIntyre to the captain out of anger. He is angry with them and takes steps to get
them punished. Feeling offended is a common type of undesirability to the pre-
action state of affairs that the motive of anger picks out. These are the examples in
Category B3.
In the second way, we are acting because of an emotion and are addressing
symptoms or behavioural manifestations of that emotion. This is like the examples
in categories D1(a) and D1(b) and, in these cases, the emotional experience qua
an experience is the agent’s putative reason. In D1(a), the agent either acts to ad-
dress the undesirable physical manifestations of her emotion, or acts to induce the
desired manifestations. The violinist, for instance, takes a sedative to steady her
nervously-shaking hands, but Begbie picks a fight to induce the angry adrenaline
rush which he enjoys. In D1(b), the agent addresses the behavioural manifestation
of her emotion. Claire the agoraphobe avoids open spaces because they induce un-
desirable panic attacks in her. Dolokhov dislikes the way his depression manifests
in apathy; he actively tries to counteract it by being cruel to others. Acting because
of an emotion in this way is not expressing an emotion, neither is the action caused
by a corresponding feeling. The agent acts purposively because of the emotion in
order to address the state, independent of its intentional nature.
These examples are like the general motive-pattern cases like buying a new suit
because the old one no longer fits. Contrast this with the first way, where Othello
murders Desdemona out of jealousy. If Othello were to act because he was jealous
in a way like the second, he may rather go to talk to the army counsellor about his
unfounded but influential thoughts regarding Desdemona and Cassio. Frank may
take anger management classes.
The third way is acting because of the emotion as an intentional state, like the
examples in Category D2 illustrate. For example, Jackson throws out his former
partner’s possessions because it gives him relief, but only because his distress is
about that particular person and these are her possessions. Alice is indignant, even
angry, about the way her boss has treated her colleague; she is edgy and in a state
of discomfort about an injustice and acts because of that edginess. If either Jackson
or Alice were to act to address the state purely as it is manifested, such as by taking
a sedative to remove their disliked physical states, then their actions are successful.
This is the second way of acting. But if Alice takes a sedative because she is edgy
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about some injustice or Jackson takes a sedative because he is upset about a loss,
then their actions are not successful—unless Alice took the sedative so that she
could think clearly about what to do in order to fix the injustice or Jackson took
the sedative so that he could forget about his fond memories of something lost and
sleep. These different success conditions for the action show that the nature of
why the agent acts is quite different between the second and third ways, where in
the third way that agent acts to address her emotion as an intentional state but not
necessarily to address what her emotion is about, except as it would change her
emotional state.
But now it seems that someone can act out of or because of an emotion in a
variety of ways. Someone can act from the ‘motive’ of anger because it is her
motive-proper, as in B3; or she can act because she likes the way the emotion feels
or wants to address the way it affects her behaviour, as in D1(a) and D1(b); but she
could also act from anger because of what she is angry about. In all cases, she may
have a backward-looking reason or be acting in a way that meets the motive pattern.
Yet, the pattern alone cannot be used to explain what the differences are and it is not
the case that ‘anger’ is a name assigned to a common type of undesirability in the
pre-action state of affairs or a common type of desirability in the post-action state
of affairs.
These differences, which Kenny’s proposal fails to capture, indicate a third prob-
lem, namely that his proposal overlooks a substantial difference that exists between
a motive-proper explanation—acting out of an emotion, the first way—and acting
because of an emotion, the second and third ways.
With the first set of examples of acting out of a motive-proper, we learn about
the manner in which the agent acted by getting a sense of what was going on in
the agent’s head, of how she was thinking and feeling when she acted. Reporting
that Othello acted out of jealousy, for instance, does not merely identify how his
pre-action state of affairs where he sees himself as losing Desdemona’s affections
to Cassio is undesirable, it also tells us that he was consumed with thoughts of Des-
demona and Cassio together, looking for evidence to confirm his suspicions. Frank
could have neutrally reported Hawkeye and McIntyre to the captain, but because he
acts out of anger we learn that he was exasperated, probably could not concentrate
on things other than the offensiveness of the troublemakers, and was desiring their
punishment.
Anscombe describes this explanatory element of describing the manner of acting
in a motive explanation as giving the ‘spirit’ of the action (Anscombe 1957, 18). As
she notes, saying that I did something out of love cannot be paraphrased to say that
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I acted so as to bring about some good for the person I love, such as ‘to release him
from this awful suffering’, because we do not then capture ‘the spirit’ in which I
acted. I could act to bring about some good for the person but not be acting out
of love, so much as out of prudence, for instance. The motive of love, Anscombe
maintains, does not specify some further goal such as being loving; it just is the
spirit in which I act and what makes the act one of love rather than one of prudence.
We can bolster what this ‘spirit’ is by appealing to our understanding of emotions as
intentional. The formal object, remember, is what all instances of an emotion type
share. So, if the formal object of jealousy is something like resentment of ‘a third
party for loss or threat to another’s affection or favour’ (Lazarus 1991, 122), then
acting out of the motive of jealousy brings with it the associated spirit where one
is alert to evidence of someone’s failing affection, preoccupied with the matter, and
desires to act because of it. It is because the formal object of anger involves seeing
an offence to oneself that one becomes extra sensitive towards the person who has
offended you, has typical thought patterns, and so acts in a certain spirit.
In contrast, we do not get the same internal insight with the second set of ex-
amples where we act because of the emotion. When the violinist takes a sedative
because of fear and in order to steady her hands, is her fear exhilarating, even if
her hands shake? When Begbie picks a fight in order to have an angry adrenaline-
surge, is his anger distressing or attention-consuming even though he craves the
adrenaline? These examples do not explain by giving the ‘spirit’ of the action be-
cause we do not get a sense of what was going on in the agent’s head, what she
desires, or even necessarily how she was feeling, just like we do not get a sense of
what was going on in the agent’s head when she washed or bought a new suit.
We therefore see that the role of the emotion in Category B3 where the emotion
is the agent’s motive-proper is quite different to the role of the emotion in Category
D where the emotion is the agent’s reason because it is what she addresses. Meeting
the motive-pattern does not exhaust the explanatory force of identifying a motive-
proper such as love because the motive-pattern does not include the ‘spirit’ of the
action and the ‘spirit’ arises partly because of an emotion’s intentional nature. While
Kenny rejects Anscombe’s motives as too vague, he overlooks this insight of her
account.
The intentional nature also plays a role in the other examples in Category B,
where the agent forms other beliefs and desires (B1) or attitudes (B2) which in
turn explain the action. General motive-pattern explanations, like buying a new
suit because the old one no longer fits or the examples in Category D, do not place
the same emphasis on the intentional nature of the emotion or its relation to other
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mental states. We therefore see that, even while all the examples illustrate action
following the same general pattern, the pattern is not sufficient for a characterisation
of acting from a motive-proper and runs together quite different ways one might act
because of an emotion, and their explanations.
I shall now go through the examples to give more precise explanations in light
of this discussion.
In Category B, the emotion plays a role because of its intentional nature. Making
use of the concept of the formal object, we can identify what kinds of beliefs, desires
and attitudes an agent forms on the basis of an emotion, and explain those beliefs,
desires and attitudes using the emotion.
B1. WHERE THE EMOTION IS CLOSELY LINKED TO OTHER BELIEFS AND DESIRES,
PERHAPS BY CAUSING THE BELIEFS AND DESIRES
• Huck Finn failed to turn Jim over to the authorities because of his compassion
for Jim.
– More precise explanation: Huck Finn failed to turn Jim over to the au-
thorities because his compassion about someone valuable led him to
believe that Jim deserved protection.
• Alice challenged her boss out of moral indignation.
– More precise explanation: Alice challenged her boss because her moral
indignation about something unjust led her to believe that she ought to
challenge the perpetrator of the injustice.
B2. WHERE THE EMOTION AFFECTS HOW WE SEE A SITUATION, IN AFFECTING WHAT
ACTION THE AGENT PERFORMS OR HOW THE AGENT BEHAVES
• Begbie beats up the man because he is angry.
– More precise explanation: Begbie’s anger makes him see innocuous
situations as offensive and he beats the man up because he finds him
offensive.
• Frank kicks up a fuss because he is angry with Hawkeye and McIntyre.
– More precise explanation: Hawkeye and McIntyre often make Frank
angry and he is predisposed to interpret their actions as offensive. He
kicks up a fuss because he finds them offensive and gets angry with them.
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• Pierre gives alms to the poor because of his overwhelming love.
– More precise explanation: Pierre gives alms to the poor because his
love for Natasha makes him see everything and everyone as good and
deserving respect.
B3. WHERE THE EMOTION IS THE AGENT’S MOTIVE FOR ACTING
• Frank reports Hawkeye and McIntyre to the commander out of anger.
– More precise explanation: Frank reports Hawkeye and McIntyre in a
spirit of anger because of the offenses they’ve committed towards him.
• Othello kills Desdemona out of jealousy.
– More precise explanation: Othello kills Desdemona in a spirit of jeal-
ousy because of he thinks that she has committed adultery.
In Category D, in contrast, the emotion does not play a role in the explanation
because of its intentional nature. Perhaps, like in D2, the intentional nature is im-
portant in determining what kinds of actions can be taken which will effectively
address the state that the agent is in. However, such a role is not in terms of being
connected to certain patterns of thought and attitudes. We can therefore give the
following more precise explanations:
D1(A). ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS OF THE FEELING OR MANIFESTATION OF THE
EMOTION
• The violinist took a sedative because she was nervous.
– More precise explanation: The violinist took a sedative because her
hands were shaking nervously.
• Begbie picks fights because he enjoys being angry.
– More precise explanation: Begbie picks fights in order to simulate situ-
ations where he gets an adrenaline rush which he enjoys.
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D1(B). ADDRESSING THE WAY THE EMOTION IS MANIFESTED IN BEHAVIOUR
• Claire avoids open spaces out of fear.
– More precise explanation: Claire avoids situations where she feels over-
whelming fear because the fear is unpleasant.
• Dolokhov challenges Rostov to gamble away money he does not have out of
cruelty.
– More precise explanation: Dolokhov challenges Rostov to gamble away
money he does not have because he seeks to break his unwanted feeling
of apathy by being cruel.
D2. NOT JUST ADDRESSING THE FEELING OR MANIFESTATION
• Jackson throws out his ex-partner’s belongings out of grief.
– More precise explanation: Jackson throws out his ex-partner’s belong-
ings because he is upset about his loss, and throwing out the belongings
addresses his sadness by removing memories of what he is sad about.
• Alice challenges her boss because she is indignant.
– More precise explanation: Alice challenges her boss immediately be-
cause the edginess of her moral indignation about the injustice spurs
her to act in challenging the injustice.
3.3 CONCLUSION
Kenny allows that emotions are intentional and makes use of the notion of the formal
object, so why does he seem to overlook the full import of his positive proposal
of emotions as intentional? By tentatively proposing an answer, I shall close this
chapter by laying out the conception of emotions as providing access to reasons
which I would like to explore in the rest of this thesis.
Kenny ultimately says very little about the formal object of an emotion and
his focus is primarily on how we develop our concepts of specific emotions. He
argues that we develop our concept of a specific emotion and learn to identify the
feeling of that emotion from the way in which its object and context, the symptoms
or manifestations, and action tend to co-occur (Kenny 1976, 99; Kenny 1989, 64-
65). He is not concerned with the questions of why the contexts which co-occur
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with certain manifestations include patterns of thought, and why they tend to lead to
certain kinds of actions, over-and-above the fact that they do co-occur. His focus on
the formal object is thus on its role in the development of our emotion concepts and
not so much on what emotions are about. Tentatively, it is because of this difference
in focus that Kenny does not explore the full explanatory import of his positive
proposal.
However, the link between the emotion and the action is not just one of co-
occurrence. There is a reason why certain emotions lead to certain actions, and that
reason lies in the intentional nature of emotion. If we approach motive explanations
from this direction, then we do find a difference between ways in which behaviour
and action fit Kenny’s patterns.
If this is right, then we must look closer at the intentional nature of emotions.
Doing so opens up the possibility for acting purely because of what an emotion is
about or represents, and not because of the ‘spirit’ or other beliefs or attitudes we
might form, as in Category B, or by being the agent’s reason because it is a state to
address, as in Category D.
Consider some of the examples in Category E. Richard buys flowers for Kath-
erine out of love. He is not acting for a backward-looking reason and he is not
caused to buy flowers because of the way his love feels. He chooses to buy them,
and does so because he loves Katherine. Natasha, distraught at the death of Prince
Andrey, pulls her life back together because she loves her mother. She is acting to
bring about some change, but that is not what acting out of love is in this context.
In both of these cases, there is not a clear sense that the agent is acting to change
things or acting because of some backward-looking reason. Rather, both Richard
and Natasha act to express their emotions, but in a way different to Category C’s
purely expressive actions, which I shall examine in Chapter 5. They act because
they value someone, and this plausibly is the reason why they act. Is it a reason? If
yes, what role does the emotion play in the action? Does Richard, say, still need to
form a belief that Katherine is someone he values if he is to act for a reason, or can
he act directly on the basis of an emotional experience? Is doing so reasonable or
rational? These are questions I shall answer in Part III.
To summarise what has been covered in this chapter, I began by identifying three
key themes found in historic thought about emotion. These were: (i) the emotions,
as passions, were seen to be passive and opposed to activity, like perceptions; (ii)
the emotions were seen as states that straddle both the mind and body; and (iii) the
emotions were given a motivating role in action. I proposed that these themes are
not at odds with ideas central to the contemporary pro-emotion consensus which
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supports the compatibility of emotion with reason. I also introduced two distinc-
tions that have been made in twentieth-century philosophy, a distinction between
the cause of and reason for an action and a distinction between be cause and object
of an emotion. I argued that these distinctions allow us to explore a more positive
role for emotion in action, and that the three historic themes actually support our
doing so.
I then looked at two proposals for the role of emotion in action, Ryle’s and
Kenny’s, and argued that neither proposal successfully applied to all the categories
of explanation which I identified in Chapter 2. This gives us a prima facie reason to
look further at what role emotions can play. I further argued that Kenny’s positive
proposal is too general and the kind of distinctions it misses are ones which rely on
the fact that emotions are intentional states which lead us to form certain beliefs and
desires and adopt certain attitudes. If this is the case, then the conceptual space for
emotions to be involved in action purely in light of their intentional nature is opened
up, including the possibility that acting on the basis of an emotional experience
could be acting in light of a reason and that an emotion explanation could rationalise
action in some way.
Before being in a position to spell out fully what those roles are, however, we
must come to grips with what emotions must be if they are intentional, as well as
be clear on what acting for a reason and rationalising explanations involve. Thus,
in Part II, I set out in Chapter 4 by examining some of the most influential contem-
porary accounts of emotion and motivate adopting a minimally cognitive account
such as one making use of an analogy with perception and, in Chapter 5, I examine





In Chapter 1, I drew attention to the diversity of things which we include under our
concept of emotion, including agitations, occurrent emotion states, emotional atti-
tudes and moods. I identified two features shared by this range to greater and lesser
extents, but which are central to our emotion concept. These features were: (i) that
emotions have an intentional nature; and (ii) that emotions have an affective nature
including an intentional quality to the way they feel. In Chapter 2, I introduced a
range of examples of the different roles emotions can play in explanations of action
and, in Chapter 3, I argued that there is conceptual space for an emotion to play a
role in action and action explanations beyond being a motivating state and in virtue
of its intentional nature. In the next two parts of my thesis, I explore how emotions
can play such a role and develop the view that emotions can have a reason-providing
role in action and explanations of action. In Part II, in chapters 4 and 5, I give ne-
cessary background on emotions and action explanations. In Part III, in chapters 6
and 7, I show how emotions can provide access to reasons and how we can act in
light of those reasons when acting on the basis of an emotional experience.
Because so much turns on the intentional nature of emotion, more needs to be
said about what emotions are such that they have this nature. This is the task of
the current chapter. After the discussion of Chapter 1, it may seem that providing
a comprehensive analysis of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for
something to be an emotion is a daunting task—if not an impossible one. So, in
this chapter, I focus on occurrent emotion states. Occurrent emotion states are both
clearly affective and intentional; they stand out as the paradigm kind of emotion.
They have also been the primary focus of accounts of emotions and so it makes
sense to limit my attention in a similar way.
There are other reasons why I focus my attention on occurrent emotions. Be-
cause my ultimate focus is on action and explanations of action, and on whether
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emotions can provide access to reasons for action, I set aside agitations. Agitations,
by the definition given in Chapter 1, are just reactions. If they result in some kind
of behaviour that is not merely a compulsive reaction, they are by definition no
longer agitations but are occurrent emotions. If the behaviour is part of the reaction,
then the role of the agitation in explaining that behaviour is simply causal. As pure
agitations, they are not relevant to my interests.
I set aside moods because they do not have stable particular objects. Occur-
rent states and attitudes are directed at particular objects and, like agitations, are re-
sponses to those objects. If we act from an emotion, we act in response to something
that we think obtains and we would explain the action in terms of that response. A
mood, in contrast, is not itself always a response to particular things in the envir-
onment. Because of this, acting from a mood is prima facie quite different to acting
from an emotion and deserves its own treatment which is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Finally, I largely set aside attitudes, for three reasons. First, attitudes are much
like character traits and many character traits will involve attitudes, such as hav-
ing the character trait of being a loving person is having a loving attitude towards
others.1 Attitudes and character traits both involve more than a single experience,
instance or state and, like moods, deserve their own treatment. Second, because atti-
tudes involve more than a single instance, their role in action explanations is plaus-
ibly most like the roles illustrated in Category B where the emotion provides an
explanation of other mental states the agent has. For the rest of this thesis, however,
I wish to explore the explanations in Category E. Third, attitudes are still similar
to occurrent emotions in many respects, such as by having particular objects and,
as we saw in Chapter 1, they share a similar intentional nature and partly involve
dispositions to experience certain occurrent emotions. Attitudes may thus be illu-
minated if we have a good account of occurrent emotions. So, while attitudes are
not my main focus, addressing occurrent emotions will hopefully provide insight
for attitudes as well.
Even limiting my focus to occurrent emotions, I will not address many of the
accounts of emotions that have been proposed in recent years.2 I have chosen to
focus on the accounts and issues that I have in order to illustrate the intertwinement
of the affective and intentional elements in an occurrent emotion, and to indicate
1One key difference between an attitude of love for X and the character trait of being loving is
that an attitude of love has a set particular object, X , while the character trait need not.
2Useful and comprehensive overviews have been given by others already. I have found Deonna
and Teroni (2012) particularly helpful, as well as the more compact sections in Deigh (2010) and
Brady (2013)
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what we must be minimally committed to if occurrent emotions are intentional.
In what follows, I therefore focus on influential accounts of the twentieth cen-
tury and break them down into three general classes of views. These classes need
not be mutually exclusive; I choose to present them this way in order to make their
particular emphases clear.
The first class is of views that highlight the feeling side and non-cognitive ele-
ments of an emotion, such as its bodily manifestations and sensations. I side with
those who argue that such accounts are unable to do justice to the intentional ele-
ment of emotions and that some cognitive involvement is required in an account of
emotion. The second class is of views that highlight the cognitive elements of an
emotion, identifying them as beliefs or judgements. I side with those who argue that
such accounts are either overly cognitive or are trivial. The third class is of views
that propose a weak kind of cognitive involvement, such as the currently-popular
perceptual model of emotion. Such views draw on perception as an intentional state
that is not belief- or judgement-like as a model for emotion. Even while I remain
neutral about the extent to which the perceptual analogy can be pushed, I shall argue
that the weak cognitive approach of the third class is the right kind of approach to
take and the perceptual model a good illustration.
With this in mind, the underlying argument of this chapter can be summed up
in the following way: emotions are about things other than our bodies and in order
to be that way, some kind of minimal cognitive involvement is necessary. Two co-
rollaries of this conclusion are important for the rest of my thesis. First, if emotions
are about things other than our bodies, then they give us information of something
other than our bodies, information that could make up facts in light of which we act.
Second, if some kind of weak cognitive involvement is necessary and is not a belief
or a judgement, then since emotions provide us with information of something other
than our bodies, they can play a role in action which is different from that of a belief
or judgement.
4.1 VIEWS WHICH FOREGROUND NON-COGNITIVE ELEMENTS
One of the most common ways to think about emotions is to conceive of them as
feelings. We ask people how they feel and expect reports of their emotional states.
You feel angry, sad, surprised, jealous; you also feel flushes of anger, pangs of love;
your heart aches or your stomach turns. Given the importance of emotional feeling
and the way emotions manifest in the body, it is no surprise that some accounts
of emotion take seriously the idea either that emotion just is a class of feeling, or
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that emotion just is the bodily change. According to such accounts, emotions are
not constituted by beliefs, judgements or other cognitive activity, nor are they ne-
cessarily caused by beliefs, judgements or other cognitive activity. These accounts
foreground the non-cognitive elements of an emotion—some even discount or elim-
inate the cognitive element—and can accordingly be called non-cognitive accounts
of emotions.
In this section, I begin by giving an overview of two specific versions of non-
cognitivism. The first is an instance of what has been called the ‘feeling theory’ of
emotion. According to feeling theories, an emotion is the feeling of bodily change.
In the late nineteenth century, the psychologists William James and Carl Lange
independently developed similar theories and we now talk of the ‘James-Lange’
theory of emotion as the ancestor of modern-day feeling theories. I shall focus on
James’ version as it is more dominant in the literature and has undergone a revival
in the last twenty-odd years. According to his version, emotions just are feelings of
bodily changes, identified as changes in the viscera. After introducing non-cognitive
theories via James’ theory, I focus on a modern-day version of a feeling theory
although, strictly speaking, this is not so much a ‘feeling’ theory as a more general
non-cognitive theory. This is the proposal that emotions are the bodily changes
themselves—including neurological changes as well as visceral changes—which
goes together with the suggestion that the feeling of an emotion is the feeling of
bodily change. This is a theory put forward by the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio.
Following others, I argue that pure non-cognitive theories like these are unable
to give due justice to the intentional element of an emotion. This is because emo-
tions are about more than the body and, therefore, they must involve some kind of
cognitive element. I next consider Jesse Prinz’s modified feeling theory, inspired
by James’ theory, as a response to the intentional challenge, but argue that it fails
to meet the challenge. I conclude that an adequate account of emotion must be able
to capture the intentional element, and that keeping an account of emotion purely
non-cognitive fails to do so.
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4.1.1 BODILY CHANGES AND THEIR FEELINGS
My theory . . . is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEP-
TION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as
they occur IS the emotion. (James 1884, 189-90)
This is how James describes his own theory. According to him, the emotion occurs
directly on perceiving some exciting fact and is not mediated or caused by a belief
or judgement, etc. Neither is the emotion constituted by any beliefs or judgements,
etc. It just is the feeling of bodily changes, which James identifies as the feeling of
visceral and muscular changes. His account is non-cognitive.
To see how the account works, consider an example. I see a car out of control
and heading towards me at great speed. This is the exciting fact. My perception
leads to my heart rate increasing, my palms sweating and my muscles tensing up.
These are visceral and muscular changes. And the feeling of my increased heart
rate, sweaty palms and tensed muscles is my emotion, fear. Because my emotion is
the feeling of the bodily changes, I would no longer experience the emotion if there
were no longer bodily changes to feel.3
In 1927, Walter Cannon wrote an attack on the physiological evidence given by
both James and Lange. With regards to James, Cannon argues that the physiolo-
gical changes in the viscera and innervation of muscles that James identifies are
not the sources of the quality of feeling of emotions. He cites evidence that the
same visceral changes occur both in different emotional states and in non-emotional
states. Nevertheless, we are able to distinguish between emotions and non-emotions
and between different emotional states on the basis of the way they feel. Cannon
thus argues that the bodily changes are not enough to distinguish between differ-
ent emotions, and concludes that ‘the responses in the viscera seem too uniform
to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing emotions which are very different
in subjective quality’ (Cannon 1927, 109). A further conclusion that he draws is
that, if James’ theory were true, then we would expect ‘not only that fear and rage
would feel alike’, because they have similar visceral changes, ‘but that chilliness,
hypoglycaemia, asphyxia, and fever should feel like them’ since they too have sim-
ilar visceral changes (100). This, clearly, is not the case. We can and do distinguish
between emotions and non-emotions and between different emotions on the basis
of the quality of how they feel.4
3The focus of James’ account is on occurrent emotion states and so it would not be an objection
that there are such things as emotional attitudes which do not have bodily profiles.
4This is not to say that we are always able to do so or that we are always right in what emotion
72
By undermining the physiological support for the theory, Cannon does not strike
a decisive blow against the core idea of the feeling theory, which is that an emotion
is constituted by a bodily change of some sort and in some combination. More
nuanced versions of feeling theories have developed the kind of bodily change in-
volved in order to address Cannon’s kind of objection. The neuroscientist Damasio
(1994), for example, proposes a modern version of a feeling theory. On his theory,
the relevant changes are not limited to bodily changes; they include neurological
ones. If this is the case, then the difference in emotional feeling may arise from
differences in neurological change, even if the bodily changes are the same.
The most important difference between James’ and Damasio’s feeling theor-
ies, however, is that Damasio identifies the emotion not with the feeling of bodily
changes but with the bodily changes themselves. For Damasio, emotions are com-
plex, automatic and unconscious bodily reactions to certain stimuli. When we are
afraid, for instance, our hearts begin to race, our muscles contract and there are
changes in our brains. This is the emotion and we need not be aware of it. Only
when we become aware of the physical changes do we experience the feeling of
fear, even though we are already in a state of fear. The emotion is the bodily change
and the feeling of the emotion is the feeling of the bodily change.
There is something quite counterintuitive to non-cognitive theories like these.
We usually think that our feeling an emotion is an immediate response to the stim-
ulus. But for both kinds of non-cognitive theory, the feelings which we ordinar-
ily classify as the emotion are instead direct responses to the bodily changes. On
James’ version, rather than feeling fear in response to the oncoming car, I feel fear
in response to my bodily changes, brought on by the car. As James notes, this is in
reverse order to our commonsense understanding of emotion, which would have me
feel fear in response to the car and then undergo bodily changes. Damasio’s view
is no less counterintuitive. For him, even while the emotion as bodily change is a
direct response to the stimulus, my conscious feeling of fear is a response to the
bodily changes and not a response to the car.
The counterintuitive appearance may be just that, an appearance. The conscious
emotion (James) or emotional feeling (Damasio) is still a response to the stimulus,
albeit mediated by bodily change. Chronologically, the emotion as feeling of bodily
change (James) or the emotional feeling of those changes which are the emotion
(Damasio) can be concurrent with the changes as they happen. The emotion (James)
or emotional feeling (Damasio) is just not a conceptually immediate response.
we identify.
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There is a deeper problem, however, which is what Cannon’s objection brings
out. It is that bodily feeling or feeling of more general neurophysiological change,
alone, cannot account for the particular quality of emotional feeling.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, we distinguish between emotions and other bodily
feelings as well as between different kinds of emotions because of the way they feel.
The way they feel could be distinguished either broadly as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ or
more nuanced, such as between two negatives like anger and fear. I also discussed
how the feeling of an emotion is the feeling of a state that is directed or targeted at
objects other than one’s body. If an emotion or emotional feeling is fundamentally
only a feeling of bodily change, the feeling theorist has the explanatory burden of
showing how emotions have a qualitative nature which sets them apart from other
kinds of feelings, explaining how we make the distinctions that we do make, and
explaining the way emotions feel like they are directed at things other than one’s
body. In the next two subsections, I shall explore this burden and see if it can be
met.
4.1.2 ACCOMMODATING THE QUALITY OF FEELING
We do occasionally confuse emotions with non-emotions and different emotions
with each other, something which does speak in favour of there being similar bodily
changes. Despite this, we usually do not confuse them and, more importantly, we
are able to identify and correct confusion. This suggests that there is a crucial
difference, a difference which cannot lie in different bodily profiles since different
emotions and emotions and non-emotions seem to have the same profiles.
In support of this idea, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962) studied
physiological arousals more broadly construed than just visceral changes. In their
study, Schachter and Singer manipulated the physiological arousal of a group of
subjects by giving them an adrenaline injection. By doing so, they induced the same
bodily state in the subjects. Schachter and Singer then introduced into the group a
‘euphoric’ or an ‘angry’ stooge who acted euphorically or angrily, respectively, to
test whether they could manipulate the emotional self-reports and behaviour of the
test subjects. The subjects in a group where the stooge acted euphorically tended to
report more positive emotions than the subjects in a group where the stooge acted
angrily. From these results, Schachter and Singer conclude that ‘[g]iven a state of
physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation’, an
arousal induced by the adrenaline injection, ‘he will label this state and describe his
feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him’ (Schachter and Singer 1962,
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398), where the cognitions were influenced by the stooge’s actions; they also con-
clude that the same feelings of physiological arousal could be labelled as different
emotions depending on the additional cognitions.
This study suggests that physiological changes are not enough to determine what
individual emotions we feel and experience. Even if some arousal is important and
even if there are subtle differences in the bodily description for different emotions
which we have not yet identified, Schachter and Singer’s study suggests that the
emotion we experience is in part determined by something beyond the feeling of
the body state, something like a cognition or an interpretation of that feeling within
some context, and not just by the bodily changes and the feeling of the changes, as
James and Damasio suggest.
The non-cognitivist could respond that the results only show that cognitions
sometimes cause emotions, not that they always do, nor that they are constitutive
of the emotion itself. After all, the subjects start in the same state of arousal but
the self-reporting euphoric and angry subjects may have different bodily profiles
corresponding to their self-reported emotional states by the end. Neither does being
caused by a cognition in one instance entail that emotions are always caused by
cognitions. In addition, someone could experience her bodily feelings, wrongly
classify them, and yet still be experiencing a different emotion. Interpreting the
feeling one way does not make the experience whichever emotion the report says it
is.
These responses, though they have some force, fail to meet the point that the
study demonstrates, namely that the bodily arousal is not enough to generate dis-
tinct emotions. It is the bodily arousal plus an interpretation of the feeling within
a context which leads the subject consciously to experience an emotion. Whether
her interpretation is correct or not, some interpretation is required and the emotion
is not a response solely to bodily changes. Later studies provide further data to sup-
port the claim that bodily changes alone are insufficient for an emotion, even when
manipulating processes in the brain to constitute one emotion rather than another.5
Where does this leave a refined feeling theory like Damasio’s, where an emotion
just is the somatic change? Damasio’s theory is compatible with Schachter and
Singer’s findings because, if there is no physiological arousal in the first place, then
there is no arousal to be interpreted and no corresponding emotion to be reported.
The physiological arousal would be Damasio’s emotion and what is reported would
5See Barrett et al. (2007) for a summary of a range of studies and the argument that stimulating
regions of the brain that are supposedly the base of certain emotions rarely produces experiences of
discrete emotions.
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be the feeling of the emotion. However, the particular feeling of an emotion is
the current focus, and so the relevant part of Damasio’s theory to be examining is
the emotional feeling. And here we see that, even if we were to accept Damasio’s
definition of an emotion as bodily changes and even if we were to accept that each
emotion has a distinct physiological or neural profile, the feeling of the emotional
experience still depends on factors other than that profile. What Schachter and
Singer show with their manipulation of conditions is that the feeling and qualitative
nature of an emotion is in part dependent on cognitive factors. If we are seeking
to explain the conscious experiential side of an emotion, the qualitative nature of
emotional feelings, something other than the bodily change has to come in.
As discussed in chapters 1 and 3, one of the major ways in which bodily sensa-
tions are distinct from emotional feeling is that emotional feeling involves the state
being directed at objects external to the body whereas mere bodily feelings do not;
I called this the ‘intentional quality’. The challenge for the non-cognitivist is to
show how this can work. If the non-cognitivist is to meet the challenge illustrated
by Schachter and Singer’s experiment, then she needs to show how emotions have
their intentional quality, a quality which distinguishes both between different emo-
tions and between emotions and mere bodily sensations, and do so in a way which
does not introduce elements that detract from her core claim, that emotions are non-
cognitive. Prinz (2004) takes up this challenge and argues that the bodily changes
are the means by which one tracks and represents external stimuli.
4.1.3 PRINZ AND EMBODIED APPRAISALS
Prinz (2004) develops a neo-Jamesian feeling theory, what he calls an ‘embodied
appraisal’ account of emotions. It is neo-Jamesian because he argues that emotions
are fundamentally feelings of bodily changes; in particular, he argues that emotions
are perceptions of bodily changes. It is an ‘embodied appraisal’ account because he
argues that emotions represent an evaluative property through changes in the body,
but are not thereby cognitive. This evaluative property that emotions represent is
the formal object, what Prinz defines as ‘the property in virtue of which an event
elicits an emotion’ (Prinz 2004, 62). He proposes that Richard Lazarus’ ‘core re-
lational themes’, some of which I introduced in a table in footnote 13 in Chapter 1
when discussing the formal object, are good candidates or approximations for what
emotions represent, namely the formal object.6 For example, sadness represents
6He rejects other details of Lazarus’ account of emotion, however, such as Lazarus’ key idea that
the core relational themes correspond to inner judgements, and are not simply external conditions as
Prinz will maintain (Prinz 2004, 65).
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and is elicited by the property of being a loss; fear represents and is elicited by the
property of being dangerous; anger represents and is elicited by the property of be-
ing a demeaning offence; love represents and is elicited by the property of inspiring
affection. While Prinz uses both ‘core relational theme’ and ‘formal object’ to refer
to what an emotion represents and is elicted by, I shall use ‘formal object’ in order
to be consistent with my own terminology.
In order to flesh out how Prinz’s account works, I start by introducing Prinz’s
idiosyncratic definitions of cognitive acts, cognitions and perception, before turning
to his understanding of representation and of dual content. Because my aim in this
section is to see if a plausible account can be given of the intentional quality of
emotions without detracting from the non-cognitivist’s core claim that emotions
are non-cognitive, I accept these background commitments. I then turn to show
how Prinz’s account fails by its own lights and end by generalising my conclusion
regarding Prinz to all approaches which deny that emotions are cognitive in any
important respect.
Prinz has idiosyncratic definitions of cognitive acts, cognitions and perception.
‘Cognitive states and processes’, Prinz writes, ‘are those that exploit representa-
tions that are under the control of the organism rather than under the control of the
environment’, meaning that, in cognitive states and processes, the representation is
activated by or maintained in working memory (Prinz 2004, 45-46).7 A cognitive
act is one which results in a cognitive state and makes use of a cognitive process.
The representations that are under the control of the organism, at least in a dispos-
itional sense, are cognitions. Cognitions include representations that are concepts
and the control is dispositional because it is possible for a cognition to be produced
automatically and not be intentionally brought forward from memory, which are
cases of what Prinz calls ‘unthought thoughts’ (46). This might happen, for ex-
ample, on seeing a dog and forming a thought of a dog. In such a case, we do not
draw on the cognition actively or intentionally but we do have dispositional control
of it because we can go on to think about dogs or identify what we are seeing as a
dog.
In contrast to a cognitive state or process, perception is a dedicated input mech-
anism. Perceptual representations arise from ‘out of the brain’ (Prinz 2004, 222),
meaning that they result from external inputs and are not under our control. Nev-
7This is idiosyncratic because cognitive states are often not thought of as under our control. We
cannot believe simply on the basis of choosing to, for example. By ‘under control’, Prinz really
means that we are drawing on concepts from memory. Thanks to Sasha Vereker for raising this
idiosyncracy and helping me to clarify Prinz’s view.
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ertheless, perception can also produce cognitions, as we see in the case of the ‘un-
thought thought’ of a dog. Perceptual representations and cognitions, however, are
different things. Imagine that you see a dog and automatically form a ‘dog’ thought
such as, ‘that is a dog’. The content of your thought is made up of a cognition but
it is not the result of a cognitive act. You could also just see something which looks
like a dog and form no thought about it. You still have a representation of what you
are seeing, but this time it is a perceptual representation that is not a cognition.
With these background definitions to hand, we can turn to Prinz’s embodied
appraisal account. To flesh out how it works, I shall have to say more about Prinz’s
understanding of representation and of concepts and their dual content.
Core to Prinz’s account is the idea that emotions track and represent their formal
object by tracking bodily changes. Prinz makes use of Fred Dretske’s (1981, 1986)
causal notion of representation, according to which something is a representation
of an X if it is reliably caused by and co-varies with Xs. Emotions, according
to Prinz, are reliably caused by and co-vary with their formal objects. The formal
objects, however, are the indirect causes of the emotions. The direct causes which
the emotion also co-varies with are changes in the body. Nevertheless, the emo-
tion functions to represent the formal object and not the bodily change because it
co-varies with the formal objects of which the bodily changes are simply the ap-
pearances.
In order to support this, Prinz draws on his theory of dual content for concepts,
developed in Prinz (2000) and Prinz (2002). There, he aims to develop a strongly
empirical theory of concepts, inspired by John Locke’s ideas of nominal and real
essences. According to his theory, concepts have a dual content that is made up of
representations of appearances and representations of essences, where the essence is
the property in virtue of which something is the thing it is and has the appearances it
has. The representations of appearances make up the nominal content of a concept,
and the representations of essences make up the real content.
For example, a concept of a dog has both nominal and real content. It represents
the doggy features which make up the appearance. It also represents the doggy
essence—its doghood—which makes a dog a real dog and have the appearance that
it does, perhaps something like a genome. Despite this dual content, our concept of
‘dog’ functions to represent real dogs and not just doggy appearances because real
dogs have their doggy appearances in virtue of having the doggy essence. In the case
of emotion, the essence of an emotion is its formal object, the evaluative relations,
and the appearance is how that essence is manifested in our bodies. For Prinz, the
bodily changes that occur are ones which have an evolutionary history for preparing
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us for responses of the right kind (Prinz 2004, 68-69). For example, physiological
priming for flight when there is danger would be evolutionarily advantageous. So,
in virtue of some evaluative relation obtaining, certain bodily changes are what
they are, and emotions function to represent the formal objects which are the real
essence.
We thus see how Prinz argues that, as perceptions of bodily changes, emotions
are also perceptions of the formal objects much like perceptions of the appearance
of a dog can also be a perception of a real dog. Because perception is not a cog-
nitive act on Prinz’s characterisation of cognitive acts, neither is an emotion. Even
those who endorse cognitive accounts of emotions can agree with this, however, be-
cause they could accept that an emotion does not actively involve bringing forward
a representation from memory, but maintain that an emotion still involves concepts.
Prinz therefore needs an even stronger claim, which he does in fact make: emotions
do not necessarily involve cognitions (Prinz 2004, 49-50). It is this last claim which
Prinz needs to show is true but, as I shall now argue, he fails to do.
If emotions are perceptions, then the representations involved in an emotion
must not be under the organism’s control; that is, they must not be brought forward
from memory. This is according to Prinz’s own definition of perception. But they
also must not involve cognitions. So, if emotions are perceptions not only of bodily
changes but also of the evaluative relations that make up the formal object, then they
represent the evaluative relations without cognitions. However, emotions cannot
represent the formal object without cognitions.8 This is because we need cognitions
in order to avoid the disjunction problem facing causal accounts of representation
like Dretske’s, on which Prinz bases his own account of representation.
The general problem is this.9 If a state represents what it is reliably caused by
and co-varies with, then it seems that there cannot be cases of misrepresentation.
This is because a state representing X may be activated when either an X or an
X-lookalike is in the environment and is therefore reliably caused by and co-varies
with both Xs and X-lookalikes. Such a state does not represent X but rather the
disjunction of X or X-lookalike. So, the state cannot misrepresent X when there is
an X-lookalike because it actually represents both Xs and X-lookalikes. However,
we want a theory of representation to allow that there can be misrepresentation and
8Mikko Salmela (2011) provides arguments for a comprehensive rejection of Prinz’s position.
My objection is similar in kind to Salmela’s second objection, which is that emotions still involve
cognitions.
9See Jerry Fodor’s ‘Semantics: Wisconsin style’ (1984) for the coining of the term ‘the disjunc-
tion problem’, as well as Dretske (1981, 1986), Fodor (1989) and Millikan (1989) for the problem
and a selection of proposed solutions.
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to be robust enough to rule out X-lookalikes. Causal theories are thus found wanting.
Consider seeing a dog. We want to say that my perceptual state represents a dog.
However, my perceptual representation of a dog is also activated when I see a wolf
on a dark night. My perceptual state of a dog tracks both dogs and wolves-on-dark-
nights, and therefore represents the disjunction of dog or wolf-on-a-dark-night. If
so, then when I think that I see a dog but instead see a wolf-on-a-dark-night, I am
not misrepresenting what is there.
The disjunction problem is a problem for Prinz not just because it is a general
problem for his causal account of representation, but particularly for his account of
emotions because of his dual-theory of content. A perceptual representation of the
appearances of a dog on a dark night and a perceptual representation of the appear-
ances of a wolf on a dark night are identical, yet only one of them will track the real
essence of doghood and represent a real dog. The perceptual representation, as is,
represents a disjunction of something that is either a real dog or a dog look-alike but
it does not represent the essence of doghood because the disjunction dog or wolf-
on-a-dark-night does not have an essence that is the same as doghood. Similarly,
an emotional experience could represent either bodily changes that are the appear-
ance of evaluative relations, or it could represent bodily changes that are not. But
representing the disjunction is not representing the essence, the formal object.
There have been various proposals for solving the disjunction problem, such
as Jerry Fodor’s theory of asymmetrical dependency (Fodor 1989), and Prinz puts
forward his own in Prinz (2000). There, he appeals to an observational and learn-
ing process whereby we form concepts, what Prinz calls ‘proxytypes’. In forming
concepts, we fine-tune our representations until they only track Xs and are only
activated by an X , thereby only representing X and not a disjunction. In this way,
the representation of ‘dog’ comes only to represent dogs and not the disjunction of
dog or wolf-on-a-dark-night.
But note that Prinz’s solution to the disjunction problem involves the develop-
ment and use of concepts, which are forms of cognitions. The concept and not the
perceptual representation is what represents both the appearance and essence. If
so, then a perceptual representation does not represent the essence. Simply seeing
doggy features does not represent doghood, and simply feeling bodily changes does
not represent evaluative relations.
Perhaps Prinz could respond that, once we have developed the proxytype or
concept, our capacity for the relevant perceptual representations too will be suffi-
ciently developed. This response is not open to him, however, because it undermines
the distinction he wants to make between perceptual representations and cognitions.
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Above, I discussed Prinz’s example of seeing a dog. If you identify the perceptual
representation as being of a dog or have an ‘unthought thought’ of a dog, then you
have a cognition. If the perceptual representation is not to be a cognition and is
to remain solely the result of external stimuli, then we cannot draw on a concept
from memory to identify that it is a dog and not a disjunction of dog or wolf-on-
a-dark-night. Again, representations of doghood are not perceptual representations
alone.
A similar story must be given for emotions. In order for an experience to repres-
ent the evaluative relations, it must track the bodily changes that are the appearances
of the evaluative relations and not the bodily changes that are not. But in order to
do so, we need to learn and observe when the correct kind of appearances obtain.
That is, we need to develop the relevant kind of concept or cognition. If our ex-
perience represents the essence, the formal object, and not just the appearance, our
experience is making use of a cognition, which is exactly what Prinz wants to deny.
He therefore fails to show how emotions can represent the formal objects without
cognitions.
My discussion of Prinz has been solely in his terms, which are controversial in
their own right. So, my rejection of his account does not sound a death-toll for all
non-cognitive theories. Nevertheless, there is a general point that can be drawn out,
which is that the formal object is, quite simply, not the same as bodily changes.
Experiencing the bodily changes that are associated with an emotion rather than
bodily changes, simpliciter, must be mediated by some cognitive state. That cognit-
ive state may just be one that is triggered in the right environment and so it does not
follow that emotions will be the same as beliefs or judgements. It only follows that
emotions are not purely non-cognitive. I therefore now turn to examining cognitive
approaches to emotions.
4.2 VIEWS WHICH FOREGROUND COGNITIONS
Emotions are about things other than one’s body, giving them their particular inten-
tional quality. It is this external focus of emotions which the non-cognitive accounts
I have discussed have struggled to capture. In this section, I go from one extreme to
the other, and introduce cognitive accounts which propose that emotions are consti-
tuted by either beliefs or judgements. While such accounts are able to accommodate
the intentional element of emotions, I argue that they do so in a way which is either
too cognitive or trivial.
In section 4.2.1, I begin by looking at a representative account of an approach
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which analyses emotions in terms of beliefs and desires in order to explain how
emotions have the intentional nature that they do. I shall argue that such an ap-
proach is problematic because it over-intellectualises emotions. In section 4.2.2, I
shall look at other versions of cognitive accounts, judgement accounts. While such
accounts are more nuanced and do not require that emotions involve belief, they do
draw on the idea that emotions involve assenting to the way things appear. Never-
theless, such accounts also run into problems, most crucially that they are ultimately
trivial. In section 4.3, I therefore turn to a third alternative, which is that emotions
are weakly cognitive in a way much like perception is.
4.2.1 BELIEF-DESIRE ACCOUNTS
Early contemporary attempts to capture the intentional aspect of emotion in philo-
sophy did so in terms of beliefs and desire. As an example of this kind of approach,
let us look at Joel Marks’ (1982) account of emotion.
Marks argues that emotions are belief-desire sets characterised by a strong de-
sire.10 Joan’s fearing the dog, for example, is the same as Joan’s believing that
the dog is threatening to bite me and strongly desiring to avoid it. The desire is
supposed to capture the affective and motivating element of an emotion; the belief
the intentional element that the dog is threatening to bite her; the two together the
evaluative element: the dog is threatening to bite and Joan desires to avoid it. In
terms already familiar to us, the belief has the content that the dog is threatening to
bite me and the particular object of the emotion is also the object of the proposition
which makes up the content of the belief; in this case, it is the dog. The formal
object is the full evaluative content of what is ascribed to the particular object. In
this example, it is that the dog is threatening to bite me and I am desiring to avoid
it.
Marks requires that the desire is a strong desire in order to distinguish between
belief-desire pairs which are emotions and belief-desire pairs which are not. The
difference between the emotion and the non-emotion, for Marks, is not in content
but in strength of desire. The belief-desire set in turn causes certain physiological
changes which characterise the bodily feeling of emotion.
Such accounts of emotions have been roundly rejected. The most compelling
objection is that such an account over-intellectualises emotions. The content of an
emotion, on this kind of view, is the content of a belief, which is a proposition.
By being afraid, the content of Joan’s emotion is that the dog is threatening to bite
10For other belief-desire combination accounts, see John Searle (1983) and O. H. Green (1992).
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me, a proposition which is in turn about the dog. This means that emotions require
grasp of the meaning of a proposition in order to be experienced, and grasping a
proposition requires language. This rules out pre-linguistic infants and non-human
animals from experiencing emotions, a consequence which is wrong.
Such accounts also give rather strange stories for emotional feelings. For Marks,
fear is having a relevant belief and a strong desire. But what is a strong desire and
how do we measure it? Usual ways in a which a desire is strong and which we use
to measure its strength are in how strong the compulsion is for us to act on it, and
in how difficult it is to think of other things. But it then seems that someone can
have an emotion without a strong desire. For example, I can be afraid of the height
of the diving board at the public swimming pool. My fear manifests as an obvious
and difficult-to-ignore nervous energy but, if I desire to avoid the diving board, it
is not a strong desire. This is seen in the way that I easily ignore the desire as I
nervously and fearfully climb the ladder to the take the plunge; my desire does not
dominate my thoughts. Perhaps my fearful desire is strong but outweighed by other
desires, such as the desire to do something I have never done before or my desire
to win a medal. But, again, on what basis do we say it is a strong desire? It neither
dominates my thoughts nor noticeably compels me to act, affecting my subsequent
action choices. It is not identifiable in a way in which a strong desire is normally
identifiable. If my desire is merely a weak one, then there is nothing special to the
belief-desire set which distinguishes the same beliefs and desires but without the
emotion.
Finally, we might question whether emotions are the kind of thing which can
be broken down into beliefs and desires in the first place. A range of philosophers
including Peter Goldie (2000), Sabine Do¨ring (2003), Bennett Helm (2001) and
Andrea Scarantino (2010) have all argued that emotions are neither belief-like nor
desire-like because they do not have the correct directions of fit. Beliefs are taken
to have mind-to-world direction of fit because we revise our beliefs in light of the
way things are in the world, whereas desires are taken to have a world-to-mind
direction of fit because we strive to change things to match what we desire. If
being a conjunction entails that we can separate out the two conjuncts, as Scarantino
(2010, 361-62) argues, then if an emotion is a conjunct of belief and desire, we
should be able to separate out the belief and the desire of an emotion. However,
we cannot because of the very nature of the intentional content of an emotion. For
example, while fear is a response to something dangerous that obtains, and in that
way is belief-like, it is also desire-like because we are motivated to change things
because there is something dangerous that obtains. As Scarantino puts it:
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. . . being motivated to get away from a snake while fearing it is insep-
arable from representing it as dangerous and not freely employable in
practical inferences, as the desire to get away from a snake would be.
(Scarantino 2010, 361)
I have only given a very brief overview of belief-desire models and the kind of
problems they face because such models are widely agreed to be unsuccessful. They
both over-intellectualise emotions and are not able to give a correct characterisation
of the kind of state that emotions are. We should therefore turn to more credible
contenders for cognitive accounts of emotions.
4.2.2 JUDGEMENT ACCOUNTS
Another kind of cognitive approach to emotions, one that is aimed at getting around
the over-intellectualisation challenge, is that emotions are or involve judgements of
a particular kind.
Judgements are usually taken to involve taking a proposition to be true. One
objection to very basic forms of judgement accounts is that such accounts are no
better than the belief-desire model. This is because making a judgement is forming
a propositional attitude and so, like belief-desire models, this rules out animals and
infants from experiencing emotions. Another objection is that it seems that we can
experience an emotion but also judge that things are not as the emotion represents
them. If so, then such accounts make implausible claims about the irrationality of
emotional experiences (Deigh 2010, 26-27). These are both compelling objections,
and so I jump directly to judgement accounts which use a wider notion of judgement
in order to avoid such problems. I shall examine two versions, those of Martha
Nussbaum (2001) and Robert Solomon (1976, 2004). I first introduce each of the
versions, showing how they attempt to get around the problems facing the belief
model, before raising two problems that affect any version of a judgement account.
Nussbaum (2001) presents a cognitive theory and even denies the importance of
bodily feelings for emotions. For her, an emotion is an assent to an appearance of
how our goals are faring and how we are flourishing. This assent to an appearance
is a judgement and only requires receiving and processing information together
with some basic positional and causal thinking. It does not require propositional
thinking. In other words, the kind of judgement involved in emotions is not one
which necessarily takes a proposition as its object. Because Nussbaum has this
minimal cognitive requirement and does not require judging that a proposition is
true, she believes that her theory can accommodate infant and animal emotions. And
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because the kind of judgement she requires is not assenting to a proposition, she
believes that we can also hold beliefs that are in contradiction to what our emotions
are about. She dismisses the importance of bodily feelings by arguing that the
phenomenology of an emotion just is the phenomenology of fully assenting to an
appearance.
Solomon (1976, 2004) argues that emotions are complexes of judgements of a
very particular kind. They are evaluative judgements which are subjective engage-
ments with the world. They need not be the singular judgements we use to define
them and they need not be deliberative or reflective, articulate or fully conscious.
This keeps the cognitive involvement to a minimum: emotions are responses which
require only recognition and we do not need to be able to articulate what we recog-
nise (Solomon 2004, 79).
In his later work, Solomon incorporates the distinctive phenomenology of emo-
tion into his account by arguing that it is the bodily feeling. He accepts that we must
incorporate into an account of emotions the workings of the autonomic nervous sys-
tem, as well as the phenomenological manifestations of bodily preparation such as
assuming a response posture. In this way, his account is importantly different to
Nussbaum’s. While he accepts these physical aspects to an emotion, he maintains
that ‘these are not just sensations or perceptions of goings-on in the body’ (Solomon
2004, 86)—contra the kind of feeling theories I have already discussed. Rather,
‘[b]oth arousal and action readiness should be subsumed under the more general
phenomenological rubric of getting engaged with the world’ (86). In other words,
the bodily feelings are feelings of the body being engaged with the world, which
is what an emotional judgement is for Solomon. So, the feeling of an emotion is a
judgement of the body (87).
By fleshing out the relevant judgement as a kind which need not be deliberative,
articulate, fully conscious, and which requires only recognition, Solomon provides
a way around the objection of over-intellectualisation facing the belief-desire the-
orist. The emotional subject need not form explicit beliefs about the way things
are; rather, she simply recognises that things are that way and the emotion is the
recognition. This recognition can be non-propositional and the kind of judgement
involved with emotion is ‘engagement with the world’, allowing for a kind of bodily
judgement and thus incorporating feelings directly.
In these ways, both Solomon and Nussbaum propose accounts that aim to get
around the propositional problem facing the belief theorist, and they both give some
minimalist story for emotional feeling. Despite this, their accounts are not satisfact-
ory. There are two main problems which together make up what has been called
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the ‘fear of flying’ objection (de Sousa 2014): the judgement is not sufficient for an
emotion and neither is the judgement necessary for an emotion.11
The first problem is that a judgement is not sufficient for an emotion. One
can make an evaluative judgement of the appropriate kind yet not experience an
emotion. For example, if you cut me off in traffic, I can judge that what you did
was offensive and insulting, yet not feel any anger (Robinson 2004). Therefore, the
evaluative judgement is not sufficient for an emotion.
The earlier Solomon attempts to get around this kind of problem by describing
emotions as a particular kind of self-involved and intense judgement. But, as Jenefer
Robinson (2004) points out, judgements are not usually thought of as lying on an
intensity scale. Unless we do already accept that emotions are examples of such
judgements, there is no reason to suppose that they are intense judgements at all.
Early Solomon risks begging the question.
In later Solomon, we find a better answer. There, as we have seen, he argues
that emotions are complexes of judgements, including bodily engagements with
the world. While we might define anger as the judgement that what you did was
offensive and insulting, he argues that it does not follow that this judgement is the
judgement in an emotion, or that it is the only judgement involved. Indeed, the very
fact that I am experiencing an emotion suggests otherwise. In particular there is a
judgement of the body as well as other judgements which are engagements with the
world.
In support of this multi-judgement view, Solomon argues that emotions are not
simple one-valence things. That is, love is not always only good or pleasant; anger
is not always only bad and unpleasant. They are made up of many different elements
and it is simplistic to reduce them to a single judgement with a single evaluation cor-
responding to a single, simple, valence. This is quite true. The feelings of emotions
are complex—just think of the enjoyment of self-righteous anger—and introducing
a range of judgements is one way to deal with the complexity. However, Solomon’s
solution brings with it new worries which undermine the idea that emotions are
judgements. I shall return to these below, once I have presented Nussbaum’s solu-
tion to the problem.
Nussbuam also denies that the judgements are the same in the case of an emo-
tion and in the case of an analogous judgement without the emotion. If an emotional
judgement is an assent to an appearance and if I judge that what you did was of-
11This objection is the ‘fear of flying’ objection because of the example that Michael Stocker
(1992) uses: I may be aware that flying is the best means of transport and judge that it is not danger-
ous and yet still feel afraid.
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fensive and insulting but am not angry, I have not fully assented to the appearance
as offensive and insulting. I may have endorsed the proposition that it is offensive
and insulting, but this need not be the same as the emotional judgement. In other
words, I am not making the same judgement and it is not a problem that I do not
experience an emotion.
These kind of responses are dogmatic. Both Nussbaum and Solomon stipulate
what a judgement is in order to incorporate emotions under the term, but are not
convincing in showing why we should adopt their definitions if we did not already
accept that emotions are an example, or involve examples, of a special kind of
judgement. Scarantino (2010) calls this strategy of modifying and stretching the
notion of judgement to fit emotions the ‘Elastic Strategy’. As he forcefully argues,
such a strategy makes the judgementalist model at best trivially true because, by
definition, an emotion will be a judgement. But, at worst, the judgementalist model
is not falsifiable because each counterexample is addressed by stretching the notion
of judgement a little bit more.
With regards to Solomon’s proposal, we see the Elastic Strategy at work in the
way it remains mysterious how a bodily judgement integrates with what we usually
think of as judgements to create a unified emotional experience. While emotions
do not have simple valences, we still have an experience of anger, say, and not an
experience of bodily engagement with the world plus my (negative) judgement that
I have been offended plus my (positive) judgement that I am in the right. Having
this multiplicity of judgements in what is, phenomenologically, a single experience
is mysterious. We can adjust what we mean by ‘judgement’ until we no longer mean
what we usually do when we talk about judging that thus-and-so is the case, which
is what Solomon does. But we have no reason to thus widen our understanding of
judgement in order to incorporate emotions unless we already believe that emotions
are like judgements.
With regards to Nussbaum’s proposal, we are left wondering why fully assent-
ing to appearance is importantly different to neutrally judging that the appearance
is the case, or why it has its own specific phenomenology. If fully assenting to
an appearance feels a certain way, does that mean that people making a judgement
with a propositional content which expresses that appearance are not fully assenting
to how things are? This is despite believing that judgements of the usual kind are
assenting to the way things are by taking an attitude of truth towards its content.
For instance, a judge assents to the judgement that there has been a murder but does
not necessarily feel angry. Does this mean that we are engaged in an elaborate error
theory when we think that judgements are truth attitudes? These are just questions,
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not arguments. I merely wish to draw attention to how much such judgement the-
ories require adopting a very different notion of judgement which, if we did not
already think that emotions involve judgements, there are no good reasons to accept
and perhaps even good reasons for rejecting.
The second problem is that the judgement is not necessary for an emotion. In
a famous debate in the 1980s with the cognitive psychologist Richard Lazarus, the
non-cognitive psychologist Robert Zajonc argued that emotions do not involve cog-
nitions like judgements. For example, in ‘Feeling and Thinking: Preferences need
no inferences’, Zajonc (1980) argues that studies on recognition support the idea
that faster affective reactions, such as liking something with which one is familiar,
occur before the slower cognitive judgement, such as recognising that something is
familiar.12 He interpreted data like this as showing that the cognitive act takes too
long for there to be an emotional experience.
For Zajonc, cognitions are full-blown judgements that happen after a sensory
input, and it is clear that we can experience an affective state without making such
a judgement in this sense. Therefore, on that interpretation, the judgement model
must be rejected. However, as we have seen, neither Nussbaum nor Solomon think
of judgement in this way and neither did Lazarus, who endorsed a broader definition
of cognition. If we water down the cognitivist claims, then we could argue that the
judgement is still necessary for there to be an emotion and not just an affective
reaction (Barrett et al. 2007). If we follow this route, then Zajonc’s data can be
interpreted to show that we can have faster affective reactions, but that we only
experience an emotion once some simple cognition gets involved. Barrett et al.,
for instance, propose a primitive kind of evaluation, one which is subconscious
and functions independently of more complex cognitions. If we insist on calling
such cognitions ‘judgements’, however, we return to the first problem of the Elastic
Strategy.
Judgement models of emotions are not satisfactory. While they are better placed
than belief-desire models because they do not require that emotions are fundament-
ally about propositions, they are ultimately trivial and uninformative. Nevertheless,
the failure of judgement models does not show that all cognitive accounts of emo-
tion are lost. It may still be the case that emotions involve a primitive kind of
evaluation that is not a judgement. In the last section of this chapter, I shall explore
how we can make sense of this idea by adopting a perceptual analogy.
12For an overview of the debate, see Schorr (2001). The debate between Lazarus and Zajonc
ultimately arose out of different definitions of cognition (Leventhal and Scherer 1987) and was even
about quite different features of emotion (Lewis 2010).
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4.3 WEAK COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS
In section 4.1, I argued that pure non-cognitive accounts of emotion fail because
they cannot accommodate the intentional element of emotion. Some cognitive in-
volvement is required. In section 4.2, I argued that strong cognitive accounts of
emotion will also not work, either because emotions come out as too cognitively
complex or because the account becomes trivial. Nevertheless, emotions are still
intentional and we need an account of emotion which is able to capture this.
In this last section, I explore a final option, that of weak cognitive accounts. I
first introduce Scarantino’s distinctions between different forms of cognitivism as a
means to establish what the different kinds of claims a cognitivist could be making
are. Doing so allows us to see that emotions do not have to be analysed in terms of
cognitive states with which we are familiar, such as beliefs and judgements, in order
to have the intentional nature that they have, and it opens the way for a whole new
approach to emotions. I shall end the chapter by introducing one such approach,
that of modelling emotion on perception.
4.3.1 DIFFERENT KINDS OF COGNITIVISM
In discussing cognitive accounts of emotion, Scarantino (2010) distinguishes between
three different kinds of cognitive claims. His discussion helps to set up a frame-
work to compare different cognitive accounts, to pinpoint where accounts like Nuss-
baum’s and Solomon’s go wrong, and to establish what a successful account needs
to do. I shall therefore draw on it in order to motivate the kind of approach that
should be taken in giving an account of occurrent emotions.
Scarantino divides the various cognitivist positions into three groups, each mak-
ing one of three different claims. These groups and claims are:
1. Constitutive Cognitivism: emotions are essentially judgements.
2. Etiological Cognitivism: emotions are caused by an appraisal.
3. Representational Cognitivism: emotions represent their formal objects.
Nussbaum and Solomon are examples of the Constitutive Cognitivist because
they claim that emotions are essentially judgements of a particular kind, and so
experiencing an emotion is making a judgement. Constitutive Cognitivism fails
for the reasons presented in the previous section. It is at best trivially true and, as
Scarantino writes:
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Introducing a seemingly unitary construct into a mongrel of evaluative,
physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioural and mental
components leads us to lose track of the way in which components
contribute towards something being an emotion E. (Scarantino 2010,
749)
Etiological Cognitivism is the subject of the Lazarus-Zajonc debate and Schachter
and Singer would also fall under Etiological Cognitivism. They are all concerned
with whether an emotion is caused by an appraisal or a cognition and do not ne-
cessarily say anything about whether that appraisal or cognition also constitutes
the emotion. Whether or not an emotion is caused by an appraisal or a cognition
of some sort will depend on what that appraisal or cognition involves. If it is a
full-blown judgement, then Etiological Cognitivism is false. If it is some primitive
evaluation of the kind that Barrett et al. (2007) endorse, then the jury is still out.
Representational Cognitivism only ‘states that emotions, whatever they are and
however they are caused, are intentional states of a particular sort’ (Scarantino
2010, 756). An emotion could be intentional by being a judgement or belief, but
it could also be intentional by being an evaluative feeling (Helm 2009), a feeling
towards (Goldie 2000), pleasant or unpleasant feelings about some features attrib-
uted to the object of an emotion (Greenspan 1988), an evaluative construal of how
things are (Roberts 1988), perhaps an evaluative attitude (Deonna and Teroni 2012),
or even a perception of an evaluative property—the last of which I shall use as an il-
lustration of a weaker cognitive account in section 4.3.2. Despite the problems with
the cognitive accounts I have discussed, by distinguishing between Representational
and Constitutive Cognitivism, we are not forced into abandoning cognitivism tout
court.
The insightful idea behind both Solomon’s and Nussbaum’s accounts is that we
are recognising a situation as being a certain way, but we now see that the kind of
recognition need not be judging that it is that way and we can conclude that, just in
virtue of having an intentional nature, emotions do not have to be analysed in terms
of cognitive states with which we are familiar, such as beliefs and judgements. In
fact, we cannot do so.
4.3.2 PERCEPTUAL MODELS
In this last section, I introduce one example of a way in which an emotion could
be intentional without involving a belief or a judgement, and that is by being like
perception. I focus on perceptual accounts to illustrate a weaker cognitive account
rather than one of the others I named above for three main reasons.
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The first reason is that I want to illustrate how an intentional state can be min-
imally cognitive but have a rich intentional nature. The perceptual model illustrates
this well. The second reason is that many of the weaker accounts can themselves
either be interpreted in ways that are compatible with a perceptual reading—for ex-
ample, the emotional ‘modality’, as such, could be an evaluative feeling or a feeling
towards—or are not substantial improvements on the judgement accounts.13 Fur-
ther, as John Deigh (2010) and Michael Brady (2013) both draw attention to, the
shift within weaker cognitive accounts is towards accounts that are perceptual in
nature. The third reason is that I wish to stay as neutral as possible with regards
to which account we should adopt, and my discussion of the perceptual model will
be general in a way that discussions of an individual proposal cannot. Ultimately,
my aim in focusing on the perceptual model is to provide an illustrative account of
emotions which I can use to structure my subsequent discussions, one which is at
least, if not more, plausible than its contenders. The most important commitment
I have is to the way in which, on the perceptual model, there is a robust sense in
which emotions inform us of how things are.
With this in mind, I will begin by laying out what the perceptual model generally
endorses, showing how, as an analogy, it illustrates a way in which emotions can be
intentional states but weakly cognitive. I will emphasise how emotions can inform
us of how things are, something which the perceptual model highlights nicely. I
will end the section by flagging a few worries but concluding that, nonetheless, the
perceptual model is a good working model to have to hand.
While the details of the different perceptual accounts vary,14 the core idea is that
emotions are (or are like) perceptual experiences.15 As we saw with Prinz (2004),
Prinz thinks that emotions are perceptual experiences of both bodily changes and of
the formal object of an emotion. The dominant view amongst perceptual theorists,
however, is that emotions are perceptual experiences of values or evaluative prop-
13Deonna and Teroni (2012, 55) argue that accounts like Greenspan’s and Roberts’ are still too
cognitively complex and Brady (2013, 28) argues that such accounts make emotions active in a way
that they are not.
14Versions of the perceptual model or models which have similar core claims can be found in
de Sousa (1987), Jones (2003), Deonna (2006), Do¨ring (2007, 2008), Tappolet (2005, 2012). Critics
of different aspects of the perceptual model include Deigh (2010), Salmela (2011), Whiting (2012),
Brady (2013).
15We need to be aware of the difference between ‘perception’ and ‘perceptual experience’. As
Brady (2013, 46-47) notes, perceptions are factive but emotions are not. Perceptual experiences,
on the other hand, are not factive. However, emotion theorists do not seem to use ‘perception’ in
the same factive way as perceptual theorists, and we should not interpret the emotion theorist as
necessarily endorsing a view of emotions as factive. We should therefore rather compare emotions
with perceptual experiences.
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erties; that is, they are perceptual experiences of the formal object of an emotion.
Christine Tappolet writes:
According to the perceptual account, emotions are perceptions of val-
ues. Thus, fear would consist in perceiving something as fearsome, dis-
gust as perceiving something as disgusting, shame in perceiving some-
thing as shameful, and so forth for every distinct kind of emotion. (Tap-
polet 2012, 206-207)
We could interpret the perceptual claim in at least three ways, two literal and
one as an analogy. On the first literal interpretation, emotions are their own form
of sensory modality. One could say that the modalities include seeing, hearing,
tasting, touching, proprioception—and emoting. Prinz (2004), for example, argues
that emotion is ‘perceiving one’s place in the world’ via perceiving bodily states.
Through a kind of bodily feeling, emotions are a special kind of perception. He
does not think that the dependence that emotion has on other states undermines the
thought that it is a distinct modality; he in fact argues that other modalities can also
be dependent on other modalities, as happens with synaesthesia.
This interpretation is problematic. Demian Whiting (2012) argues that the feel-
ing of an emotion, such as the edginess of fear, does not alone represent the evaluat-
ive property, such as the dangerous or the frightening. He writes, ‘the representation
of there being a dangerous (or fearsome) object in front of me is no part of the ex-
perience of the unpleasant edgy sensation that pervades my guts and limbs when I
am frightened’ (Whiting 2012, 97).16 This I agree with, as we saw in section 4.1. If
the emotional modality does consist of feelings, then in order also to be emotional
feelings they have to incorporate inputs from sources of cognition. In general, emo-
tions depend on other modalities as well as other brain states and processes, what
we might call their ‘cognitive bases’ (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 5). Or, as Fabrice
Teroni puts it, ‘emotions are not independent modes of access to particular objects’
(Teroni 2007, 404). I am therefore not inclined to adopt this interpretation of the
perceptual model.
On the second literal interpretation, emotions piggy-back on our established
senses, so to speak. Experiencing fear would be the same as seeing or hearing
something as dangerous. However, emotion is not linked to any particular percep-
tual modality and, while seeing or hearing might be the source or the cognitive base
of an emotion, they are not the same as the emotion (Whiting 2012, 95-96).
16Salmela (2011) presses a similar objection to a literal interpretation.
92
We are left with a non-literal interpretation. On such an interpretation, we can
understand emotional experience as being analogous to or generally like perceptual
experience in that we experience, emotionally, some evaluative property just like
we experience, visually, some visual property. For example, a visual experience of
redness is an experience of the property of red. An experience of fear, then, is an
experience of danger. This non-literal and very loose interpretation is enough to
have some model of how an intentional state which is not a belief or judgement can
still be intentional.
There are three reasons why the perceptual model, even on this non-literal and
minimal interpretation, is potentially fruitful in light of my argument to this point.
The first is that perception provides a model of an intentional state which does
not have propositions as its object like a belief or judgement does. Nevertheless,
its content is expressible propositionally and we can have cognitively rich percep-
tual experiences. It therefore avoids the problem facing belief accounts and strong
judgement accounts.
It is beyond my current scope to engage in debates in the philosophy of percep-
tion about what perception and the content of perceptual experiences are. Advoc-
ates of the perceptual model of emotion tend to work within the representationalist
approach to perception according to which perceptual experiences have representa-
tional content. Many representationalists with regards to perception, however, con-
clude that the content of perception is propositional (Tye 1995; Byrne 2001). But
this is by no mains a required tenet. For example, Tim Crane (2009) rejects that the
content of perception must be propositional even if it is representational. We may
think that the content of perception is propositional because it has accuracy condi-
tions and can be true or false, and truth and falsity are properties of propositions.
However, as Crane argues, a picture is a representation of a state of affairs which
is also assessable for accuracy, but a picture is not a proposition that can be true or
false even if it can be described in propositional terms. Therefore, something can be
a representation that is assessable for accuracy without being a proposition. For the
purposes of the perceptual model, it is important to understand perceptual content
as non-propositional, even if the content is the kind of thing that can be expressed
propositionally and assessed for accuracy.17
The second reason why the perceptual model is fruitful is that it provides a
model of an intentional state which is not a truth attitude like belief or judgement. It
17A number of emotion theorists defer to Crane, both for his arguments about the non-conceptual
content of experience as well as for his understanding of intentionality. These include Goldie (2000),
Do¨ring (2007) and Salmela (2011).
93
therefore creates room for the possibility of holding beliefs and making judgements
which conflict with our emotions without being found undesirably irrational all too
often.
The third reason is that the perceptual model draws attention to the way in which
emotions can inform us about the world. As Brady writes, it is ‘a platitude that emo-
tions constitute reactions to objects, events, and states of affairs that are potentially
significant or important to us’ (Brady 2013, 10). From our own experiences of emo-
tions, we see the truth of such a platitude. For instance, when in a dangerous situ-
ation you react in fear; or when around your children you react with loving feelings.
Through experiences like these, we learn that emotions are reactions to things that
are of significance to us. But many research programmes in psychology are built on
and provide evidence of the way in which we react emotionally to things of potential
significance. For example, emotions are understood as being ‘affect programmes’,
which are short-term reactions to a certain class of inputs (see, for example, Ekman
1977; Griffiths 1997), or as involving action tendencies which prime us for suitable
responses within the environment (see, for example, Frijda 1986), or as involving
appraisals (see, for example, Schorr 2001; Moors 2014).
If emotions are reactions like this, then another platitude becomes apparent,
which is that, as Karen Jones writes, ‘[e]mpirical work on and common observation
of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real
and important reason-giving considerations’ (Jones 2003, 181). We can and do
learn about the world through our emotions. For example, if you feel intense anger
at the acquittal of some apparent felon, you can gain self-knowledge by learning
that you cared about the case a lot more than you thought you did, but you also
learn something about the world, namely that something you care about has been
infringed on, or even that there has been an offence. Or, walking down a dark
street, you might feel a twinge of fear which makes you reflect on where you are
and realise that you are actually in danger. Through the emotional experience, you
come to learn something about the situation that is of potential significance.18
In Chapter 3, I proposed that, if emotions are passive like they have been histor-
ically treated, then they could give us information about the things which ‘act’ on
us, much like perception can. And much like through perception we can come to
know about things and whether they are present, through experiencing an emotion
we can come to know about how things are and their significance. The perceptual
model provides a way in which to understand how emotions are reactions to and
18See Brady (2013, 10-25) for a more detailed overview of the epistemic value emotions have,
with a particular focus on how they direct our attention to salient features of the world.
94
inform us about the world.
The perceptual model therefore provides a neat illustration of how emotions can
be intentional and how they can give us information of how things are. There are, of
course, problems facing the perceptual model. One of these, argued by Deigh and
pertinent to my current discussion, is that perceiving an evaluative property, namely
the formal object, still requires application of the concept of the formal object. For
instance, perceiving something as dangerous requires the application of the concept
of danger. If so, then emotions potentially remain too cognitive for pre-linguistic
infants and non-human animals (Deigh 2010, 29-32).
I do not think that this poses a problem for the perceptual theorist. Consider the
example that Deigh raises about a dog fearing a man with a stick. Deigh proposes
that the dog does not see the man as dangerous, but rather sees the man as an immin-
ent source of pain. This is owing to previous experiences of the man’s threatening
behaviour leading to his (the dog’s) being struck, combined with the perception of
the man in a similar state. We should, however, keep distinct our concept of the
formal object from the actual property, and doing so avoids Deigh’s objection. We
describe the formal object of fear as the dangerous or the frightening. Being dan-
gerous, in contrast, requires that there is a threatening relation that holds between
the subject and some object in her environment and we can experience that relation
without applying the description. The dog thus does perceive something dangerous:
it perceives the man as an imminent source of pain, where being a source of pain
is standing in a harmful relation with himself. As creatures get more cognitively
complex, they may start to recognise the formal object in more complex scenarios
and they may start to recognise danger as danger, but it is possible to see some
evaluative relation as holding without applying a concept. I shall say more about
the concept of the formal object in Chapter 6.
Other problems with the perceptual model arise specific to not adopting a literal
interpretation. In particular, there may be important limits to how far the model can
go or important ways in which emotion and perception are disanalogous. For ex-
ample, emotions appear to have different epistemic roles to perception (Wild 2008;
Salmela 2011; Brady 2013), and we might worry about the kind of evaluative in-
formation which emotions are supposed to be perceptions of as being disanalogous
to the kind of information that normal perception gives us (Salmela 2011). I shall
address these kinds of problems in Chapter 7.
The way in which I develop the concept of the formal object in Chapter 6 and
the way in which I respond to these objections in Chapter 7 may take us further
away from a perceptual analogy. My current purpose, however, has been not to
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argue for the perceptual model rather than to give an illustration of how we could
understand emotion as an intentional state that is minimally cognitive but which still
gives us information about how things are, thereby avoiding the problems facing
both non-cognitive and cognitive accounts. My core motivations for introducing the
perceptual model remain: it illustrates an understanding of emotions as intentional
and it draws attention to the informative role emotions can have. All accounts face
problems so one has to choose what to use as a working model, and the perceptual
model seems at least as good, but perhaps even one of the best, models to use.
4.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have had fairly limited aims. I have not set out to provide a com-
prehensive analysis of what emotions are, nor even to whole-heartedly endorse any
one account. Rather, I have argued two things. First, I have argued that emotions
are about something other than our bodies. Non-cognitive accounts of emotions are
unable to accommodate this insight satisfactorily without bringing in some kind of
cognitive involvement. Second, I have argued that the cognitive involvement is not
that of a belief or a judgement. Rather, emotions are another kind of intentional
state which gives us information about how things are, beyond our bodies.
I ended by proposing the perceptual model as an account of emotions which
illustrates how emotions can be intentional but minimally cognitive. My argu-
ments about whether emotions provide access to reasons for acting will not turn
on whether or not the perceptual model is in fact correct. What they will turn on is
whether emotions give us information which could be the agent’s reason for acting,
either through being like perception or involving some other kind of cognition. And
since the perceptual model can accommodate this fact and is at least as plausible as
the other contenders, I shall adopt it as a working framework.
As I noted right at the outset, there are two corollaries of the discussion in this
chapter which are important for the rest of my thesis. First, if emotions are about
things other than our bodies, then they give us information of something other than
our bodies. This information could be a fact in light of which we act. I shall explore
this in Chapter 6. Second, if some kind of weak cognitive involvement is necessary
for emotions and that need not be a belief or a judgement, then emotions could play
a role in action which is different to that of a belief or judgement. I shall expand on
how this is possible in Chapter 7.
Before getting there, in Chapter 5, I address some more important background
and lay out what acting in light of a reason and rationalising explanations are.
CHAPTER 5
RATIONALISING EXPLANATIONS
In chapters 2 and 3, I introduced examples of explanations of action in terms of an
emotion and tentatively proposed that some of those explanations could involve an
emotion in virtue of its intentional nature, where acting in light of an emotion could
be acting for a reason in some way. The emotions in Category D, for instance, are
the agent’s reasons because they are states which the agent acts to address. But
perhaps the emotions in Category E, where the agent acts because of the emotion
but not in order to address it, also provide the agent’s reasons through being about
or elicited by those reasons in the right kind of way. In Chapter 4, I argued that
emotions are best understood as intentional states that are weakly cognitive but
which provide us with information about how things are. The information they
provide could be those reasons in light of which we act.
In order to establish whether emotions can play this kind of reason-providing
role in action and action explanations, it is necessary to look closer at what the
information is and at whether emotions provide these reasons in the right kind of
way. Before being able to do so, however, it is necessary to clarify what reasons
are, what rational action is, and what a rationalising explanation would involve.
This is my task for the current chapter. Ultimately, I shall argue that rational action
is action done in light of a reason and side with those who argue that a reason is
a fact, that a rationalising explanation gives the agent’s reason for acting, and that
even if a rationalising explanation is not available, we can still give an explanation
showing how an action was reasonable. The topics of rationalising explanations
and rational action are large, controversial and unwieldy. The positions I adopt
form a plausible account albeit not free from their own difficulties—but none is—
and, while I cannot here provide a comprehensive defence of them, I shall motivate
why we should adopt them.
In section 5.1, I begin by identifying three necessary conditions for rational
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action, including the condition that the agent acts in light of a reason in order to
achieve something. This will set me up to turn to explanations of rational action in
the rest of the chapter.
In section 5.2, I introduce Donald Davidson’s influential thesis that a rational-
ising explanation must be in terms of a belief-desire combination. Even if this is the
case, something I will dispute, I argue that it does not follow that the agent’s mo-
tivating reason—the reason for which she acts—is also a psychological state like
a belief or desire. Instead, I side with those who have argued that a motivating
reason is a fact that counts in favour of the action and which can be stated by a true
proposition. I reject the view that a rationalising explanation must be in terms of
a state of belief, a state of desire or a combination, or that such an explanation is
the central kind of rationalising explanation. This is because what makes the action
rational is that the agent has a motivating reason. An explanation of rational action
qua rational which gives the agent’s motivating reason will be the central kind of
rationalising explanation and such an explanation need not make reference to psy-
chological states like beliefs and desires. I shall end the section with a problem
for the proposal that the central kind of rationalising explanations are in terms of
motivating reasons. This is the problem that not all action can be explained in terms
of facts. For example, an agent who is wrong about the facts, on the view I accept,
does not have a motivating reason; nevertheless, it seems that we can still explain
her action as rational by identifying her states of belief and desire. Because it seems
that we can explain all action in terms of states of belief and desire, in contrast, it
seems that the central kind of rationalising explanation is not one in terms of mo-
tivating reasons as facts or, the even stronger conclusion, that motivating reasons
are not what rationalise the action. I consider one kind of response to the problem,
which is to claim that we can explain all action in terms of motivating reasons, but
conclude that such a response does not work.
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I take a different tactic to argue that this problem does
not show that motivating reasons do not have a central place in rationalising action.
In section 5.3, I argue that not all action can be explained in terms of states of belief
and desire. I then propose an alternative model of explanation. On this model, we
can give a rationalising explanation in terms of the agent’s motivating reason, but
we can also give an explanation in terms of the agent’s states of belief and desire or
another psychological state. The former explains by giving the motivating reason
and provides a rationalising explanation; the latter explains by giving an explanatory
reason. Sometimes motivating and explanatory reasons will overlap, but they need
not. I shall end by discussing how the latter kind of explanation may show that the
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action was reasonable, but it does not show that it was rational or done for a reason.
By the end of the chapter, I will have introduced a framework of explanation
which helps to formally describe the difference between the different categories of
emotion explanation I identified in Chapter 2, as well as a framework which makes
genuine the questions of whether we can act in light of a reason when acting on
the basis of an emotional experience and whether emotions can provide a kind of
rationalising explanation. I will conclude the chapter by describing the categories
of explanation in light of the framework and highlighting how the framework opens
up the rationalising potential of emotions. In particular, if rationalising explanations
must be articulated in terms of states of belief and desire alone and if emotions are
not reducible to beliefs and desires, as I argued in Chapter 4, then an explanation
citing an emotion would not be a form of rationalising explanation. However, if
explanations can be in terms of motivating reasons and if emotions could provide
those motivating reasons, then giving an emotion in an explanation could be a form
of showing that the agent acted in light of a reason and a form of explaining the
action as reasonable.
5.1 RATIONAL ACTION
In this section, I identify three necessary conditions for rational action. These are
that the agent controls the action in some way, that she is aware of the action un-
der a certain description, and that she acts in light of a reason in order to achieve
something.1
What would make an action a rational one?2 We could begin by saying that
rational action is something a rational agent does.3 This, however, is too inclusive: it
includes things that a rational agent does but which we do not think of as actions, let
alone rational. For example, I am a rational agent. Two things I do are breathe and
digest my food; if I did not do either, I would no longer be a rational agent as I would
not be living. If I am pushed and stumble forward, stumbling forward is something
that I, a rational agent, do. But none of these is rational let alone an action. What
is the difference between things like breathing, digesting and stumbling on the one
hand, and what we would want to call rational action on the other?
1I draw largely on Joseph Raz (1999) and Maria Alvarez (2009) for these conditions.
2It may be the case that all action is rational action but I shall not assume this.
3Defining what is a rational agent is itself a difficult task. An agent, quite generally, is something
that effects change. A rational agent, at the very least, effects change through a rational capacity,
such as by being capable of deliberating and weighing up choices and acting on those choices.
Humans are the paradigmatic rational agent.
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One thing that is lacking in the cases of breathing, digesting and stumbling is
control. As Joseph Raz (1999, 39-40) discusses, the kind of control that is neces-
sary for rational action comes in different degrees and can be control over initiation
of the action, including being able to stop or avoid an action, or control over the
execution of an action. Digesting my food is something over which I have no con-
trol; therefore, it does not meet the control requirement for rational action. If I am
pushed and stumble forward, I do not have control over the initiation of what I do. If
I were to continue forward and playfully run into my friend, then I do have control
over the execution because I would have been able to stop earlier than I did. While
my initial stumbling was not an action, my playful continuation is. While I do not
have full control over whether I breathe or not, I can sometimes control the execu-
tion of my breathing—such as holding my breath on entering a stinky tube carriage,
taking a large breath in order to play saxophone, or controlling my breathing pat-
tern while meditating. When I control my breathing in these ways, my breathing
plausibly becomes an action, distinct from my automatic breathing. Having control
over what is being done is thus the first condition for rational action.4
Control, however, is not enough. Suppose that, when inhaling deeply in prepar-
ation of playing a long passage on the saxophone, I also unknowingly swallow a fly.
I control my inhalation and my action is of inhaling; it is not of swallowing a fly
even though this is something I also do. What is the difference between these two
descriptions of what I am doing? The difference is that, in the former, I am aware
of what I am doing as inhaling but, in the latter, I am not aware of what I am doing
as swallowing a fly. We therefore have a second condition for rational action: being
aware of what one is doing.
Awareness and control, alone, are still not enough for rational action. Consider
another case of non-rational action, this time of an animal. An otter controls its
breath as it dives under water and it is surely aware that it is doing so. The action is
not a rational action, however. In order to be a rational action, the agent needs to be
acting purposively and for a reason.
The otter, in one sense, does act for a reason. It holds its breath in order to dive
underwater without its lungs filling with water, and in this sense does act purpos-
ively and for a reason. It does not, however, ‘act for a reason’ in another sense of
the phrase.
4Exactly what kind of control is required, as Alvarez (2009, 294) draws attention to, is controver-
sial. The relevant kind of control might include that one would have been able to refrain from doing
what one did, but this is a hotly debated topic. I do not need to say anything about these debates; the
point is simply that some kind of control is important.
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Acting for a reason, in this sense, is acting in light of some consideration and in
pursuit of a goal, where the consideration counts in favour of acting and the agent
is aware of the relationship between the consideration, the action, and the goal. The
considerations which count in favour of acting are the agent’s reason and not just
the reason why the agent acts. It is this sense of acting for a reason which is crucial
for rational action and I shall refer to it as ‘acting in light of a reason’. As we
shall see below, some philosophers have argued that the considerations in light of
which we act are our states of believing and desiring; others have argued that the
considerations in light of which we act are facts or propositions. Either way, what
sets the otter’s breath control apart from my breath control is that I am acting in
light of some considerations in order to achieve something and am aware of the
relationship. Thus, in addition to having control and being aware of what one is
doing, rational action requires a third condition: the agent is acting in light of a
reason in order to achieve something.
Rational action, on this understanding, is acting in light of a reason. As we shall
see, we must distinguish between rational action and intentional action, where the
latter is action under our control and with awareness, and is not done accidentally
but not necessarily done in light of a reason.5 Whether intentional action is always
done for a reason is a debated topic and I shall return to it in section 5.3. It is
enough for my current discussion that, as far as terminology goes, ‘rational’ action
is accepted to be action in light of a reason, regardless of whether it is the same as
intentional action. Action not done in light of a reason need not be irrational, just
arational.
We now have three conditions for rational action: the agent is in control of the
action in some way and to some degree, she is aware of what she is doing, and she
acts in light of a reason in order to achieve something. As rational agents, we act
with purpose and in order to achieve our aims, and we act for reasons which will
help us to do that. Acting in light of a reason is what sets rational action apart from
other action.
If these are three conditions for rational action and if acting in light of a reason
is the characteristic condition, then an explanation of rational action qua rational
action will show how an action is something the agent did in light of a reason.
5I draw on Alvarez (2009) for these requirements for intentional action.
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5.2 BELIEFS, DESIRES AND MOTIVATING REASONS
The aim of explaining an action is to come to know why the agent did what she
did, and the aim of explaining rational action qua rational is to show that the agent
acted in light of a reason and come to know the reason in light of which the agent
acted. This kind of explanation is a rationalising explanation. The agent’s reasons
for doing what she did are often called the agent’s motivating reasons (see Dancy
2000; Audi 2002; Alvarez 2010).6 The questions to be investigated, then, are: (i)
what are the agent’s motivating reasons and (ii) how do we rationalise an action by
reference to them?
Following Donald Davidson’s seminal paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’
(1963), the dominant account of rationalising explanation of action, often called the
‘standard account’ (Everson 2010), holds that rational action is explained by the
agent’s states of belief and desire that caused the action. The standard account has
three further commitments. First, all intentional action will be explicable in terms
of states of belief and desire. Second, these beliefs and desires, it is thought, are
the agent’s reasons for the action; they are the agent’s motivating reasons. Third, all
intentional action is rational action, or action done for a reason.
I am not concerned with whether the agent’s reasons will be the same as the
cause of the action or whether the only rationalising explanation is a kind of causal
explanation, two important claims to Davidson’s own philosophy. We can explore
the nature of rationalising explanations without taking a stand. This is because we
can give explanations which increase understanding but which do not show a causal
link, and so there is nothing necessary to an explanation that it gives a cause. For
example, Napoleon walked under the archway without bending because he was a
short man. Napoleon’s height did not cause him to walk under the archway without
bending, but it is still why he did it. Perhaps rationalising explanations show why an
agent acted without necessarily showing that the reasons why the agent acted caused
her to act. I shall thus rather put pressure on the standard account by arguing, first,
that states of belief and desire are not the agent’s motivating reasons and, second,
that not all intentional action will be explicable in terms of states of belief and
desire.
6I am not concerned here with normative reasons, reasons which independently count in favour
of or justify an action, reasons for which an agent ought to act. My focus is on explanations of action
that an agent has performed, seemingly for a reason, and so I set aside controversial debates about
whether normative reasons are internal or external, and whether one can have a normative reason
and not be motivated by it. I do, however, accept that normative reasons must be the kind of thing
for which one could act, that is, that normative reasons can be motivating reasons and vice versa.
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In the rest of this section I address the first point. In section 5.2.1, focusing on
Davidson’s proposal, I argue that explaining an action in terms of the agent’s states
of belief and desire does not entail that the agent’s motivating reasons for the action
are states of belief and desire. Instead, we should accept that the agent’s motivating
reasons are facts in light of which she sees the action as good or desirable. This
implies that an agent’s motivating reasons are not psychological states. Even if
motivating reasons are not psychological states, it may still be the case that we can
rationalise an action by giving the agent’s states of belief and desire. Indeed, it
might be argued that we can rationalise all action in terms of states of belief and
desire, suggesting that motivating reasons do not have a central role in rationalising
action. This is a problem I raise in section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 EXPLAINING AN ACTION IN TERMS OF BELIEFS AND DESIRES
Davidson calls explanations which explain rational action ‘rationalisations’. These
are explanations where ‘the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason
for doing what he did’ (Davidson 1963, 685, my emphasis). I shall suggest that
the first reason mentioned in the quotation, the reason that explains, need not be
the second reason, the agent’s reason. To do so, I present Davidson’s account of
explanations of action in terms of the agent’s beliefs and desires, then argue that
it does not follow that the agent’s motivating reasons are the same as the reasons
which explain the action. Indeed, I argue, the agent’s motivating reasons are facts in
light of which the agent sees the action as a good thing to do. They are facts which
count in favour of the action and which can be stated by a true proposition.
According to Davidson, not just any reason will rationalise an action:
A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the
agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action—some feature, consequence,
or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear,
thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable. We cannot explain
why someone did what he did simply by saying the particular action
appealed to him; we must indicate what it was about the action that
appealed. (Davidson 1963, 685)
We see in this quotation that Davidson identifies two necessary features of a reason
if it is to rationalise an action. The first is that it captures something the agent saw
or thought he saw in the action. In other words, the agent believes (or knows,
perceives, notices, remembers) something about some feature of the action that
makes it appeal to him. The second feature is that the agent must desire, want or
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have some other pro-attitude to that appealing feature which he sees in the action.
A pro-attitude is just what the name suggests: an attitude of the agent in favour
of action of the relevant kind. Davidson talks about ‘pro-attitude’ rather than just
desire or want because he wants to include cases where we may not desire to do
something, but still have a pro-attitude towards doing it, like having a sense of duty
or an obligation.
A reason which has these two features is what Davidson calls a ‘primary reason’.
Specifically, the primary reason is made up of a pro-attitude towards a class of
action, along with the belief that the action under a certain description falls into that
class. By requiring a certain description, Davidson aims to rule out descriptions of
the action for which the agent could not have acted. For example, I open my mouth
to take a deep breath in order to blow on the saxophone and inadvertently swallow
a fly. Because I did not know that there was a fly there, we cannot say that I opened
my mouth in order to swallow a fly, even though I did intentionally open my mouth
and inhale deeply. With the description condition, we can rule out the description
of my action as ‘swallowing the fly’ as one done for a reason because I do not
have the accompanying belief that this action is an action under the description of
‘swallowing a fly’, even if I were to have a pro-attitude towards such action.
We now have the outline of what a primary reason involves and can focus on
some details. In particular, if there is a primary reason when the agent has a belief
and a pro-attitude of the right description, then is the agent’s motivating reason
also made up of that belief and pro-attitude? Many philosophers have interpreted
Davidson as saying that the agent’s reasons for acting, her motivating reasons, are
her psychological states. This, however, does not follow smoothly from Davidson’s
own discussion.
Going back to the indented quotation above, we see that a reason ‘rationalizes
an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in
his action’ and what the agent saw is ‘some feature, consequence, or aspect of the
action the agent wanted’. The reason rationalises by leading us to see what the agent
saw in his action. In other words, the reason rationalises by picking out something
external to the agent, albeit of which the agent has beliefs and desires. Davidson
carries on to say that, ‘we cannot explain why someone did what he did simply by
saying the particular action appealed to him; we must indicate what it was about
the action that appealed’. What does the work in showing that an action is one
of an agent is not so much that the agent has states of belief and a pro-attitude,
but that there is something which he believes and something which he has a pro-
attitude towards. That is, what does the rationalising work is what makes the action
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something to do in the first place.
Despite this, one school of thought, what can be described as the ‘Humean’
view,7 proposes that the motivating reason is constituted by our state of desire. On
such a view, if we have a motivating reason to do something, it is because we desire
doing the action or desire its outcomes.
However, it is arguable that the reason why we desire certain things is that we see
something desirable in them. To see this, consider Elizabeth Anscombe’s example
of a man wanting a saucer of mud (Anscombe 1957, 30). In such a case, we would
try to find out why the man wants the saucer of mud, why he finds it desirable. If
there is no answer other than that a saucer of mud is the object of his desire, we are
dealing in nonsense. In Anscombe’s evocative words, we will dismiss him as ‘a dull
babbling loon’. In order for a desire to make sense, it needs to have a ‘desirability
characterisation’ which shows why it is desirable. What characterises the object of
desire as desirable are the reasons for desiring it.
But if we have reasons for desiring what we desire, then those reasons are also
why we act. We might say that the reasons transmit to the action (Dancy 2000, 35-
38). What this means is that we act because the action is good in light of something
desirable, not because we desire to act or desire the outcomes—even though we may
also have these desires. For example, if I desire to play the saxophone, the reason
why I desire to play is because it is enjoyable and fun. When I play the saxophone,
my reason is that it is enjoyable and fun, not that I desire to play the saxophone or
desire something that is enjoyable and fun.
According to another school of thought, what can be called ‘psychologism’
(Dancy 2000, 14), the motivating reason is constituted by some state of belief of
the agent, perhaps together with a desire. Michael Smith (1994), for example, ac-
cepts that normative reasons are facts or truths which justify or speak in favour of
an action—he therefore allows that what makes an action desirable is a fact—but
nevertheless argues that the motivating reason is a belief-desire compound. This
is because we form a belief about the normative reasons and it is this belief which
causes us to desire to act. In this way, the reason in light of which the agent acts,
the motivating reason, is a belief-desire compound.
We need to be wary of conflating the agent’s reason with background or enabling
conditions for the agent’s having a reason, however. An enabling condition is a
‘consideration that is required for the explanation to go through, but which is not
itself a part of that explanation’ (Dancy 2000, 127). Believing may be necessary for
7Jonathan Dancy (2000, 10), calls this school of thought the ‘Humean’ view, as does R. Jay
Wallace (2014). I also use Dancy’s name for the following view, ‘psychologism’.
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an agent to become aware that there is a reason to act, and it may be a necessary
enabling condition for an explanation to go through, but it does not follow that it is
itself her reason to act. To see this, we can actually go back to some of Davidson’s
later writings.
In ‘Two Paradoxes of Irrationality’ and ‘Problems in the Explanation of Ac-
tion’,8 Davidson draws attention to the fact that what is important for reasons is the
kind of logical relations which stands between the contents of the mental states. It
is not some relation that holds between different psychological states. This is be-
cause reasons play a role in practical and theoretical reasoning; and, in order to do
this, they need to be the kinds of things which can stand in logical relations to each
other: we make inferences on the basis of reasons, for example. So, my state of
belief that the compulsory research seminar is on Wednesdays, as a state, does not
stand in a logical relation to or entail other beliefs and attitudes. It does not play a
role in reasoning. It is the content of my belief which stands in logical relation to
other beliefs and attitudes, such as the belief that if today is Wednesday, I ought to
go to the seminar. A belief-desire compound is thus the wrong kind of thing to be a
reason.
A final point which brings out why the agent’s motivating reason should not
be identified with psychological states is that we can explain an action in terms of
psychological states that are not motivating reasons. We need to be able to say
which psychological states are motivating reasons and which are not, and a view
identifying motivating reasons with psychological states cannot.
Consider, for example, James who does not go to the orientation week party
because he is shy.9 We could explain his action by saying that he is shy. We could
also explain his action by saying that he believed that there would be many strangers
there. Both explanations are in terms of his psychological states and, while the latter
is an explanation in terms of what he takes to be reasons, the former is not. If the
agent’s reasons are psychological states, however, we cannot say which one is in
terms of the agent’s reasons. One might respond that the motivating reason must be
a belief-desire compound; shyness is neither a belief nor a desire, therefore shyness
cannot be the motivating reason. But this is jumping a step. What is it about a
belief or a desire which makes it the right kind of psychological state to constitute a
motivating reason? It might seem that they are the right kind of state because they
are the ones in light of which we act. James sees staying away from the party as a
good thing to do in light of believing that there will be many strangers there. If he
8Both reprinted in the collection Problems of Rationality (2004).
9This kind of example is discussed in Dancy (2004), Alvarez (2010) and Littlejohn (2012).
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did not believe that there were going to be many strangers there, he would not see
staying away from the party as a good thing to do (other things being equal). But
this will not work: it is in light of being shy that he also sees staying away from the
party a good thing to do. If he were not shy, he would not see staying away from
the party as a good thing to do (other things being equal).
Perhaps his shyness is not his motivating reason because it is not his consider-
ation in favour of staying away. He does not think, ‘Because I am shy, I shall stay
at home.’ But this response does not help because the same can be said for other
psychological states. James does not think, ‘Because I believe that there will be
strangers, I shall stay at home.’ James’ state of believing is not his consideration
in favour of staying away; rather, it is the content of his belief, that there will be
strangers. The psychological states, alone, are not able to distinguish between the
agent’s reasons and other reasons which are also psychological states.
If we accept that the content of the beliefs and desires is what makes up the
agent’s reason, we can make the distinction. James does not act in light of the
content of shyness, whatever that would be, and so his shyness is not his reason
for acting. It is the consideration about which James forms a belief which is his
motivating reason, not his belief.
We therefore see that even if a primary reason is made up of how the agent sees
a situation through what she believes and desires, it does not follow that the agent’s
own reason for acting is a state of belief and a state of desire. In fact, the agent’s
motivating reason will be what makes the action desirable, and a primary reason
gives the agent’s reason for what she did because, amongst other things, it identifies
what the agent finds desirable.
The agent’s reasons for acting, the motivating reasons, are best understood as
‘the considerations in the light of which the agent chose to do what he did’ (Dancy
2000, 6). I side with those who argue that these considerations are facts about which
we can form beliefs. Motivating reasons, on this view, are facts in light of which
the agent sees the action as a good thing to do. They are facts which count in favour
of action and which can be stated by true propositions. This position on reasons is
controversial and it is beyond the scope of my thesis to defend it more than I have
done so far and will do in the rest of this chapter, but developments and defences
of different versions of reasons-as-facts can be found in Raz (1986, 1999), Scanlon
(1999), Alvarez (2008, 2010) and Littlejohn (2012).
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5.2.2 A PROBLEM FOR MOTIVATING REASONS
It is all very well to mark a distinction between the reasons which explain and the
agent’s motivating reasons, but the reasons which rationalise an action may still be
states of belief and desire. In this subsection, I begin by going over Smith’s account
that distinguishes between motivating reasons as constituted by psychological states
and normative reasons as facts.10 Because all action can be explained in terms of
states of belief and desire but not in terms of facts, or so Smith claims, Smith thinks
that belief-desire explanations are the central kind of rationalising explanation be-
cause they are what rationalise the action. We could reject this argument in two
ways. We could argue that we can explain all action in terms of facts, in some way.
Or we could deny that all action can be explained in terms of beliefs and desires.
In the rest of this subsection, I show that the first way is doomed. The second way
is the right tactic, and in sections 5.3 and 5.4 I argue that the belief-desire model is
not as central as Smith presumes.
We do explain action by citing facts independent of the agent’s psychological
state. Even Smith accepts that we often explain action by citing a fact. He writes:
. . . if a desire and a belief pair explains an action then it follows that the
things that explain the desire and the things that explain the belief ex-
plain the action too. Thus, given that we can explain Fred’s turning on
the light by citing, inter alia, his belief that he can illuminate the room
by turning on the light, and given that the fact that he can illuminate the
room by turning on the light explains his belief, it follows that we can
explain Fred’s turning on the light by citing, inter alia, that very fact:
that is, we can say that Fred turns on the light because he can illuminate
the room by doing so. (Smith 1998, 19-20)
The fact, for Smith, is a normative reason to act. It is one which justifies the action
and we can explain the action in terms of what justifies it. So far, it seems that Smith
and I are on the same page.
Smith, however, goes on to argue that the belief-desire explanation still occupies
the central position in explanations of action. He thinks that an explanation in terms
of the relevant fact presupposes that there is a belief-desire explanation, which we
can grant for now.11 An explanation in terms of a belief-desire combination, how-
ever, does not presuppose the existence of a fact. If the agent is wrong about what
10Derek Parfit (1997) also defends a distinction between normative reasons as facts and motivating
reasons as constituted by psychological states.
11As will become clear in Chapter 7, however, it is possible that an explanation in terms of a fact
does not have an accompanying belief-desire explanation, such as if the action was done on the basis
of an emotional experience. But this is jumping the gun.
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the facts are, then she does not have a motivating reason of the kind I have endorsed,
a fact. As a consequence, it would seem that we cannot give a true explanation of
her action purely in terms of what she took to be a reason because the explanation
would be false. But we can still give an explanation from her point of view in terms
of her beliefs and desires.
For example, Jo goes to the library because her book is there. If it is the case
that the book is at the library, then we could potentially explain her action by saying
that she went to the library because her book was there. If it is not the case that the
book is at the library, then Jo does not act in light of a fact. Yet, we can explain her
action by saying that Jo believed that her book was at the library or that she desired
to obtain the book which she believed was at the library. It is true that Jo believes
that the book is at the library or that she desires to obtain the book, regardless of
whether the library really does have the book. We can give a true explanation in
terms of her states of belief and desire.
Smith takes the fact that all rational action can be explained in terms of states
of belief and desire but not in terms of facts to show that belief-desire explanations
are the central kind of rationalising explanation. He also takes this to show that mo-
tivating reasons are constituted by our psychological states. It would seem that an
explanation of Jo’s going to the library when her book is not there but she believed
that it was, from her point of view, shows how the agent was acting for reasons even
if she was not acting in light of facts. Therefore, her motivating reason is not a fact
but is her psychological state. We might agree that something is lacking when the
agent is wrong about the facts and, on Smith’s kind of account, what is lacking is
not a motivating reason but a normative reason. If Smith is right, then explanations
in terms of facts are not the central kind of explanation of rational action.
We should resist this conclusion. It is necessary to emphasise what should be
apparent by now, that the rationalising force of even belief-desire explanations lies
in the way we explain by reference to how the agent takes herself to be acting for
considerations that are independent of her psychological states. To quickly sum-
marise some important points:
1. As we have seen in my discussion of Davidson, the agent’s motivating reason
for acting will not be her psychological states but what makes up the content
of her psychological states.
2. We also saw that, if the agent has a reason, she needs to see what she does as
desirable in some way. With Davidson, we saw that a primary reason gives
the agent’s reason for what she did because, amongst other things, it identifies
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what the agent finds desirable. The rationalising force of such an explanation
lies in the way the agent takes herself to have a reason.
3. Even someone like Smith accepts that what explains a belief or desire can
also explain an action.
All of these factors together emphasise the central role that the agent’s motivating
reason that is not a belief-desire compound plays in a rationalising explanation.
We should therefore try to find a model of explanation which gives the motivating
reason its central place.
One way we can resist Smith’s conclusion about the centrality of belief-desire
explanations for rationalising action is by denying that we cannot explain all action
in terms of facts. If all action can be explained in terms of facts, then it does not
follow that the central kind of rationalising explanation is in terms of beliefs and
desires. We thereby undermine the claim that motivating reasons are constituted by
psychological states. This is the tactic that Jonathan Dancy takes and it is distinctly
unsatisfactory.
Dancy maintains that the reasons which explain the action will be motivating
reasons, as facts, but denies that reason explanations in terms of motivating reasons
are factive (Dancy 2000, 131-37).12 His test for factivity is to see whether we end up
with a contradiction if we deny that things are as the agent takes them to be (132).
If we do end up with a contradiction, then the explanation is factive. If we do not,
then it is not. So, for Dancy, we can give the explanation:
(D1) Jo’s reason for going to the library was that her book was there. But it wasn’t.
To Dancy’s ears, there is no contradiction. This, he argues, shows that the reason
explanation is not factive. So, explanations in terms of the agent’s motivating reas-
ons will not be factive even though they may be true.
In cases of not acting in light of a fact, we can still explain the action in terms of
the motivating reason. If the reason explanation in terms of the motivating reason
is not factive, then it does not matter if the motivating reason is false as we cannot
infer from the explanation alone that the motivating reason holds. However, Dancy
does think that a better way to explain is to add additional contextual markers such
as ‘as she supposed’. We now get:
(D2) Jo’s reason for going to the library was that, as she supposed, her book was
there. But it wasn’t.
12If a reason is factive, then we can infer that both p and q are true from ‘the reason why it is the
case that p is that q’.
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Again, adding the ‘But it wasn’t’ does not create a contradiction, for Dancy.
This full explanation, however, is now factive because we do get a contradiction if
we deny the full explanans:13
(D3) Jo’s reason for going to the library was that, as she supposed, her book was
there. But she did not suppose that her book was there.
If Dancy is right, then we can reject Smith’s claim that belief-desire explanations
are central because we can give true non-factive explanations in terms of the agent’s
motivating reasons even when the agent is wrong about the facts.
This proposal is intuitively uncomfortable. For one thing, we could have dif-
ferent contradiction-seeking ears to Dancy and reject that there is no contradiction
involved in (D1) and (D2). Both Jennifer Hornsby (2007) and Clayton Littlejohn
(2012) take this tactic, providing linguistic data to support that there is a contradic-
tion. I share their ears but, as Littlejohn notes, the linguistic data could be over-
ridden by powerful arguments. A deeper worry is that a non-factive explanation is
insufficient.
One way it is insufficient is by passing on explanatory power to the contextual
markers. According to Dancy, an explanation like ‘Jo went to the library because
her book was there’ is not factive. It follows that even in the case where she is right
and the book is at the library, we cannot infer this from the explanation. But we
are now left with a very puzzling explanation: Jo went to the library because her
book might or might not have been there and we cannot infer from the explanation
which was the case. If we have to introduce further bits of information in order
to infer what was the case, information such as ‘as she supposed’, then we get a
better understanding of what happens with an explanation in terms of the agent’s
beliefs and desires because we actually come to understand what the case is. The
contextual feature, in the factive version of the explanation, is doing the explanatory
and informative work. It seems that Smith would be right about the centrality of
explanations in terms of psychological states.
A second way it is insufficient is that it is a puzzle why we often revise reports
of why we acted when we find out that we were wrong about the facts (Littlejohn
2012, 152). For example, if we ask Jo why she went to the library, she may say
that the book she needs is there. On discovering that the book was actually checked
out by someone else last week, she will typically revise her report to something like
‘I thought that the book was there’. But if her original report was true, as Dancy
13The explanans of an explanation is that which does the explaining; the explanandum is that
which needs to be explained.
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claims, then there is no need to revise her report. Dancy’s account cannot explain
why this would be the case and entails a kind of error theory in the way we revise
our reports when we do not need to.
Similar worries can be levelled at views which endorse that reasons are pro-
positions which, if true, would favour acting, such as endorsed by Mark Schroeder
(2008): if true, Jo’s reason that the book is at the library would count in favour of
going there. But this too will not work. First, we would not be able to construct ex-
planations like (D1) without contradiction. It is still the case that Jo’s reason is that
her book was at the library, and if (D1) is contradictory when dealing with Dancy,
it is contradictory when dealing with the propositional view. Second, similarly to
Dancy’s model, we would not be able to infer from an explanation like ‘Jo went to
the library because her book was there’ what was the case. If we introduce markers
like ‘as she believed’, then we can infer that Jo had beliefs. We get a better under-
standing of what happens with an explanation in terms of the agent’s beliefs and
desires. Finally, if the agent’s reason is a consideration which, if true, would count
in favour of acting, we are left puzzled by why the agent will revise her report when
she finds out that she was wrong.14
Dancy’s proposal and the propositional views do not show that Smith is wrong
about the centrality of the belief-desire model. We must turn to the second way of
challenging Smith’s account, which is by denying that all action can be explained
in terms of beliefs and desires.
5.3 THE LIMIT OF BELIEF-DESIRE EXPLANATIONS
In this section, I argue that not all action is the result of states of belief and desire,
and so we cannot explain all action in terms of states of belief and desire. In partic-
ular, pure expressive action of the kind that makes up my Category C of examples
of emotion explanations cannot be explained in terms of states of belief and desire.
As Rosalind Hursthouse concisely defines it, pure expressive action is inten-
tional action that the agent did not do for a reason ‘in the sense that there is a true
description of action of the form “X did it (in order to). . . ” or “X was trying to. . . ”’;
and the agent would not have performed the action if she were not in the grip of an
emotion (Hursthouse 1991, 59). It is action for which one might say, ‘I φ-ed be-
cause I was so frightened (or happy, excited, ashamed. . . so overwhelmed by hatred
or affection or. . . ) that I just wanted to, or felt I had to’ (58). It is not action done
to communicate an emotion or to release tension. It is generally accepted that it
14I draw on Littlejohn’s (2012) helpful comparison of views like these with Dancy’s view.
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is intentional, that is, that it is under the agent’s awareness and control, to some
degree.
Two examples of expressive action which I introduced in Chapter 2 were:
• In a wave of hatred, Jane tears at Joan’s eyes in a photograph. Jane is not
trying to communicate her anger nor relieve her pent-up energy. She acts
purely because she is angry.
• Having lost his much-loved wife, the man rolls around and buries his face
in her clothes. Like Jane, he is not communicating his grief or relieving his
emotion; he is simply expressing it.
If all action can be explained in terms of states of belief and desire, including
intentional action like this, the challenge is to show how. An initial attempt to
explain expressive action in terms of states of belief and desire might seem to ascribe
some rather bizarre beliefs and desires to an agent (Hursthouse 1991, 60). For
example, Jane tears at Joan’s eyes in a photograph out of anger. Because Jane is
angry with Joan and not Joan’s photograph, it looks like the explanatory desire
will have to be something like: Jane desires to scratch at Joan’s face. But then
the associated belief would be something bizarre like the belief that scratching the
photograph is scratching Joan. Such a belief is false, and it is also surely false that
Jane has this belief in the first place. I shall therefore focus on more sophisticated
accounts of explanations of expressive action, such as those of Smith (1998) and
Peter Goldie (2000).
Smith proposes that, rather than ascribing a bizarre belief to the agent, we should
look amongst the beliefs she actually has. What rationalises and explains the action
of the man who rolls around in his dead wife’s clothes, for example, is the desire to
roll around in the clothes and the belief that he can. The role of the man’s grief is
to provide an explanatory context in which having those beliefs and desires makes
some sort of sense. Smith writes:
When we say that the man is rolling around in his dead wife’s clothes
because he is grieving for her we thereby locate the belief/desire pair
that explains his action in a context in which having them makes a cer-
tain sort of sense. This is because grief at the loss of a loved one is, by
definition, a state in which we are disposed to think, and to desire, and
to do, all sorts of things . . . For it in effect tells us that the man is acting
on the basis of some desire that it is typical for people who are grieving
to have: in this case, the desire to roll around in his dead wife’s clothes.
(Smith 1998, 22-23)
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I shall raise two general problems for this approach. In section 5.3.1, I focus on
the first problem which is that the beliefs and desires that Smith identifies mischar-
acterise the action and trivialise acting for a reason. In section 5.3.2, I turn to the
second problem which is that, even if the belief-desire pattern of explanation could
be made to work, we would be left with a trivial explanation.
5.3.1 FIRST PROBLEM: MISCHARACTERISING & TRIVIALISING THE ACTION
The first problem is that the states of belief and desire that Smith identifies mischar-
acterise the action and trivialise acting for a reason. I first focus on the desire aspect
and show how it mischaracterises the action. I pose an objection to Smith, introduce
Goldie’s attempt to get around it, and show how that also fails. Turning to the belief
aspect, I shall end this subsection by arguing that the kind of explanation we are left
with trivialises acting for a reason.
As expressive actions are characterised, the agent would not have performed the
action if she were not in the grip of the emotion. When we seek to explain her
action, we want to explain why, given the emotional state she is in, the agent acts
as she does. The problem with the desire aspect of Smith’s proposal is that, if the
explanation is partly that the agent desires to so act, we have provided hardly any
illumination whatsoever.
Remember Anscombe’s example of the dull babbling loon who wants the saucer
of mud despite not seeing anything desirable in it. If the man scoops mud into a
saucer, we can give an explanation of his action in terms of his states of belief and
desire: he desires a saucer of mud, and believes that scooping mud into a saucer is
a way of getting a saucer of mud. But let us compare the dull babbling loon to the
grieving man. If the man’s relevant desire is just that he desires to roll around in the
clothes, and that is that, then his action is no different to the loon’s. But surely there
is a difference between expressive action of the man’s and the nonsensical action of
the loon’s? There is, and we can turn again to Anscombe for insight into what it is.
Anscombe argues that to make sense of desire, we need to be able to characterise
the object of desire as desirable. We cannot make sense of the loon case if the saucer
of mud is not seen as desirable but the man still desires it. So, if the man rolling
around in his wife’s clothes acts because he desires it, we are left asking, ‘But why
did you want to do that anyway?’ Unlike the babbling loon’s answer to the mud case
of ‘I just wanted to’, the grieving man does have an informative answer: ‘Because
I grieve.’ Rolling around in the clothes is seen as desirable because, we learn, the
man is experiencing an overwhelming and very sad emotion and emotions often
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call for expression. Grief therefore provides a further characterisation of the action,
making the action intelligible because it shows why the agent saw it as something
to do.
In addition, our concept of grief is of a deeply felt and motivating state. So, not
only does the grief make the action intelligible, it also shows how the agent saw
the action as desirable because it is an expression of a deeply felt and motivating
state.15 The grieving man is different to the dull babbling loon precisely because
there is this further characterisation to why he finds the action desirable and to say
that the man simply desires to roll around in the clothes mischaracterises the kind of
pro-attitude that he has, as one without a further desirability characterisation which
it does in fact have. We thus see that the man’s grief does more than simply set up
a context where certain beliefs and desires make sense; it is fundamentally part of
why the agent sees the action as desirable in the first place. The man’s action is
quite different to the loon’s but the belief-desire model overlooks that difference.
Goldie also finds Smith’s proposal unsatisfactory because of a similar com-
plaint. Returning to the photograph-scratching example, Goldie writes, ‘[i]t does
not really make it at all clear why someone should be disposed when hating or in
anger to desire to do such a “bizarre” thing as scratch the eyes in a photo of the
person they hate or are angry with’ (Goldie 2000, 128). He allows that some desires
are ‘primitively intelligible’ if ‘they cannot be better explained in virtue of anything
else’. An example of a primitively intelligible desire would be: desiring to get re-
venge on someone with whom you are angry. The problem with expressive action
like in the two examples under consideration, for Goldie, is that the desire to scratch
out the eyes in a photograph or the desire to roll around in someone’s clothes is not
primitively intelligible, even in the context of an emotion.
Goldie proposes that we should rather understand the action as an expression
of a wish. The expression involves being disposed to imagine some desire being
satisfied. So, working with the example of Jane scratching out the eyes of Joan in
a photograph, the explanation is: ‘Jane has a desire to scratch out Joan’s eyes, and
she imagines that she is doing this in the expressive action’ (Goldie 2000, 130).
For Goldie, the action is explained along two ‘vectors’. The action vector is
explained in terms of the belief-desire pair that Smith identifies, and the expressive
vector is explained with reference to a desire and a wish. We make sense of the
bizarre desire to scratch out the eyes in a photograph, contained in the action vector,
by appealing to a more intelligible desire to scratch out the actual eyes, accompanied
15Even if the grief provides a desirability characterisation for the action in this way, it does not do
so by showing how the action was desirable in order to achieve anything.
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by the wish or the imagining that this is what one is doing. This desire is in turn
primitively intelligible in the context of the emotion of anger. Jane is angry with
Joan and scratches out the eyes in a photograph of Joan because it is a photograph
of Joan, and she wishes to scratch out Joan’s eyes. Similarly, the man is grieving and
rolls around in his dead wife’s clothes because they are her clothes and he wishes to
be with her.
As Goldie notes, his account does not apply to all cases of expressive action. The
cases where it does not apply are when there is no clear relation between the object
of the emotion and the object of the expression, like there is between a person who is
the object of one’s anger or grief and their photograph or belongings. In such cases,
the explanation of the action is simply that the person is in the grip of the emotion.
For example, while arguing with his wife, a man smashes a vase which belongs to
her ‘simply because he is in the grip of anger; there is no further explanation beyond
the primitively intelligible desire to vent one’s anger’ (Goldie 2000, 134-45).
The fact that Goldie’s account does not apply to all kinds of expressive action,
however, highlights that an expression of a wish is not a truly expressive action of
the type we are seeking to explain.
If you have a wish you want to enact, then there is a right and a wrong way, or
a successful and unsuccessful way, to enact it. But, as Hursthouse points out, pure
expressive actions do not have the possibility of being expressed in the wrong way
(Hursthouse 1991, 60-61). An expression may be inappropriate or disproportionate
but it is not wrong as an expression. She levels this as a fault with the belief-desire
model: if you have a belief about what description your action falls under, then
there must be the possibility that your action is the wrong way to do things. My
objection is similar: if you have a wish, then there is the possibility that your action
is the wrong way to enact it.
To illustrate, consider the man who smashes his wife’s vase and suppose that it
transpires that he actually smashes his brother’s vase. In the purely expressive case,
this makes no difference to the ‘success’ of his action as an expression of his anger.
He acts expressively and that is that. In the expression of a wish case, in contrast, it
does make a difference. The symbolic connection between his wife and her vase is
no longer there. His enactment of a wish is thwarted.
Similar scenarios can be constructed for Jane and the grieving man. On dis-
covering that the photograph is not of Joan, Jane’s expression is not affected in the
purely expressive case: it is sufficient that the photograph looks like Joan but Jane
could also express her anger by gouging holes in her notebook. In the wish case,
her action has backfired: she has not achieved what she wanted, which was to enact
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scratching out Joan’s eyes on an image of Joan. The grieving man still acts express-
ively even if the clothes turn out to be his daughter’s; he may roll around in the
clothes because they smelt like his wife, they looked like her clothes, but that is not
why he expresses his grief. The man expressing a wish, however, has failed in the
enactment because the clothes are not his wife’s and rolling around in them does not
enact his wish to be close to her, even if the clothes look and smell like her clothes.
What about cases where there is no symbolic connection but the agent is still
expressing a wish? For example, the man angry with his wife wishes to harm her
and grabs any substitute and tries to break it. He is enacting the wish of harming
his wife. But suppose that the object does not break. He has failed in his symbolic
act of harming his wife. In contrast, if the man were purely expressing his anger,
not breaking or harming the object does not affect the ‘success’ of his expression.
He may feel foolish that the object does not break, but from this it does not follow
that his expression was not successful. Rather, he may realise the extremity of his
expression and feel foolish about feeling so strongly that he acts as he does, or,
perhaps feel foolish about the way in which he is just so angry he cannot even
successfully break a vase.
These examples show that the agent is acting in order to achieve something
when she acts from a wish. The explanation is of the form ‘X φ-ed in order to
symbolically enact a wish’. Therefore, it is not the kind of expressive action we are
seeking to explain.16
While Goldie does describe a set of interesting cases, his account focuses on the
wrong ones and is thus inadequate. However, even if it were addressing the right set
of cases, the account faces other problems. This is because it relies on the belief-
desire explanation of action that Smith proposes, and so it faces the same problems
as Smith’s does, to which I shall now return.
Turning to the belief aspect, we again run into problems with the characterisa-
tion of what the man takes himself to be doing when he rolls around in his dead
wife’s clothes.
In order to have a primary reason, which is what rationalises the action for
Smith, the agent must have a pro-attitude towards a class of action, such as rolling
16Sabine Do¨ring (2003) poses a similar objection. She argues that Goldie’s account faces a di-
lemma where either the explanation of expressive action is available in terms of a belief-desire
account or it is not. If the former, then where there is symbolic value attached to the object of the
action, the agent is not acting purely expressively. (Do¨ring does not address the wish-aspect of Gol-
die’s account, but we can bolster this horn of the dilemma by including that the agent is enacting a
wish.) If the latter, then Goldie has not shown what he set out to do, which was to give an account
in belief-desire terms.
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around in the clothes,17 and he must have the belief that this action, under a certain
description, falls under that class. If so, then the agent’s reason will be composed of
the belief along the lines of, ‘rolling around in my wife’s clothes is a way in which I
can roll around in my wife’s clothes’. The reason explanation, then, is that the man
rolled around in his wife’s clothes because he wanted to and believed that doing
so was a means of doing so. This is distinctly unsatisfying as an explanation and
trivialises the notion of acting for a reason.18
5.3.2 SECOND PROBLEM: TRIVIAL EXPLANATIONS
The second problem is that, even if the belief-desire pattern of explanation could be
made to work, we would be left with a trivial explanation.
We see this by the fact that different emotions can set up different contexts for
the same beliefs and desires. For example, another man is rolling around in his dead
wife’s clothes. Rather than grieving, he is ecstatic that his evil and domineering wife
has died and that he is finally free. He rolls around in her clothes because he desires
to do so and believes that he can. On a belief-desire model, the grieving man and
the ecstatic man act for the same reason and we explain their action with the same
reason. If that is where the explanation leaves us, then it is trivial.
Smith is right that the two men’s emotions provide a context for the action. But
what is really of interest in explaining the action is identifying what it is about grief
and what it is about ecstasy that do so. Unlike the man who wants a saucer of mud,
the two men who want to roll around in the clothes see the action as desirable in
some way.
In these particular cases where we have one man rolling around out of grief and
17One might object that the relevant pro-attitude is towards a class of actions which will get the
man closer to his wife. But this cannot be the case if we are dealing with purely expressive action.
If that is the relevant pro-attitude, then the man is acting in order to achieve something, namely to
get closer to his wife, and the action is no longer purely expressive.
18Alvarez (2009) makes the same point with a non-emotion example of doing a cartwheel, and
with regards to saying that expressive action is acting just because I want to. She writes:
If we apply this [Davidsonian] model to our example, we get: “I did a cartwheel
because I had a pro-attitude (e.g. a desire) towards actions with a certain property
(namely, the property of ‘being a cartwheel’), and also had a belief that my action
A, under description d (namely, ‘doing a cartwheel’), had that property”; or more
conversationally, “I did a cartwheel because I wanted to do a cartwheel and believed
that my action of doing a cartwheel was what? a means? an instance? a way? of
doing a cartwheel”. But this barely makes sense, and the only reason to claim that I
had such a belief is that then the example will fill the Davidsonian model. (Alvarez
2009, 299)
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another rolling around out of ecstasy, the difference is in what the emotions are
about and in how the actions are seen as desirable. Both emotions are about the
dead wives. But the man who is grieving sees the loss of his wife as irrevocably
bad, whereas the ecstatic man sees the loss of his wife as a release from tyranny.
The first is drawn to the action as an expression of grief, the second as an expression
of ecstasy. If Smith is to allow that the emotion provides a context, and he is right
to do so, and if the kind of context an emotion provides is dependent on how the
agent experiences things emotionally, then the emotion provides a context in virtue
of its intentional quality and intentional nature. But, as I argued in Chapter 4, emo-
tions are not reducible to belief-desire compounds. So, why should we side-line the
emotion in the way that Smith does, especially if the explanatory focus is shifted
back to the emotion? Without giving an emotion its central place, a belief-desire
model of explanation is trivial. But if we give an emotion its central place, it is the
emotion as an intentional state which explains, not some belief or desire. Smith’s
account does not provide a satisfactory explanation of expressive action.
Goldie attempted to account for the role of the emotion by arguing that emotions
involve primitive desires. The action is still explained in belief-desire terms, but
the expressive nature of the action is explained with reference to a desire made
primitive by the emotion, together with a wish to satisfy that desire. The wish is
symbolically enacted. As I argued, the class of action that is expressive of a wish is
still action for a reason and so he has not provided an account of the nature of our
target actions. Even if it did apply, Goldie’s account falls into the same quagmire
as Smith’s with regards to trivialising both acting for a reason and giving a trivial
explanation. We must conclude that expressive action is not action done for reasons
that are combinations of beliefs and desires. Consequently, we cannot explain such
action as rational in terms of beliefs and desires. It therefore seems not all actions
are done for beliefs and desires and we need another way of explaining expressive
action.
Several philosophers have argued that expressive action is not action done for
a reason or a reason of the ‘in order to’ kind.19 Hursthouse led the way with her
defining paper ‘Arational Actions’ (1991) where she argues that expressive action
is intentional action that is arational. Arational action is action not done for a reason
but which is not irrational. It is simply arational. While it is arational, she thinks that
it can be given a rational or irrational description, and it is this description which
makes us think of some expressive actions as either rational or irrational, not the
19For example, see Hursthouse (1991); Do¨ring (2003); Alvarez (2009); Betzler (2009).
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nature of the action itself.
The failure of attempts to show how acting purely expressively is acting for a
reason, the very nature of such actions—that they are somehow different to paradig-
matic action for reasons—and the existence of convincing accounts of the difference
between intentional and rational action is good support for supposing that such ac-
tions are not actions done for a reason at all. Nevertheless, they are intentional and
not irrational. They are arational. I find these considerations compelling and shall
accept that expressive action is arational.
This means, however, that the way in which we explain expressive action need
not have any direct bearing on how we explain rational action. If we want to explain
action done for a reason and if we cannot explain action not done for a reason in
terms of states of belief and desire, it does not follow that action done for a reason
is not rationalised by states of belief and desire.
What does follow is that states of belief and desire are not required for an action
to be intentional. I ended the previous section by drawing attention to Smith’s claim
that the belief-desire model of explanation is central because all intentional action
can be explained according to it. But not all intentional action can be explained
according to it, and so we do not need to accept that the belief-desire model of ex-
planation is central. We also saw that a belief-desire explanation risks trivialising
the notion of acting for a reason if there is not some further desirability character-
isation of the action. What makes the action desirable, however, is not a state of
belief or a state of desire, but some consideration or fact—a motivating reason.
This means that, even if we can give an explanation of action in terms of states
of belief and desire, it may still be the case that they are not necessary for an explan-
ation and we can give another form of explanation of the same action, one which
gives the motivating reasons as facts their central place in rationalising action.
5.4 MOTIVATING REASONS AND EXPLANATORY REASONS
In this section, I propose and adopt an alternative model for explanations of rational
action in terms of the agent’s motivating reasons as facts, one which avoids the
problems facing Dancy’s proposal. Alvarez (2010) distinguishes between motivat-
ing reasons and explanatory reasons and, by making this distinction, we do not have
to commit to the idea that the reasons the agent takes herself to have and the reasons
that explain her rational action are always the same, and neither do we have to give
up the factive nature of explanations.
Explanatory reasons are more general than motivating reasons. An explanatory
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reason ‘plays the role of (part of) the explanans in an explanation of the agent’s
φ-ing’ (Alvarez 2010, 35). While an explanatory reason can still provide an ex-
planation from the point of view of the agent and why she did what she did, an
explanatory reason need not pick out the actual reason for which the agent took her-
self to be acting. We might explain with reference to an explanatory reason when
the agent is wrong about her reasons or when we wish to remain neutral on whether
her reasons were real, such as when Jo goes to the library because she believes that
her book is there but it is not. We may also explain by giving other features of the
agent which give us insight into her point of view, such as a character trait. For ex-
ample, if James does not go to the party because he is shy, his reason for not going
to the party is not that he is shy even though we can explain his action in terms of
his shyness.
A motivating reason will always be an explanatory reason because it provides
an explanation in virtue of being the reason the agent took herself to have. The
reverse need not always hold. If the explanatory reason is that Jo believed that the
library had her book, and if she is wrong, we cannot explain simply by saying that
the library had her book.
Nevertheless, we can still explain her action from her point of view by identify-
ing an explanatory reason which picks out what the agent took to be a reason. Be-
cause we are explaining Jo’s action from her point of view, we are still explaining
her action as a reasonable or potentially as rational action. This allows us to dis-
tinguish between psychological explanations in terms of beliefs and desires which
pick out what the agent took to be a reason, and psychological explanations which
explain in other ways, such as in terms of a character trait like being shy. A belief-
desire explanation still gives an explanation in terms of what the agent’s consider-
ations in favour of acting were, even if she was wrong about those considerations
being reasons. On this kind of framework, we could understand Smith’s ‘motivating
reasons’ as explanatory reasons.
One may still object that a motivating reason is not actually what rationalises the
action. The idea behind this new form of the objection is that, in cases where the
agent is wrong about her reasons, there are still considerations in favour of why the
agent did what she did: Jo did not just randomly find herself at the library, she went
there with a purpose and in order to achieve a goal. She is completely reasonable
in acting as she did, given the beliefs and desires she had, and what rationalises her
action is showing that she took herself to be acting for a reason, not that she actually
did act for a reason.
On this line of thought, we might be tempted to distinguish between ‘subjective’
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and ‘objective’ reasons. Subjective reasons are ‘what the agent justifiably sees as
a reason because of the contents of his actual mental state’ (Do¨ring 2010, 287).
Objective reasons are what are reasons because of features of the agent’s situation.
The claim, then, is that what rationalises an action is that the agent acts for what she
believes is a reason, regardless of whether the reason is a fact.
Sabine Do¨ring (2007, 287) gives the example of being told by a doctor to take a
certain medicine. Unknown to you, the medicine will actually harm you. In such a
case, the objective reason is that the medicine will harm you and so you should not
take it. If you believe that you ought to take the medicine because the doctor told
you to and yet do not take it, you are acting irrationally even when what you have
most objective reason to do is not take the medicine, Do¨ring claims. This suggests
that what actually makes an action rational is that you are acting in line with your
beliefs about what your reasons are, not that you are acting in line with what the
actual reasons are.
If this is the case, then an explanation in terms of the agent’s beliefs and desires
may be sufficient to rationalise an action and, even stronger, giving an explanation
in terms of the objective reason alone does not rationalise the action because it does
not show how the agent acted for what she believed was a reason.
We can reject this kind of argument for three reasons.
First, the objective-subjective reason distinction is not needed if we make the
motivating-explanatory reason distinction. Giving an explanation in terms of the
agent’s motivating reason is not the same as giving an explanation in terms of an
objective reason, even though a motivating reason is an objective reason. This is
because a motivating reason is the reason in light of which an agent acted, not just
any good-making feature of the situation. Even if it is the case that the medicine
will harm me, and it is a reason for which I ought to act, if I am not aware that
it will harm me, it cannot be my motivating reason. This means that the stronger
claim must be rejected: if we explain an action in terms of the motivating reason, it
is implicit that the agent was relevantly aware of the motivating reason, perhaps by
believing that it is the case. It is therefore compatible with rationalising an action
by identifying the motivating reason that we are showing that the agent is acting for
what she believes she has reason to do.
Acting for a motivating reason does not imply that one is acting for the best
reason or, even, a good reason. One can act guided by a fact which is a good reason
for the action, but one can also act guided by a fact which is a bad reason. For
example, I go to the corner shop to buy milk because it is a shop which stocks milk.
This is a good reason to go to the shop to buy milk. But perhaps I go to the corner
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shop to buy milk because I dreamt last night that this is what I would do today.
This is a bad reason to go to the shop to buy milk. I can also act guided by a false
consideration which, if true, would be a good reason or a false consideration which,
if true, would be a bad reason. The shop is out of milk. Nevertheless, if it had milk,
that would be a good reason for going there to buy milk. I did not dream about
buying milk from the corner shop. Even if I had, it would be a bad reason for going
to the shop to buy milk.
Second, the subjective-objective reason distinction cannot account for the norm-
ative force of reasons to act. Imagine that the building you are in is burning down.
If there is a pro tanto reason for you to φ, then you ought to φ; and there is a pro
tanto reason for you to get outside, namely that the building is burning down. So,
you ought to get outside. But if having a subjective reason is required for acting
rationally then, if you do not believe that you have a reason to get outside, then you
do not have a reason to get outside on pain of irrationality. But there is a reason,
which is the fact that the building is burning down. How do we adjudicate between
what you should do in this scenario? We cannot say that the normative force of the
pro tanto reason to get outside is defeated by your lack of belief that it is a reason
regardless of how well that belief coheres with your other beliefs, else we lose the
normative force of reasons. At best it seems that we can say there is a reason for you
to believe that the building is on fire, namely the fact that the building is on fire, but
that same fact is not a reason for you to act. This is an undesirable conclusion to be
forced into, because we do think that reasons have normative force on our actions
and our acting rationally, independent of whether we believe them or not.
Third, we can accept that not taking the medicine despite believing that you
should is problematic. However, the problem need not arise from your not acting
in lines with your beliefs. What is problematic, even irrational, is that your beliefs
and attitudes are in conflict because you cannot, without contradiction, hold all of
them together. Your belief that you should take the medicine is in direct conflict
with your intention not to take it; and in cases of such conflict, you are rationally
required to give one of them up.20 This could be the belief or the intention but in the
case as described, it seems that neither is given up. Hence, we have an alternative
20This is a wide-scope interpretation of rational requirements, introduced by John Broome. See
Broome (1999, 2005) but also Kolodny (2005) and Way (2009) for discussion. On such an interpret-
ation, rational requirements govern combinations of attitudes, not individual attitudes. In contrast, a
narrow-scope interpretation would have that rational requirements govern individual attitudes. Here
is the contrast. On wide scope, if I believe that I should take the medicine, then I must either take the
medicine or give up the belief. On narrow scope, if I believe that I should take the medicine, then I
must take the medicine. The wide-scope interpretation is widely accepted (Wallace 2014).
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explanation for the seeming irrationality, one that is independent of the subjective-
objective reason distinction.
Nevertheless, the subjective-objective reason distinction does capture an import-
ant intuition, but we can capture that intuition by adopting alternative distinctions
which are not similarly problematic. I shall distinguish between acting rightly or in
light of a reason and acting reasonably, and subjective and objective rationality.
‘Acting rationally’ is an ambiguous term. As I have been using it, acting ra-
tionally is acting in light of a reason. A reason is a fact that counts in favour of
the action so, if one acts rationally, one is doing what one has reason to do. In this
sense, acting rationally is acting rightly. One can also use ‘acting rationally’ to refer
to acting reasonably. Acting reasonably need not be acting rightly or in light of a
reason, but it is acting in a way that is warranted, considering the beliefs and desires
that you have.
To see the distinction, consider an example that Littlejohn (2012, 149) gives
to show that one can act reasonably but not rightly (in light of a reason). Parents
have to decide when it is all right to allow their children to play on their own in
the neighbourhood. When it is all right will depend on what the neighbourhood
is: in safe neighbourhoods, the parents may end up being overly protective but in
dangerous neighbourhoods, insufficiently protective. Given the variety of factors,
parents may reasonably but incorrectly judge when they ought to let their children
out. If we insist that acting rightly (for a reason) and acting reasonably are the same,
then we would be forced to say that parents cannot reasonably but incorrectly judge
when to let their children out, but that is surely false.
We now see that the subjective-objective reason distinction is not without basis.
What the distinction attempts to capture is the idea that acting reasonably may not
be acting in light of a reason. However, as we have seen, there are problems with
making the distinction one of types of reasons. We should rather adopt Niko Ko-
lodny’s distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ rationality as a means to
talk about the intuitive difference (see Kolodny 2005). Subjective rationality refers
to the relations that hold between our psychological states and attitudes, whereas ob-
jective rationality refers to the relations that hold between our psychological states
and facts. Rather than making a claim about different kinds of reasons and thereby
running into problems regarding the normative force of having a reason, we can
talk about different kinds of relations between states and facts. Acting reasonably is
acting coherently with our other attitudes: it is being subjectively rational. In good
cases, we also act rightly and in line with the facts: we are objectively rational.
The subjective-objective rationality distinction also helps us to explain what is
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intuitively compelling about a psychological explanation in terms of beliefs and
desires. What is intuitively compelling is not that it shows that the agent acted
for a reason. Rather, it shows that the agent was subjectively rational and acting
reasonably. Compare this to an explanation in terms of a character trait like shyness.
Here, the explanation does not show that the agent was subjectively rational, that
she acted reasonably or that she acted for a reason.
We therefore see that by distinguishing between motivating reasons and explan-
atory reasons and by allowing that they can sometimes overlap but need not always
do so, we both keep motivating reasons central in a rationalising explanation and
avoid the problems of Dancy’s proposal. Dancy insisted that the reasons which
explain will always be the motivating reasons, but this is not the case. We can there-
fore give explanations in terms of beliefs and desires and give explanations in terms
of motivating reasons but, because explanations in terms of beliefs and desires ex-
plain by showing how the agent took herself to have a motivating reason, the latter
kind of explanation is the central kind. Finally, explanations in terms of the agent’s
beliefs and desires are not completely disconnected from the agent’s rational action.
Such explanations can still show how the agent was subjectively rational and acting
reasonably.
5.5 CONCLUSION
I set up the discussion of this chapter by asking what a rational action is. I defined
it as action that is under the agent’s awareness, control, and is action that is done
in light of a reason. I then argued that acting for a reason is acting for some fact
in light of which the agent sees that action as good. That fact is stated by a true
proposition and is the agent’s motivating reason.
Turning to explanations, I argued that, while we can explain a rational action
in terms of states of belief and desire, those states of belief and desire are not the
motivating reasons. I showed how we can explain an agent’s action by identifying
the motivating reason and argued that such an explanation rationalises an action. If
the agent was wrong about her reasons then, while we cannot explain the action as
one done for a reason, we can still show how it was reasonable by showing how the
agent took herself to be acting for a reason.
The discussion in this chapter helps to formally describe what the differences
are between the kinds of explanations in the different categories I introduced in
Chapter 2, and to phrase more precisely what is so different about Category E.
These categories of explanation were:
125
A Manifestation A1. Symptoms of manifestation
A2. Manifestation in behaviour
B Other intentional states B1. Beliefs and desires
B2. ‘Seeing’
B3. Motives
C Pure expression C. Expressing an emotion
D As a reason: D1. Avoiding, alleviating, encouraging:
addressing a state (a) Symptoms of manifestation
(b) Manifestation in behaviour
D2. Avoiding, alleviating, encouraging the
emotion, not just the manifestation
E Providing a reason: E. Not avoiding, etc., or expressing
intentional nature
Category A illustrates cases where the emotion plays a causal role but is not the
reason in light of which the agent acted. We can now more formally say that the
kind of explanation in Category A is not a rationalising explanation.
The explanations in Category B are either examples of cases where the emotion
leads to or is associated with other beliefs, desires and attitudes of the agent. The
kind of explanation thus shows how the agent had the beliefs, etc., she had. Or, as
in the case of the explanation referring to the agent’s motive, the explanation draws
on how emotions have associated mental states, etc. The kind of explanation is thus
not a rationalising one but it is one which potentially shows the action as reasonable
given the agent’s other states and attitudes. The emotion in the explanation is an
explanatory reason.
In this chapter, I have argued that the examples in Category C are examples
of arational action and so the explanations, too, are not rationalising explanations.
The emotion does not play a rationalising role and it is an explanatory reason in the
explanation.
This leaves categories D and E as potentially illustrating how an emotion can
play a rationalising role of some kind. I argued in Chapter 3 that the emotions
in the examples in Category D are the agent’s reasons because they are states to
be addressed. We can now say more formally that they are the agent’s motivating
reasons: the emotional experience, as an experience, is a consideration in light of
which the agent sees the action as good. These cases are not different from other
rationalising explanations despite the involvement of an emotion.
From the discussion of this chapter, however, we can now see how the explana-
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tions in Category E could be quite different in kind to the explanations in the other
categories. There are two important ideas that can be used to crystallise a descrip-
tion of the kinds of cases in Category E. The first is that, if an agent’s reason is
not her states of belief and desire but a fact in light of which she sees the action as
good, then another intentional state which alerts her to the fact could provide the
reason. That other intentional state could be an emotion. For example, if Richard
buys flowers for Katherine because he loves her, his love need not be his reason in
a way like it would be in Category D—a state to be addressed—but the informa-
tion which the emotion provides, namely that Katherine is affection-inspiring and
valuable in his life, could be his motivating reason. The second idea is that we do
not need states of belief and desire in order to explain an action, then other psycho-
logical states could also explain an action as reasonable, much like states of belief
and desire can. If Richard bought flowers because he loved Katherine then, while
the emotion in the explanation is an explanatory reason, the nature of the explan-
ation is one which shows that he acted for a putative reason and acted reasonably.





THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF EMOTIONS
In Part II, I argued in Chapter 4 that emotions are intentional states which provide us
with information about how things are but which are neither belief- nor judgement-
like. I also argued in Chapter 5 that acting in light of a reason is acting for a mo-
tivating reason, which is a fact, and that giving a rationalising explanation requires
showing that the agent had a motivating reason. We have now canvassed the basis
to articulate the view that, if we act on the basis of an emotional experience, then
we can act in light of a reason, perhaps in a way much like how we act in light of
a reason when we act on the basis of a belief. What remains now is to show how,
in virtue of their intentional nature, emotions can provide access to reasons in light
of which the agent acts and that when she acts on the basis of an emotional experi-
ence, she can act in light of those reasons. We need to establish what, exactly, those
reasons are and whether we can indeed act in light of them in the right kind of way.
This is the task of Part III.
In this chapter, I examine the concept of the formal object of an emotion more
closely than I have so far done. This is because it is central to the idea that emotions
are intentional and that emotions could provide access to information about how
things are, information in light of which we act. In other words, it is central to the
idea that emotions could provide access to reasons.
I begin in section 6.1 by examining the concept of the formal object and how it is
used in the emotion literature. In section 6.2, I examine what characterisation of the
formal object best meets the conditions and requirements we have of it and I argue
that the concept of the formal object is best understood as a response-dependent
concept. However, response-dependence brings with it the worry that the formal
object may now be trivial because it becomes something like ‘whatever property
elicits emotion x in subject S’. I therefore argue, in section 6.3, that the formal
object is not trivial if understood in this way because we can be wrong about when it
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obtains and because we can fail to respond emotionally to it; that is, it is not the same
as ‘whatever property elicits emotion x in subject S’. In light of this understanding
of the formal object as a response-dependent concept, in section 6.4 I articulate three
potential reasons to which an emotion can provide access in virtue of its intentional
nature. These are:
1. The fact of how things seem to the agent.
2. The fact of how things are, as in what response is merited.
3. The fact of how things are, as in what relation holds.
6.1 THE FORMAL OBJECT OF AN EMOTION
Part of our understanding of emotions as intentional states is that they are about
particular objects at which they are targeted. But, as we saw in chapters 1 and 4,
it is supposed to be in virtue of some formal object that the particular object is the
object of the emotion it is. In this way, the concept of the formal object plays an
important role in enhancing our understanding of emotions because it is the concept
of something that illuminates the nature of each emotion.
The formal object of a mental state is something, generally taken to be a prop-
erty, that is suitably general so that a range of particular objects can have it. We
might say, for instance, that the formal object of belief is truth, where truth is some-
thing general which a proposition, the particular object of belief, can have. Further,
a mental state is a belief in virtue of being a mental state which takes a proposition
as true, rather than imagining a proposition as true, wishing it were true, etc. This
entails two ways of assessing a belief. The first is to assess whether the proposition
really is true, and is a question about the formal object as a property. I shall use
‘formal object as a property’ and ‘formal property’ interchangeably. The second
is whether the mental state is what it is in virtue of taking the proposition as true,
rather than one of imagining it as true, wishing it were true, etc., and is a question
about how the formal property relates to the mental state. It is a question about the
concept of the formal object. The actual truth of the proposition does not affect
whether the mental state is a belief or not because we can believe things that are not
true. We also do not have to believe everything that is true.
In a similar fashion, the formal object of an emotion must be a property that a
range of particular objects can have. It is generally taken to be an axiological or
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evaluative property.1 So, the formal object of an emotion is an evaluative property
which the particular object of an emotion can have. Further, an emotion is fear
rather than hatred, for example, in virtue of being elicited by the property that is
fear’s formal object. And, like belief, we can assess an emotion by asking questions
about both the formal property and the concept of the formal object.
For instance, we can ask two distinct questions about the formal property. Like
for belief, we can ask whether the particular object really has the relevant property.
But we can also ask whether something else which is not the particular object of
the emotion has the property, in virtue of which the emotion is elicited.2 For ex-
ample, I may be crying over spilt milk but it is in fact my grandmother’s death that
I have been ignoring which elicits my sadness. I am wrong in what I attribute the
formal property to, but nevertheless right that something is that property, namely a
significant loss. In this way, I can learn from my emotions. Turning to the concept
and how the formal property relates to the emotion, and like for belief, we can ask
whether the emotion is what it is in virtue of being elicited by the formal property.
It is in virtue of being elicited by my grandmother’s death as a significant loss that
my emotion is grief rather than anger, for example.
We thus have two sets of questions through which we can increase our under-
standing of the intentional nature of emotions, questions about the formal property
and questions about the concept of the formal object, including about the way the
formal property relates to the emotion. We can start examining the formal object by
asking: (1) what is the formal property itself; and, (2) how does the formal prop-
erty relate to the emotion, and what role does it play in the intentional nature of an
emotion?
So, what is the formal property itself? There is a lack of consistency in the
philosophical literature about what kind of property the formal object of an emo-
tion is. Some talk of the formal object of fear, for instance, as danger (Lazarus
2001)3, the dangerous (Prinz 2004), a threat (Roberts 1988), the property of being
1See Fabrice Teroni (2007, 396) for discussion on this point. It is worth noting that emotions like
wonder or surprise do not seem to have formal objects that are evaluative properties. Whether or not
all emotions have evaluative properties as formal objects would affect whether ‘emotion’ is a natural
kind but does not affect the claim that all emotions have a formal object and, more-often-than-not,
it is evaluative. See also Kevin Mulligan (2010) for a discussion of value and evaluative properties,
and different proposals about their connection to emotions. Mulligan argues, and I agree, that the
formal object of an emotion is not a value although it may still be an evaluative property.
2I talk of the formal object as the property in virtue of which an emotion is elicited. The kind
of elicitation can remain vague. An emotion could be elicited by automatically responding to some
formal object, imagining a scenario with the formal object, believing falsely some proposition about
the formal object, etc.
3Strictly speaking, Richard Lazarus talks about the core relational themes and not the formal
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an aversive possibility (Roberts 2003), the threatening (Nussbaum 2001). These are
evaluative relational properties, as described in Chapter 1. Others, however, talk
about the formal object of fear as the frightening (de Sousa 1987), or the fearsome
(D’Arms 2005; Tappolet 2010). This latter way of talking about the formal object is
often interpreted as saying that the formal object is a response-dependent property.4
And sometimes we find both as, while talking of fear as construing a threat, Robert
Roberts (1988) also refers to the fearsome.5
We will not immediately do any better in answering the second question, about
how the formal property relates to the emotion and what role it plays in the inten-
tional nature of an emotion, because there is also a lack of clarity and agreement
here. In order to pinpoint where the lack of clarity arises, let us return to belief.
Just because the formal object of belief is truth, it does not follow that my belief
is about the proposition ‘x is y is true’ rather than, simply, ‘x is y’ which is repres-
ented as being true. In other words, the formal object of belief does not explicitly
enter into the intentional content of the belief. It is how the explicit content, ‘x is
y’ is represented as being and we can express the content in the description: the
truth that x is y. So, just because the formal object of fear, say, is the frightening, it
does not follow that the content of fear is ‘x is frightening’ rather than ‘x’ which is
represented as frightening by being perceived or experienced in a certain way. We
can express the content in the description: the frightening x.
Following the failure of strong cognitive accounts of emotions, no-one these
days (of whom I am aware) proposes that the formal object needs to be explicitly
represented. This is because explicit representation would require application of
a concept, which in turn requires language and mastery of abstract concepts like
the dangerous or the frightening. Nevertheless, there are contrasting views about
how the formal object relates to the intentional content and this is where the lack of
clarity arises.
Some suggest that the formal object makes up part of the emotion’s own inten-
tional content. Jesse Prinz, for example, talks about emotions being about their core
objects. However, amongst appraisal theorists in psychology, like him, the core relational themes
are roughly equivalent to the philosophical formal objects (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 51).
4I will distinguish between response-dependent properties and response-dependent concepts in
section 6.2.2.
5Christine Tappolet (2010, 328, fn 7) gives a list of these different identifications, which I have
added to, and flags that one can interpret the formal object as relational or as response-dependent.
Mulligan (2010) also identifies different forms the formal object has taken, such as being a value,
an axiological or evaluative property, or a deontological property. I do not think that anyone really
identifies the formal object as a value and so shall not focus on that option. The deontological
property corresponds to the response-dependent property.
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relational themes or formal objects. For him, emotions represent the formal objects
and the formal objects are represented in the intentional content (Prinz 2004, 62).
For Christine Tappolet (2010), emotions have intentional content that is an evalu-
ative but non-conceptual representation of the formal object. As she writes, ‘[t]he
idea is often formulated as the claim that emotions are perceptions of values, where
it is understood that the perceptions in question are non-conceptual’ (Tappolet 2010,
329).6
Others suggest that the formal object need not be in the emotion’s intentional
content. On Richard Lazarus’s brand of appraisal theory, for instance, the core
relational themes—his equivalent notion to the formal object—are not explicitly
represented. They are what emotions are designed to represent, but they are only
implicitly represented by other explicit representations in the appraisal dimension,
such as appraisals about goal relevance, goal congruence, ego-involvement, coping
potential, etc. (Lazarus 1991, as discussed in Prinz 2004). This suggests reading the
role of the formal object in the intentional nature as a description of the emotion’s
intentional nature as a whole, rather than a claim of what the emotion’s actual inten-
tional content is. Kevin Mulligan (2010) argues that emotions do not represent the
formal object, even while the formal object is what justifies or explains an emotion.
And Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012) argue that the way in which emotions
have correctness conditions traces back to the kind of attitude emotions are rather
than their specific content. Indeed, they argue that emotions are not about evalu-
ative properties even if the particular objects are bearers of evaluative properties.
We therefore find differing views and a lack of clarity about the role of the formal
object in an emotion’s intentional nature.
In the next section, I examine the concept of the formal object in more detail
in order to clarify what it is and what role it plays in the intentional nature of an
emotion. I argue that the the concept of the formal object is a response-dependent
concept because it is the concept of a property which produces experiences of a
certain kind in a responder. Nevertheless, emotions need not be explicitly about
the formal object under this full description, even though the emotion’s intentional
nature as a whole represents its formal object and we can describe the implicit
content in terms of the formal object.
6While Tappolet says that emotions are perceptions of values, I interpret her as referring to eval-
uative properties.
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6.2 THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FORMAL OBJECT
In order for the concept of the formal object to enhance our understanding of emo-
tion, there are two conditions which our characterisation of the formal object must
meet. First, it must be possible to experience an emotion even when the relevant
formal object is not the case or what elicits the emotion. Like for belief, whether
the property actually is what elicits the emotion or not does not affect whether the
emotion is what it is, so long as we experience the property as obtaining and as
eliciting our emotion. We can and do experience inaccurate or inappropriate emo-
tions. Second, it must be possible that the relevant formal object be the case but
for the relevant emotion not to be elicited, such as when we are not aware of the
formal property or when we judge neutrally that it obtains. These conditions on the
characterisation of the formal object entail that it must not be something trivial like
‘whatever property elicits emotion x for me’.7
In addition, and as already mentioned in Chapter 1, the concept of the formal
object is the concept of a property that individuates different emotions and we can
use it to identify individual emotions of a type. So, we also require that our char-
acterisation of the formal object is such that the formal object can play these roles.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, if the formal object is what individuates and what all
instances of an emotion type share, then we can also use the formal object to assess
an emotion for intelligibility, accuracy and appropriateness. These five roles often
given to the formal object are thus:
(I) The formal object is what all instances of an emotion type share.
(II) The formal object is what individuates emotions.
(III) The formal object determines whether an emotion is intelligible.
(IV) The formal object determines whether an emotion is correct.
(V) The formal object determines whether an emotion is appropriate.
In this section, I begin in section 6.2.1 by fleshing out what we are committed to
by accepting roles (I) and (II). This will lead to the objection that the formal object
7As Teroni puts the point, we should not understand the formal object in a way which makes
it trivial, such as if being frightening, for instance, is ‘the property of inducing fear in a given
individual or species’ (Teroni 2007, 397). This is because we need to allow that particular objects
can ‘exemplify formal objects independently of the occurrence of the relevant emotions (say for
lack of relevant information)’ and that the relevant emotions can ‘occur without particular objects
exemplifying the relevant formal objects’ (397).
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of an emotion is not what individuates. In responding to this objection in section
6.2.2, I argue that the concept of the formal object is best understood as the concept
of a property which produces experiences of a certain kind in a responder, namely a
response-dependent concept, and if we understand it in this way it does individuate.
In section 6.2.3, I draw together my conclusions for 6.2 and how they affect our
understanding of the formal object and the intentional nature of an emotion.
6.2.1 WHAT THE ROLE OF THE FORMAL OBJECT COMMITS US TO
Because of the role in (I), we are committed to the necessary conditions that:
A. If an emotion is of type E then it is the emotion it is in virtue of being elicited
by something as f .
• For example, if Joan is afraid, then her emotion is fear in virtue of being
elicited by something as dangerous or as frightening.
B. If an emotion is not the emotion it is in virtue of being elicited by something
as f , then it is not of type E.
• For example, if Joan’s emotion is not the emotion it is in virtue of being
elicited by something as dangerous or as frightening, then it is not fear.
Explicating these conditions for (I) makes clear that we can be wrong about
what emotion we are experiencing. For example, if I am driving in a dangerous or
frightening part of town and experience an emotion, that emotion is fear because it is
elicited in virtue of the area as dangerous or as frightening. I may, however, identify
my emotion as anger with my innocuous passenger. If asked why I am angry with
my passenger, I will try to show that the passenger is somehow being offensive; in
other words, I will try to show that the passenger instantiates the formal object of
anger and thereby make my emotion intelligible. It nevertheless remains the case
that my emotion is not anger because it is not elicited by something as offensive; it
is elicited by something as dangerous or as frightening.
What does not follow from (I) is that, if an emotion is the emotion it is in virtue
of being elicited by something as f , then it is an emotion of type E. Nor does it
follow that, if an emotion is not of type E, then it is not the emotion it is in virtue
of being elicited by something as f . This, however, is how we might be tempted to
explicate (II), the role that the formal object is what individuates emotions:
C. If an emotion is the emotion it is in virtue of being elicited by something as
f , then it is an emotion of type E.
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• For example, if Joan’s emotion is the emotion it is in virtue of being
elicited by something as dangerous or as frightening, then it is fear.
D. If an emotion is not of type E, then it is not the emotion it is in virtue of being
elicited by something as f .
• For example, if Joan’s emotion is not fear, then it is not elicited by some-
thing as dangerous or as frightening.
There are, however, apparent counterexamples to C and D. If they hold up, then it
seems that emotions cannot be individuated on the basis of their formal object alone
and we must deny (II). Doing so does not detract from (I). I return to (III), (IV) and
(V) in section 6.3.
6.2.2 COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE INDIVIDUATING ROLE
William Lyons (1980) identifies the formal object of fear as the dangerous and gives
the example of feeling excited in virtue of something as dangerous and being afraid
in virtue of something as dangerous.8 Let us grant for discussion that the formal ob-
ject of fear is the property of being dangerous. It seems that both emotions are what
they are in virtue of something as dangerous, but they are not the same emotion.
Therefore, the objection goes, the formal object is not what individuates. Lyons’
solution is to propose that not all cases of excitement are in virtue of something as
dangerous whereas all cases of fear are; therefore, the dangerous is not the formal
object of excitement (Lyons 1980, 101). This is quite right. The dangerous does not
meet A or B, and therefore fails to meet (I), with regards to excitement.
Fabrice Teroni (2007), however, gives some different examples and concludes
that the formal object is not what individuates emotions, thus rejecting (II). His
examples are of thrill and fear, and of shame and contempt. He identifies the formal
object of both thrill and fear as the frightening, and the formal object of both shame
and contempt as the shameful.
Teroni proposes that thrill is only ever elicited by something as frightening, and
that it is in virtue of the particular object as frightening that the emotion is thrill.
If he is right, then A and B are met for thrill, but on the basis of the formal object
alone, we cannot distinguish between thrill and fear. Similarly, both shame and
contempt are only ever elicited by something as shameful.
I do not find these examples convincing for two reasons.
8I use ‘in virtue of’ as short-hand for ‘in virtue of being elicited by’ because Lyons does not talk
about elicitation. This does not affect the point being made in this paragraph.
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The first reason is that one emotion’s simply being elicited by the same thing
as another emotion does not entail that the formal object of the first emotion is the
same as the formal object of the second. We can have beliefs about something as
frightening or about something as shameful, beliefs which are elicited by something
as frightening or something as shameful, respectively, without also experiencing an
emotion. It is therefore possible to be in a state which is elicited by the same thing
as an emotion without being in that emotion state. If it is possible for non-emotions
to be elicited by something as frightening or shameful, then it may also be possible
for another emotion to be elicited by something as frightening or as shameful, so
long as the emotion has its own formal object in virtue of which it is the emotion it
is. We thus need to look closer at how the emotion is elicited; and this gives rise to a
question about the concept of the formal object and how the formal property relates
to the emotion, rather than a question about the formal property itself. By returning
to the difference between fear and excitement and starting with the assumption that
the formal object of fear is partly the property of being dangerous, we can cash out
how this works.
Suppose the free solo-climber Alex Honnold, who scales cliffs without any gear
and by himself, feels excited by what he does. Even though Honnold is a highly
trained and conditioned climber and the possibility of his falling is very low, what
he does is dangerous. There is a fact of the matter that, as a human being, the
cliff-face poses a threat to his well-being and is dangerous. Let us suppose further
that, like many other adrenaline-fuelled extreme sports enthusiasts, he does not feel
afraid; rather, he feels excited. And, crucially, he feels excited exactly because
scaling great heights with no safety equipment is dangerous. That is, in virtue of
the situation as dangerous, he is excited and his excitement is elicited by something
as dangerous. We have already seen that the dangerous is not the formal object of
excitement because it fails to meet (I); however, we need to ask: what is the formal
object of excitement which does meet (I)?
We do not only feel excited in the face of danger: Honnold may be excited by
going on holiday or seeing an old friend for coffee. This suggests that the formal
object of excitement is more plausibly something like being presented with a tan-
gible and immanent good. Whether the situation presents a tangible and immanent
good depends on the features of the situation and what relation holds between the
particular object of the emotion and the subject, just as whether there is a danger
depends on features of the situation and what relation holds between the particular
object and the subject. Honnold, for example, is a skilled climber and I am not.
Even while the situation is dangerous for both of us, it also presents a tangible and
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immanent good for Honnold in virtue of which his excitement is elicited, where the
tangible and immanent good is something like the chance to meet a challenge. It
does not present a tangible and immanent good for me.
This is a feature of the formal object as a relational property. A relational prop-
erty is a property which holds between two relata. For example, the man who is
the child of my parents is my brother. His being my brother is relational: he is my
brother because of the relation that holds between him and me, that we are children
of the same people. Similarly, being dangerous is a relational property because
something is only dangerous if it stands in a particular relation to something for
which it is dangerous. A cliff-face is dangerous for ground-bound humans because
we cannot fly but it is not dangerous for eagles because they can fly. Because he is
a human, the cliff-face is dangerous for Honnold. However, because he is a skilled
climber, the cliff-face also presents him with a tangible and immanent good in vir-
tue of which his excitement is elicited. We therefore see that the relational property
is also relative to the individual. To distinguish between something which is dan-
gerous and also the formal object of fear and something which is dangerous and
also the formal object of excitement, let us talk about the formal object of fear as
the frightening and the formal object of excitement as the exciting.9
Excitement, then, does not have the same formal object as fear. Teroni’s version
of the objection, however, was that thrill does. But a similar story can be given in
response.
It is not clear to me that thrill is different to excitement, except that it is pos-
sibly the class of excitement which is elicited by something as frightening.10 By
definition, then, Teroni would be right that thrill is elicited by something as fright-
ening. But if thrill is just the class of excitement which is elicited by something as
frightening, then the formal object is rather the property of presenting a tangible and
immanent good—and a tangible and immanent good is contingent on, in this case,
the situation as frightening. Perhaps the tangible and immanent good arises out
of showing off bravery, in which case being frightening directly elicits excitement.
Or, perhaps the tangible and immanent good arises out of the way the situation eli-
cits fear by being frightening, where the tangible and immanent good is the fearful
9This is a statement of terminology, not a statement about the formal object as response-
dependent.
10Although even this is not clear to me. We talk of the ‘thrill of the chase’, for instance, but thrill
here is not what it is in virtue of being elicited by something as frightening. Thrill is more likely the
class of excitement elicited by something as dangerous but, as we have seen, simply being elicited
by something as dangerous does not entail that it is elicited in virtue of of that thing as dangerous.
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adrenaline.11 In this latter case, excitement is elicited indirectly by something as
frightening, via fear.
We therefore see that being elicited by something which may be the formal
object of some other emotion does not entail that that the two emotions share a
formal object. In other words, because, e.g. thrill, is elicited by something as
frightening, directly or indirectly, it does not follow that it is in virtue of being
elicited by something as frightening that it is thrill, except contingently.
The second reason why I do not find the examples convincing is that, if we look
closer at why emotions of the same type share a formal object, that is, if we look
closer at (I), we see that the concept of the formal object is broader than someone
like Teroni allows.
If our concept of the formal object is of something which all instances of an
emotion type share, we need to say more about how the formal property relates to
the emotion in order to establish why a certain property elicits a certain emotion.
After all, a proposition as true can be the object of believing, wishing, imagining,
etc., but it is in virtue of being taken as true, rather than being imagined as true or
wished it were true, that it is the object of belief. So, why are emotions of a certain
type elicited by the same kinds of properties? It is in answering this question that
we uncover how the concept of the formal object is a response-dependent concept,
and we see that the formal object does individuate.
Imagine Scared-Honnold, Honnold’s doppelga¨nger with the same abilities. Un-
like Honnold, Scared-Honnold feels absolute terror while scaling cliffs and he only
does it for the money. Both Honnold and Scared-Honnold are humans, and climb-
ing cliff-faces is dangerous for humans. Both are also skilled climbers and climb-
ing cliff-faces is a challenge they can meet and a dangerous situation—frightening,
even—they can enjoy. For both of them, the situation presents a tangible and im-
manent good. In contrast, I am not a skilled climber. While the situation is dan-
gerous for me as well, it does not also present a tangible and immanent good. Nev-
ertheless, both scared-Honnold and I experience fear while Honnold experiences
thrill. This is because our different cares and interests affect which property elicits
an emotion in us.
Unlike Honnold, Scared-Honnold is not set on showing off his bravery or accu-
mulating fame, although the situation is such that he could do both. Neither does
11Honnold’s own description of his state of mind picks up on this fact that fear and excitement,
or thrill, are so closely connected. ‘I do get scared while soloing’, he says. ‘Something will happen
and you have tht little jolt of fear, excitement, or whatever you want to call it’ (Schmalz 2012, my
emphasis).
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Scared-Honnold have a thrill-seeking nature and take pleasure from the adrenaline
rush of being afraid, although the situation is such that he could do so. In other
words, Scared-Honnold does not experience the situation as frightening and also
as presenting a tangible and immanent good like Honnold does, either directly or
indirectly. And unlike Honnold, Scared-Honnold does not feel thrill but, like me,
he feels afraid. So, because Scared-Honnold and I have the cares we have, includ-
ing ones for our safety, the situation as frightening elicits fear in virtue of being
frightening. But because Honnold has the cares he has, including ones for fame and
adrenaline, the situation as frightening elicits excitement in virtue of being exciting,
not in virtue of being frightening. If this is the case, then the subject’s goals, what
she values, and what she cares about play an important role in whether an emotion,
and which one, is elicited. It is because of the similarity in which our cares are
affected, or are seen as being affected, that all instance of fear, anger, etc., share a
formal object.
Now, if you have certain cares, then you will be disposed to respond actively
to the ways in which those cares are being affected, perhaps by wanting to and
trying to protect the objects of those cares from harm, or viewing them favourably
in deliberation. Of course, any one person may have many cares, some of which
conflict, and some of which are more important than others. Sometimes a care may
not be motivating or intense at a particular time for a range of reasons, such as
being momentarily forgotten about, not being relevant, or even because the person
is suffering debilitating apathy. It is therefore possible for someone to have certain
cares, for them to be affected, for her to recognise or judge that they are being
affected, and not, in the moment, actively care about this being the case. However,
other things being equal, if someone has a set of cares, and one of them is being
affected in a given situation and she is aware that it is, then she will care. That is,
she will react actively, engagingly—in line with something she cares about being
affected. Having a care is, other things being equal, caring. And the concept of
caring is partly of being responsive.
We therefore see that in order for an emotion to be elicited in virtue of a some
property, the subject has to care, and the concept of caring invokes the concept of
responding. As a consequence, the concept of the formal object of an emotion is
not just the concept of a relational property. It is the concept of a relational property
that stands in relation to someone actively caring who experiences the property as
salient to her cares. In other words, the concept of the formal object is a response-
dependent concept, where a response-dependent concept is essentially a concept
of a property which produces experiences of a certain type in a responder (such
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as Johnston 1989 describes). Applying the concept involves thinking that such a
response is required, in a way still to be established. For example, we might say
that our concept of redness is essentially a concept of something that produces red-
experiences. If something is red, then it would produce red experiences. Or, our
concept of the frightening is essentially a concept of something that elicits fear. If
something is frightening, then it would elicit fear.12
A response-dependent concept is distinct from a response-dependent property.13
A response-dependent property is one which essentially stands in a certain relation
to some kind of subjective response (Wedgwood 1997). We might think that red is
an example of a response-dependent property. If something is red, then it essen-
tially stands in a relation where it evokes a phenomenal red experience in normal
perceivers in normal conditions.14 We may, however, accept that the concept of red
is response-dependent because it is essentially a concept of a property which pro-
duces red experiences, but deny that the property itself is response-dependent, that
is, a property that essentially stands in a relation to a subjective response. Perhaps
it is instead, essentially, a pattern of lightwaves.
Similarly, if the formal object of an emotion is a response-dependent property,
then it would essentially elicit an emotional response of a certain kind in a class
of perceivers in certain conditions.15 For example, the property of being frighten-
ing, we might suppose, is one which essentially elicits fear in human perceivers in
dangerous-for-humans conditions. But, while our concept of the frightening might
essentially be the concept of something which produces fear experiences in us, the
property of being frightening might also be independent of the kind of experiences
that we have. It might simply be the relational property of being dangerous(-for-
humans), or even the bearers of those relational properties, like the steep cliff-face.
We now also see that the emotions are what they are in virtue of being elicited
by different properties, the frightening or the exciting, and so the counterexamples
12We could also understand a response-dependent concept as a concept which we acquire only
through experiences of the relevant kind (Pettit 1991, 587). Without experiencing red, we will
not have a full first-hand grasp of the concept ‘red’; without experiencing fear, we will not have a
first-hand grasp of the concept ‘frightening’. I am not concerned with how we acquire the response-
dependent concept and set aside this interpretation.
13Ralph Wedgwood (1997) and Jussi Haukioja (2013) both give useful overviews of response-
dependent properties versus response-dependent concepts.
14Sometimes a response-dependent property is cashed out as a dispositional property, where it is
a property that would invoke experiences of a certain kind in the right kind of subject in the right
kind of conditions. Something can have a disposition without that disposition being made manifest.
15As Mikko Salmela (2011) points out, specifying the relevant class of perceivers and kind of
conditions appears harder for emotion than for colour, and we need to be cautious of giving a trivial
and highly subject-relative definition.
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to the formal object as what individuates no longer hold. Teroni does have a further
objection which targets this kind of proposal, however. His objection is that defining
the formal object in the way I have bundles together a whole bunch of things, other
than the formal object, which can be used to individuate emotions, such as action
tendencies or other beliefs held by the subject. He writes that ‘[t]he worry here
is that this might well lead to merely verbal distinctions, since it does not seem,
for instance, that the “shameful” and the “contemptible” [or the “thrilling” and the
“frightening”] refer to distinct values’ (Teroni 2007, 402).
Granting that both shame and contempt are elicited by something as shameful
and that both thrill and fear are elicited by something as frightening, I agree that
they do not refer to distinct values. They do not refer to distinct values because
they are responses to the same property. However, experiencing shame elicited
by the shameful rather than contempt elicited by the shameful, or fear elicited by
the frightening rather than thrill elicited by the frightening, does entail that there
are distinct values on another level which change the way the shameful and the
frightening are experienced. That level is determined by the subject’s background,
including her skills and cares. So, while the property that elicits different emotions
may be distinct from other aspects which may be used to individuate the emotion,
those other aspects still fall under the concept of the formal object because they
elucidate how an emotion is elicited in virtue of the formal property. It is not a
random bundling and the distinction is not merely verbal.
6.2.3 CLARIFICATION ON THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF EMOTION
In this section, I have argued that the concept of the formal object is a response-
dependent concept but I have not said much about what the property itself is. It
is compatible with the view of the concept as response-dependent that one of its
elements is an evaluative relational property like being dangerous, offensive, a loss,
valuable to me, etc. Indeed, the concept of the formal object of an emotion does
include that, whatever the particular object is, it stands in a certain kind of eval-
uative relation to the subject, like being dangerous, offensive, a loss, valuable to
me, etc. I therefore accept the widespread view that the formal property is best
understand as an evaluative relational property; nevertheless, our concept of it is
response-dependent. This brings some consistency to the way people talk of the
formal object, as highlighted at the beginning of the section. Those like Tappo-
let and Justin D’Arms are concerned primarily with the concept of the frightening,
whereas someone like Prinz is concerned with the relational property of being dan-
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gerous.16 So, while the concept of the formal object groups together a number of
elements, the evaluative relational property is one of these elements.
There is also now clarity concerning the role of the formal object in the inten-
tional nature of an emotion. The formal object need not be mentioned in the explicit
intentional content of an emotion. Both Honnold and Scared-Honnold experience
different emotions which are about something as dangerous or about something as
frightening. Their emotions, however, are elicited by different formal objects and
the emotional experience as a whole represents the dangerous or the frightening as
exciting, for Honnold’s excitement; or the emotion as a whole represents the danger-
ous or the frightening as frightening, for Scared-Honnold’s fear. It seems wrong,
therefore, to talk of emotions as perceptions of value because the value does not
enter explicitly into the intentional content. The value is rather represented by the
emotional experience as a whole and, in this way, the subject can respond to some-
thing as dangerous or as frightening without necessarily recognising that it is so.17
Nevertheless, the intentional content can still be expressed as ‘x’ represented as
frightening, or, the frightening x. In this way, the formal object is both represented
in the expression of the intentional content and describes the intentional nature.
6.3 USING THE FORMAL OBJECT
At the beginning of section 6.1, I introduced two conditions for the characterisation
of the formal object if it is to enhance our understanding of an emotion. First, it
must be possible to experience an emotion even when the relevant formal object is
not the case or what elicits the emotion. Second, it must be possible that the relevant
formal object be the case but for the relevant emotion not to be elicited,
If the formal object is a property which we characterise as response-dependent—
16Prinz in fact argues that the property of the formal object cannot be response-dependent. His
argument is not successful because it relies on a misrepresentation of the contemporary response-
dependent claim about properties. He defines a response-dependent property as ‘one that would not
exist without being represented as P by a human experience, judgement, or other mental state’ (Prinz
2004, 61). From this, he seems to conclude that the property must be represented by a mental state
at any one time in order to exist at that time. But, he argues, something can be a loss, a danger, etc.,
or another relational property, without being represented or experienced as such. If these are the
formal objects, as Prinz claims they are, then the formal object is not a response-dependent property.
Prinz’s definition is crude, however. A response-dependent property is one which, if something has
it, essentially stands in a certain relation to some kind of subjective response. But it does not follow
that something has the property only when there is someone responding; that is, when it is the object
of a mental state right now. It only follows that, if something has it, it would elicit the relevant
response in someone who is in the right kind of relation.
17As I argued in response to John Deigh’s (2010) objection to the perceptual model in Chapter 4.
My response thus perhaps does not salvage the perceptual model.
143
although it need not itself be a response-dependent property, essentially—then we
need to ensure that we can define what the formal object is in a non-trivial way. If
we do not, then we could end up by defining the formal object as ‘whatever property
elicits emotion x in subject S’. For instance, a dispositional analysis of the property
of being frightening as the property of having the disposition to elicit fear in cer-
tain responders in certain conditions will run into problems when we try to specify
what those perceivers and conditions are. Amongst other things, there is a lack of
uniformity in what is frightening to people (D’Arms, 2005, pp. 4-5) and we may
end up defining the conditions as those where emotion x is elicited in subject S. But
then we fail to meet the two conditions because it is not possible to be wrong about
the formal object or for the formal object to be present but for the relevant emotion
not to be elicited. We might object, that is, that on the view I am proposing, the
view of the concept of the formal object as a response-dependent concept, these
two conditions are not met and the formal object comes out trivial.
Luckily, plenty of insightful work, especially by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jac-
obson, has been done on an alternative, what is often called ‘neo-sentimentalism’.18
According to the neo-sentimentalist, ‘to apply a response-dependent concept φ (i.e.
to think that X is φ)’—what we do when characterising the formal object of an emo-
tion but not necessarily what we do when we respond to the formal property—‘is to
think it appropriate (merited, rational, justified, warranted) to feel an associated sen-
timent F toward X’ (D’Arms 2005, 3). In this section, drawing on the work done by
neo-sentimentalists like D’Arms and Jacobson, I argue that the two conditions are
met by showing how the formal object can be used to assess whether an emotion is
merited in terms of its intelligibility, correctness and appropriateness, the remaining
three roles for the formal object.
6.3.1 THE FORMAL OBJECT IN ASSESSMENTS OF INTELLIGIBILITY
John is afraid of the snake. Can the formal object, characterised as response-
dependent, fulfil the required role of determining whether his emotion intelligible?
It can, and it can do so in two ways. Because it can be used, we can meet the first
condition.
The first way is by determining whether the particular object seems a certain
18For representative work, see D’Arms (2005) and D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), but also John
McDowell (1984) and David Wiggins (1987). Neo-sentimentalists are primarily concerned with
the nature of evaluative properties, not so much with emotions (although D’Arms and D’Arms and
Jacobson argue that examining the sentiment, the emotion, provides necessary elucidation of the
property). Some are concerned with evaluative properties as a whole, while others focus on only a
few, such as the shameful, the fearsome, the offensive.
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way to the subject, regardless of whether it really is that way. If John’s fear is not
elicited in virtue of something as frightening to him, then it is not intelligible. Even
if he denies finding the snake frightening, the very fact that he experiences fear
casts doubt on his denial rather than casts doubt on his finding it frightening. If he
genuinely did not find it frightening, consciously or not, then his emotion, as fear,
is not intelligible. Further, even if the snake is not really frightening, his emotion is
still elicited in virtue of it as frightening to him and is in that way made intelligible.
The second way is whether the emotion coheres with the subject’s other cur-
rently held mental states. Suppose that John has a phobia of snakes and lives in
London where he is not likely to have ever encountered, or ever to encounter, a dan-
gerous snake. He knows his snakes and believes that the snake in front of him is not
dangerous, nor does he believe that he ought to find it frightening. In other words,
he believes that the situation does not merit fear. Despite this, he is afraid.
On the one hand, his emotion is intelligible in the first way because the snake
is frightening to him, even if he finds it frightening regardless of his other beliefs.
We do not think that he does not really find the snake frightening, that his fear is
not genuine. Rather, we think that he ought not to feel fear because the snake is
not dangerous and ought not to be found frightening—and this is exactly why we
treat phobias as pathologies and try to fix them using techniques such as exposure
or desensitisation.
On the other hand, however, his emotion is not entirely intelligible because,
while he finds the snake frightening, he denies that it is dangerous. If John genu-
inely believes that the snake is not dangerous and genuinely does not believe that
the snake is dangerous, then his finding it frightening is unintelligible because part
of finding something frightening is also finding it dangerous. Perhaps John is in
denial or unaware of the fact that he actually believes deep down that the snake is
dangerous. Even so, his overall experience is not entirely intelligible because his
fear is in conflict with what he actively takes himself to believe, or what he act-
ively takes himself to believe is not what he really believes. His emotion might be
what is problematic, but so might what he believes he believes, or what he genu-
inely believes. In order to determine which is problematic, we must establish which
is getting things right, and that involves establishing whether the formal object of
the emotion is as things are: dangerous and meriting fear. His overall experience,
however, is not entirely intelligible and the concept of the formal object as response-
dependent allows us to assess how his responses cohere with his other mental states
and how he is subjectively rational.
We therefore see that the concept of the formal object as response-dependent
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does play a role in determining whether an emotion is intelligible. The kind of
response that is merited must be intelligible, and what is intelligible is independent
of the subject’s current emotional experience. Therefore, we meet the first condition
which is that it is possible to experience an emotion even when the relevant formal
property is not the case or what elicits that emotion and the concept of the formal
object as response-dependent need not be trivial.
6.3.2 THE FORMAL OBJECT IN ASSESSMENTS OF ACCURACY
The formal object does also determine whether an emotion is accurate because it
provides accuracy conditions for whether the emotion is fitting. Because it does so,
the concept of the formal object as response-dependent meets both of the conditions.
We can say of an emotion that it is appropriate or inappropriate, which I shall
address in section 6.3.3, but as D’Arms and Jacobson argue, ‘there is a crucial
distinction between the question of whether some emotion is the right way to feel,
and whether that feeling gets it right’ (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 66). Whether
an emotional response is merited could thus be in terms of whether the particular
object of the emotion fits the circumstances (D’Arms 2005, 4).
As I have argued, the concept of the formal object is both of a property and of
how that property elicits an emotion through the subject as caring. We can therefore
assess an emotion for accuracy and fittingness in two ways. We can ask whether the
emotion fits because the particular object has the relevant property, and we can ask
whether the emotion fits because it is elicited in the right kind of way. These are
the two sets of questions about the very notion of the formal object I identified in
section 6.1.
With regards to the property, for example, fear will be fitting if the particular
object really is dangerous, independent of whether the subject finds it so. It is
dangerous if it is a fact that the particular object really does stand in some kind of
threatening relation to the subject. Fear will also be fitting because the situation
is dangerous or frightening if the subject really has the relevant cares relative to
which the situation would be dangerous, although this can be difficult to establish.
Nevertheless, Julien Deonna (2006) makes useful headway in fleshing out what
some conditions must be for whether the subject really has the cares, where the
cares are facts about the subject.19 He argues that there will be some species-relative
facts, such as the fact that cliff-faces are dangerous to humans who cannot fly. He
19Salmela (2011) argues that Deonna’s attempt at fleshing out the conditions is not successful and
I will respond to his criticism in Chapter 7.
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also argues that there will be individual-relative facts. These are composed of both
long-standing values we might have, as well as our character traits or temperaments.
For instance, Honnold has a long-standing goal to be one of the best climbers in the
world. Because of this long-standing goal, scaling the cliff-face presents a tangible
and immanent good and does merit excitement for him even though, as a human, it
also merits fear. Scared-Honnold and I are both of cowardly characters. Scaling the
cliff-face is thus dangerous for both of us, relative both to ourselves as human and
relative to ourselves with the things we care about, and does merit fear. Given our
characters and long-standing values, excitement is not a merited response and we
would be wrong to feel excited.
This way of assessing accuracy and whether the property obtains is important
because it allows room for a subject to react to the wrong cares, so to speak. If her
emotion is in conflict with her character traits or long-standing evaluative tenden-
cies, then it is not fitting. Suppose John is a world-famous snake scientist who has
made his life’s aim to share his love and knowledge of snakes. He is being filmed
for television while interacting with a highly dangerous snake. He knows how to
treat it, has done similar things in the past and has been looking forward to it. This
time, however, he feels terrified. While it is the case that his fear is fitting in relation
to himself as human, it is not fitting given who John is. This is not simply a matter
of his fear not being intelligible; it also gets things wrong by going against John’s
own long-standing values to which he is committed.
We can also ask whether the emotion fits because it is elicited in the right kind
of way. If I am one of the subject’s in Schachter and Singer’s experiments described
in Chapter 4, for example, then my anger is not accurate because it is elicited by
an induced chemical change together with a stooge acting angrily; it is not elicited
by my caring and there being something offensive. Suppose that the stooge, in his
angry antics, actually does something offensive without my knowing—perhaps he
tears up my questionnaire behind my back. In such a case, my emotion is still not
elicited in virtue of something offensive, even though it would be merited because
there is something offensive present.20
All of this shows the ways in which we can establish what emotion is fitting
in terms of the formal object, independent of the subject’s emotional experience.
20It is less clear what to say about the case where I also observe the stooge’s offensive act. Is
my emotion elicited in the right kind of way? The formal object as a response-dependent concept,
however, still helps to give conditions for establishing whether the emotion was elicited in the right
kind of way, even if we cannot definitively say which was the case. If my anger was elicited by the
adrenaline injection and interpretation of my feelings in the given context, then no. But if my anger
was elicited by caring about my questionnaire being torn up, then yes.
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We can thus, again, meet the first condition because it is possible to experience
an emotion even when the relevant formal object is not what elicits the emotion,
because the emotion is elicited in the wrong kind of way, or it is not the case because
the emotion is not fitting. We can also meet the second condition because, given
what evaluative relation holds and who the subject is, the situation does merit an
emotion regardless of whether the subject experiences the emotion. That is, it is
possible for the formal object to be the case but for the relevant emotion not be
elicited.
6.3.3 THE FORMAL OBJECT IN ASSESSMENTS OF APPROPRIATENESS
Finally, the concept of the formal object as response-dependent also determines
whether an emotion is appropriate. One way in which an emotion could be ap-
propriate is by being fitting, in the sense detailed above. An emotion can also be
appropriate morally, prudentially, or in some other prescribed way. For example, we
can ask: ought the subject to have the cares she has in the first place? A paedophile
may feel angry when his favourite pay-per-view website is shut down. It is true that
something he values has been removed to his detriment and that he apprehends the
scenario as such, yet he really ought not to value child pornography. His emotion is
accurate and intelligible but it is entirely inappropriate. Anger, in such a scenario,
is not merited and not just anything will be offensive, thereby meeting the first con-
dition that it must possible to experience an emotion even when the relevant formal
object is not the case or what elicits the emotion. The subject may fail to respond
to the formal object because she does not have the morally worthy cares or because
she is unaware of the moral, prudential, or other reasons which determine what re-
sponse is merited, thus meeting the second condition, that it must be possible that
the relevant formal object be the case but for the relevant emotion not to be elicited.
6.3.4 A FINAL EXAMPLE
Let us walk through an example as a final illustration of how the concept of the
formal object as response-dependent is not trivial.
Suppose that Jesse, a good middle-class white woman, has an implicit attitude
towards black people, taking them as dangerous.21 Let us suppose that she formed
this attitude simply by growing up in an all-white community which was not expli-
citly racist. However, she is now politically aware, believes in justice for all, and
21Thanks to Sophie Stammers and the King’s College London Rationality and Reasoning reading
group for raising and discussing this case with me.
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would not endorse the underlying attitude if it were brought to her attention. In fact,
she actively argues against racism and rejects outright generic statements like ‘All
x are y’ which express problematic stereotypes. Despite all of this, she often finds
herself feeling afraid when walking through majority-black Lewisham to attend her
evening yoga class. In this example, her fear is elicited by the people around her as
dangerous and she finds the situation frightening because of a problematic attitude
she unknowingly has.
Jesse’s fear is intelligible in that the situation is frightening to her. She does
not endorse the attitude towards black people as dangerous and does not understand
why she feels jumpy whenever in Lewisham at night, but she nevertheless finds
the situation frightening. It is not intelligible in the wider sense of her subjective
rationality, however, because it is in conflict with other beliefs that she has.
Her fear is not accurate. She experiences the situation as frightening because
of her implicit attitude towards black people as dangerous. But it is not the case
that all black people are dangerous or that the situation is dangerous. We might
appeal to how growing up in a white society in a world where the media presents
black people as criminals has led to her forming the attitude she has; doing so,
however, does not make either her attitude or her emotion correct. It only makes
it intelligible. It remains the case that her fear inaccurately represents what danger
there is. Further, the situation is not frightening because it does not merit fear.
Fear is not fitting because the situation is not dangerous, hence not frightening and
therefore does not merit fear; but it is also morally inappropriate. It is potentially
even prudentially inappropriate because her fear might cause offense and thereby
create a truly dangerous and frightening situation.
Suppose Jesse’s childhood and life experiences were completely different and
that from a very young age she and her family had been subject to various crimes
committed by people of a different ethnicity to her. Again, this does not make
her implicit attitude correct, it only makes it intelligible and does not change the
accuracy of her current emotion. Suppose now that it really is the case that Jesse is
in a dangerous situation. If so, then her emotion accurately represents how things
are even if how she comes to experience the emotion is based on false associations.
This, however, is not a problem specific to emotions as similar complaints abound,
for instance, with Gettier examples regarding true belief and knowledge.
Her fear is also not accurate based on what her own cares and interests are.
She actively endorses anti-racism and in all other aspects of her life works against
racism. Feeling fear goes against and inaccurately represents her own long-term
values.
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Now consider Jesse’s racist twin, a white supremacist with explicit racist beliefs.
The kinds of things she cares about and her background both make it the case that
being stuck in a majority-black area is genuinely frightening for her. But how a
situation seems to the subject pertains to an emotion’s intelligiblity and we need
not be forced into saying that fear is also merited and that the situation genuinely is
frightening. On the one hand, the reasons why the situation is frightening include,
amongst other things, the racist twin’s explicit racist beliefs about black people, of
which presumably many are false. So, while the situation is frightening to her it
may not be dangerous and fear is thus not merited. On the other hand, we can also
assess the evil twin’s fear for appropriateness. Given that she feels fear on the basis
of morally dubious commitments, fear is inappropriate.
6.4 THE EMOTIONAL REASONS
We can finally return to what reasons an emotion could provide access to in virtue
of its intentional nature. I have argued that the concept of the formal object of an
emotion is response-dependent and that it is implicitly represented in the emotion’s
intentional content. This can be expressed as ‘the FO x’, where x is the particular
object. For example, John’s fear is about ‘the frightening snake’. I have also argued
that one element to the concept of the formal object is a relational property on
which the merited response is grounded. The property is relational because it holds
between the agent and some feature of her environment but it is also relative to the
agent as a member of a group or species, or as an individual. It is not relative,
however, to how things seem to her. This reason can thus be expressed as ‘the
RP x’, such as ‘the dangerous(-to-me) snake’. Because the emotion is occurrent
and elicited by some particular object as being a certain way, the emotion provides
access to the potential fact that ‘there is a FO x’ or the potential fact that ‘there is a
RP x’.
Through looking at how an emotion can be assessed for intelligibility, accuracy
and appropriateness, we saw that an emotion can be intelligible, accurate and ap-
propriate in a variety of ways: in terms of how things seem to the subject, in terms
of what response is merited, and in terms of how things are. In discussing intelligib-
ility, I introduced the suggestion that an emotional experience is intelligible because
of how things seem to the subject. We therefore get a third potential fact, that ‘there
is an FO x (to me)’.
To illustrate, suppose that John backs away from the snake because he is afraid
of the snake. Currently, ‘he is afraid of the snake’ functions as a placeholder for
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whatever his reason is. We now see that there are three options for his reason:
1. How things seem to him: There is a frightening snake (to me).
2. How things are, in terms of what response is merited: There is a frightening
snake.
3. How things are, in terms of what relation holds: There is a dangerous(-to-me)
snake.
All of the options, 1-3, could be reasons. If the snake is frightening to John, then
it is a fact about the experience that John is having and is therefore a reason. If
the snake is frightening, then this is a fact about whether the snake really does merit
fear. The fact may be true relative to different individuals or different value systems,
but it is a fact nonetheless. Finally, if the snake is dangerous, then it too is a fact.
6.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I examined the concept of the formal object and argued that it is
best understood as a response-dependent concept. If we understand it in this way,
then we can see how the formal object fulfils its five role. These were that it: (I) is
what all instances of an emotion type share, (II) is what individuates emotions, (III)
determines whether an emotion is intelligible, (IV) determines whether an emotion
is correct, and (V) determines whether an emotion is appropriate. Such a character-
isation of the formal object meets the two conditions that it is possible to experience
an emotion even when the relevant formal object is not the case or is not what elicits
the emotion, and that it is possible that the relevant formal object be the case but for
the relevant emotion not to be elicited. The characterisation of the formal object as
response-dependent is thus not trivial.
One of the implications of this understanding of the formal object is that it
is only implicitly represented in an emotion’s content; nevertheless, we can still
identify three potential reasons which the emotional experience provides access to.
For each of these potential reasons, we now need to ask two questions:
Q1. Can we act in light of the reason when acting solely on the basis of an emotion
as an intentional state?
Q2. Can we act reasonably when acting solely on the basis of an emotional exper-
ience?
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One might argue that the answer to both questions is ‘no’. With regards to the first
question, we might object that even when we do act from the reason an emotion
provides access to, we first have to believe that it is the case. We therefore do not
act in light of the reason when acting on the basis of an emotion, but when acting
on the basis of a belief. With the second, we might object that emotion just is the
wrong kind of state to allow us to act reasonably from the emotion. In the next
chapter, I respond to these two objections.
CHAPTER 7
ACTING REASONABLY IN LIGHT OF A REASON
‘Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emo-
tions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving con-
siderations,’ writes Karen Jones (2003, 181), describing one of the key motivations
behind the pro-emotion consensus, the school of views which rejects the opposi-
tion of emotion to reason. The reason-giving considerations, I argued in Chapter 6,
arise from emotion’s intentional nature and I articulated three potential reasons, as
follows:
1. How things seem to the agent.
2. How things are, in terms of what response is merited.
3. How things are, in terms of what relation holds.
As discussed in the Introduction, this is not yet sufficient for an emotion to be in-
volved in our conception of rational action. Even if emotions have a functional role
that is not opposed to more traditional reason capacities, such as deliberation, and
even if they do provide these reasons through their intentional nature, it does not
follow that acting solely on the basis of an emotional experience is either acting
reasonably or acting in light of a reason. That is, it does not follow that emotions
have an important role in our conception of rational action, where part of our con-
ception is that the agent guides her action in light of reasons and does not simply
respond. I therefore need to address the two questions I posed at the end of Chapter
6 in order to show that acting on the basis of an emotion is acting in the right kind
of way to be acting in light of a reason.
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The two questions were these:
Q1. Can we act in light of the reason when acting solely on the basis of an emotion
as an intentional state?1
Q2. Can we act reasonably when acting solely on the basis of an emotional exper-
ience?
In this chapter, I argue for positive answers to these two questions. I argue that we
can both act in light of a reason when acting solely on the basis of an emotion and
act reasonably when acting solely on the basis of an emotional experience. This
contention requires responding to two brands of objections.
The first brand of objection targets what is required in order to act in light of a
reason and is primarily concerned with acting rightly. The thought here is that, even
if emotions provide access to reasons, we do not act in light of those reasons when
acting solely on the basis of an emotion. In order to act in light of those reasons, we
need to believe or judge that they are the case and it is through judging or believing
that we act in light of them and guide our action. In section 7.1, I address this
objection by responding to Sabine Do¨ring’s (2007; 2010) formulation of it.
The second brand of objection targets the kind of state that an emotion is and
is primarily concerned with acting reasonably. There are two distinct objections I
shall focus on. The first is that emotions are not evidence of the evaluative facts
which are the reason or do not constitute justificatory reasons, as Michael Brady
(2013) argues with regards to emotional experiences as putative reasons for belief.
The second is that we are not entitled to believe or act on the basis of an emotional
experience alone, as Mikko Salmela (2011) argues, also with regards to emotions
as putative reasons for belief. In section 7.2, I address these two forms of objection
and apply them to action.
In the process of exploring these objections, I will develop my positive proposal
for how we can act both in light of a reason when acting solely on the basis of
an emotion and act reasonably when acting solely on the basis of an emotional
experience. I end, in section 7.3, by returning to the examples of Category E and
examining how they fare, in terms of acting reasonably and acting in light of a
reason.
1I take this first question to be about the principle of whether, when an emotion presents us with
accurate information, we can act on the basis of that emotion. I therefore will use ‘emotion’ rather
than ‘emotional experience’ when discussing the first question.
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7.1 ACTING IN LIGHT OF A REASON WHEN ACTING ON THE BASIS
OF AN EMOTION
As I argued in Chapter 5, to rationalise an action is to show that the agent acted in
light of a reason. Acting in light of a reason requires having that reason in mind in
some way, and guiding one’s action by it. ‘Having a reason in mind’ is ambiguous.
It might mean that the thing you have in mind is the reason itself, such as if it
were a proposition. But it might also mean that we have in mind something that
is represented and expressed by a proposition, but which is not itself a proposition,
such as the emotional reasons I identified in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, if acting for
a reason requires having it in mind, it is not enough if we simply track information
that could constitute reasons; we need to be aware of them as considerations in
favour of acting and respond in an appropriate kind of way. The driving idea of this
first objection I will consider is that emotions are not the appropriate kind of way
in which to have reasons in mind. So, acting solely on the basis of an emotion will
not be acting for a reason in the right kind of way.
I shall examine Do¨ring’s (2007; 2010) version of the objection, which is the
argument that, while emotions have a role to play in practical rationality, they do
not themselves directly rationalise an action by providing the agent’s reason for
acting. Rather, she claims, they provide non-inferential justification for the belief
(or judgement) that things are as the emotion represents them to be.2 It is this
corresponding belief which does the rationalising work.
I begin in section 7.1.1 by presenting Do¨ring’s argument and giving an initial
assessment of it in terms of her background commitments. While her background
commitments are problematic, we can nevertheless reformulate her argument so that
her conclusion still follows. Thus, in section 7.1.2, I argue positively that we can
act reasonably when acting on the basis of an emotion and, in section 7.1.3, I argue
that we can also act in light of a reason when acting on the basis of an emotion.
7.1.1 DO¨RING’S ARGUMENT
Do¨ring’s argument draws on two background claims. She endorses a very particu-
lar view of emotions as perceptions, what she calls ‘affective perception’, and she
endorses a distinction between subjective and objective reasons.
Emotions, for Do¨ring, are affective perceptions of evaluative facts. She develops
this claim by laying out an analogy with perception, of which four commitments
2Do¨ring uses belief and judgement interchangeably and I will too.
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are important in her argument against the rationalising role of emotions. First, she
is committed to the claim that emotions, like perceptions, have representational
content subject to correctness conditions. If I feel fear when I spot a threatening
shape hiding in the shadows late at night, my fear is a perception of and represents
something dangerous to me. If the shape is simply a bush, then it is not dangerous
and my fear does not accurately represent how things are. I discussed how emotions
can be fitting and assessed for accuracy in this kind of way in Chapter 6, where I also
identified three candidates for how the emotion could represent things to be. These
were: x as dangerous(-to-me), x as frightening, or x as frightening (to me). Because
Do¨ring distinguishes between an emotion’s representational content and its formal
object, and thinks that ‘an emotion’s formal object need not enter into the emotion’s
representational content’ (Do¨ring 2003, 222), her focus is on the evaluative content
made up of ‘x as dangerous(-to-me)’. For this reason, I shall discuss the agent’s
reason as ‘x as dangerous(-to-me)’ or, more simply, ‘x as dangerous’.
Second, she is committed to the claim that the representational content of an
emotion appears correct to the agent: it definitely seems to me that there is some-
thing dangerous in the shadows, much like the Mu¨ller-Lyer lines definitely seem to
me to be of different lengths. This gives us how things seem to the subject, such as
‘frightening to me’ or ‘dangerous to me’.
I accept the first two commitments, but shall ultimately reject the next two.
The third commitment is to the idea that, like perception, emotions do not involve
regarding the content as true. It is not incoherent or contradictory, Do¨ring argues,
to feel fear despite knowing that there is nothing dangerous to be afraid of, much
like I can continue to see the Mu¨ller-Lyer lines as different lengths even though I
know that they are equal in length. Finally, Do¨ring is committed to the claim that
the contents of emotions do not stand in inferential relations with the contents of
beliefs or with each other. To support this claim, Do¨ring argues that we can have
‘conflict without contradition’ both with perception and emotion, suggesting that
the contents do not stand in inferential relations (Do¨ring 2008). If you believe that p
and also believe that not-(p & not-p), then you cannot also believe that not-p. With
perception, in contrast, if I see the Mu¨ller-Lyer lines as unequal in length, it has
no inferential bearing on whether I should not believe that they are equal in length.
I can see them as unequal and believe that they are equal, without contradiction.
With emotion, too, whether I experience a situation as dangerous has no inferential
bearing on whether I also believe it is dangerous, as I can feel fear and believe that
there is nothing dangerous without contradiction, Do¨ring argues.
Another important background claim to her rejection of the direct rationalising
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role of emotions, one that is independent of her commitments arising from her
model of affective perception, is her claim that there is a distinction between sub-
jective and objective reasons. I have already introduced the distinction—and re-
jected it—in Chapter 5. In quick summary, subjective reasons are ‘what the agent
justifiably sees as a reason because of the contents of his actual mental state’ and
objective reasons are what are reasons because of ‘some objective features of the
situation’ (Do¨ring 2010, 297).
Do¨ring argues that subjective reasons are what rationalise action because they
account for the ‘phenomena of rational guidance’, and are what allow us to meet
the guidance condition for rational agency. The guidance condition is the condition
that we comply with or are guided by our judgements about what is right (Do¨ring
2007, 366). She refers to R. Jay Wallace:
. . . the motivations and actions of rational agents are guided by and re-
sponsive to their deliberative reflection about what they have reason to
do. Unless this guidance condition (as we may call it) can be satisfied,
we will not be able to make sense of the idea that persons are genuine
agents, capable of determining what they shall do through the process
of deliberation. (Wallace 1999, 219)
Do¨ring takes the guidance condition to mean that ‘we do what we do because we
hold certain propositions true’ (Do¨ring 2007, 371) and argues that ‘if emotions ra-
tionalise action, they do so only via the judgements they can non-inferentially jus-
tify’ (387). This is because:
. . . an emotion can play a rational role only if its content is endorsed
by the subject. In experiencing an emotion it appears to the subject
that the world is as his emotion represents it to be, but he need not
affirm the correctness of the representation. Therefore he must take
his emotion’s content at face-value, and that is: make a corresponding
judgment, before his emotion can make it rational to act in a certain
way. (Do¨ring 2007, 383)
Before proceeding, we must be clear on the difference between rationalising and
justifying.3 Giving a rationalisation requires showing that the mental state or action
was held or done in light of a reason. We rationalise a mental state or action by
giving the agent’s motivating reasons. A justification need not require that it was
3Do¨ring herself does not explicitly make this distinction and at times seems to use the two inter-
changeably, but I think we should understand her as saying something like what I describe in this
and the next paragraph.
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held or done in light of a reason, only that it is true, correct or arose from a suitable
mechanism, perhaps one that is reliable. Reasons which rationalise and reasons
which justify may sometimes come apart. For example, someone with blindsight
may reliably form true beliefs about what she does not consciously see. On a re-
liabilist theory of justification, her belief is justified and we can justify it with the
reasons that her belief is true and that it arose from a reliable mechanism. If we want
to rationalise the belief, however, we need to show that the agent held her belief in
light of a reason, but we cannot do so because the agent does not have reasons in
light of which she believes what she does.
An experience may not be the agent’s motivating reason for belief, even while
it does justify the belief. This is because an experience is not the kind of thing
that can enter into logical relations. Indeed, experience provides non-inferential
justification rather than inferential justification. So, if emotions and perceptions
play a non-inferential role in the rationalisation of other mental states and action,
it is because they provide non-inferential justification for the contents of the belief
or judgement, which in turn is what would rationalise the mental state or action
because it is the agent’s reason.
With all of this in mind, we can construct Do¨ring’s argument like this:
P1 Taking the contents of one’s state at face-value is to regard the content of
one’s state as true. [given]
P2 Emotions, like perceptions, do not involved regarding the content as true.
[affective perception]
C1 Emotions, like perceptions, do not involve taking the contents of one’s
state at face-value. [P1,P2]
P3 Subjective reasons rationalise action. [guidance condition]
P4 Having a subjective reason requires taking the contents of one’s state at face-
value. [subjective reasons]
C2 Emotions are not subjective reasons. [C1,P4]
C3 Emotions do not rationalise action. [P3,C2]
Do¨ring’s argument relies on the crucial distinction between subjective and ob-
jective reasons. Her motivation for the necessity of subjective reasons to rationalise
action is that they are required in order to meet the guidance condition for rational
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agency, and she appeals to cases where it seems that our subjective reasons, what
we see as reasons, come apart from what the objective reasons are. In these cases,
she thinks that we guide our action and act rationally even when we do not act for an
objective reason. Indeed, if we acted in line with our objective reasons, she argues,
we could even be acting irrationally. If this is right, what rationalises our actions
must be our subjective reasons.
As I have already discussed in Chapter 5, the example Do¨ring gives to illustrate
the necessity of the distinction is a case of being told by a doctor to take a certain
medicine (Do¨ring 2007, 287). The doctor is mistaken about the medicine and it will
in fact harm you. In such a case, it seems that what you have most objective reason
to do is not take the medicine because it will harm you. Nevertheless, it also seems
that the doctor’s advice provides you with a normative reason to take the medicine
because you are justified in seeing it as a reason for action. If you do not take the
medicine, Do¨ring claims, you are acting irrationally even when what you have most
objective reason to do is not take the medicine. This, presumably, is because you
believe that you ought to take the medicine and yet do not take it, suggesting that
what actually guides an action and makes it rational is that you are acting in line
with your beliefs about what your reasons are. It is not that you are acting in line
with what the objective reasons are. The reasons that rationalise an action are thus
subjective reasons, Do¨ring concludes.
While I do not think that the subjective-objective reason distinction is a good
distinction to make, for reasons argued in Chapter 5, Do¨ring’s argument can be
reformulated in a way that avoids the distinction. I shall briefly present two of the
problems with the distinction as they apply in the current context of discussion,
and then, in section 7.1.2, reformulate Do¨ring’s argument in a way which I believe
uncovers the real force of her objection.
The first problem is that Do¨ring’s example does not show that the agent’s sub-
jective and objective reasons come apart or that the irrationality arises out of not
acting according to her subjective reasons. Hence, the example does not motivate
adopting the distinction.
In Chapter 5, I argued that the reason in light of which the agent acts is her
motivating reason and that the agent can act in light of good and bad reasons. Not
all objective reasons will be motivating reasons, simply because you need to be
aware of a reason in order to act in light of it, and the agent’s motivating reason
need not be the same as what she has most reason to do. So, even if it is the case
that the medicine will harm you and that is a pro tanto reason not to take it, if
you are not aware that this is the case it cannot enter into your deliberations or be
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your motivating reason. Do¨ring erroneously conflates having an objective reason in
light of which you act with acting for what you have most objective reason to do,
something which talking instead of the agent’s motivating reason helps to bring out.
With this in mind, it now becomes clear that the example does not show that
subjective and objective reasons come apart, or that acting in light of an objective
reason can be irrational. In the example as described, it is not clear that, if you
do take the medicine, you are acting in light of any reason at all, even if there is
a reason which does justify your action. Further, it seems that you are even acting
against a pro tanto objective reason of which you are aware of as a reason, namely
the fact that the doctor has told you to take the medicine. If you see taking the
medicine as a good thing to do in light of what the doctor tells you, then you do
have an objective reason. The doctor really did tell you to take the medicine; and,
given the doctor’s medical expertise, her telling you to take the medicine is a pro
tanto reason in favour of taking it. Not taking the medicine is thus not acting for
an objective reason of which you are aware and aware of as a reason and, as the
example is described, not having a countervailing reason for why you so act. But
now we can identify what the source of the irrationality is. It is not that you are
acting against your subjective reasons or that acting for an objective reason can be
irrational. Rather, you are acting against objective reasons of which you are aware
of as reasons without having a countervailing reason for doing so.
Perhaps one could respond that the example in fact illustrates that the fact that
the doctor told you to take the medicine is not an objective reason to take it. If
so, then the irrationality cannot arise because you are acting against an object-
ive reason—there is none—but because you are acting against a subjective reason.
However, given that the fact seems to be a reason because of who the doctor is, a
healthcare expert, it is a reason albeit one that is defeated in the situation by other
reasons, in particular the fact that the doctor is, in this instance, wrong.
As a result, the example does not show that subjective and objective reasons
come apart because the reason for which the agent ought to act is an objective
reason. It also does not show that the seeming irrationality of the case arises from
acting against a subjective reason, as the agent is acting against an objective reason
of which she is aware, and is aware of as a reason. And it does not show that we can
act irrationally when acting for an objective reason, because in order to act for that
reason we need to be aware of it and be acting in light of it, in which case it is no
different to Do¨ring’s subjective reasons. Nevertheless, I have not disagreed with the
spirit of the distinction, so there needs to be a stronger argument against adopting
it, an argument which can be found in the second problem.
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The second problem is that the objective-subjective reason distinction cannot
account for the normative force of reasons. If there is a pro tanto reason for you to
φ, then you ought to φ. For example, suppose that the building is burning down. The
fact that the building is burning down is a pro tanto reason for which you ought to
get outside. But if you do not believe it is a reason, then you do not have a subjective
reason. And if having a subjective reason is required for acting rationally, you do
not have a reason to get outside unless you believe that you have one, on pain of
irrationality. But you do have a pro tanto reason to get outside, which is the fact
that the building is burning down. How do we adjudicate between what you have
reason to do in this scenario? We cannot say that the pro tanto reason to get outside
is defeated by your lack of belief that it is a reason, else we lose the normative force
of reasons. At best it seems that we can say that there is a reason for you to believe
that the building is on fire, namely the fact that the building is on fire, but that same
fact is not a reason to act.
Because of the way in which the subjective-objective reason distinction cannot
account for the normative force of reasons, and because Do¨ring’s example does not
motivate adopting the distinction anyway, if there is a better option available which
captures the same intuitive idea regarding acting in light of what we take to be the
case, we should rather go with that option.
As I argued in Chapter 5, there is a better way to capture the intuitive idea behind
the subjective-objective reason distinction, and that is to distinguish between sub-
jective rationality and acting reasonably on the one hand, and objective rationality
and acting rightly on the other hand. As I discussed in Chapter 5, one sense of acting
rationally is acting in light of a reason where a reason is a fact that counts in favour
of the action. So, if you act rationally, you are doing what you have reason to do.
In this sense, acting rationally is acting rightly. Another sense of acting rationally
is acting reasonably and need not be acting rightly or for a reason, but it is acting
in a way that is warranted, considering the beliefs and desires that you have and the
factors of which you are aware. Sometimes one can act reasonably but not rightly.
In Chapter 5, I proposed that acting reasonably refers to our ‘subjective rationality’
and is acting coherently with our other attitudes: it is being subjectively rational.
Acting rightly refers to our ‘objective rationality’ and is in line with the facts: it is
being objectively rational. In good cases, we act both reasonably and rightly. We
rationalise an action by identifying the agent’s motivating reason, a fact, but we can
still explain an action as reasonable by showing how she acted in line with what
she took to be reasons. In this way, we can capture the intuitive idea behind the
subjective-objective reason distinction. This alternative distinction between acting
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reasonably and being subjectively rational, and acting rightly and being objectively
rational, does not lose the normative force of reasons because it does not make the
agent’s motivating reasons of a different kind to normative reasons. Both are facts
and, regardless of whether we believe that we have a reason, we have a reason to
act.
Wallace originally introduced the guidance condition when discussing some-
thing like subjective rationality. He writes that what I am calling subjective ra-
tionality ‘may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent’s
conception of what they have reason to do’ (Wallace 1999, 217). On the basis of
this, he proposes a ‘guidance condition’ for subjective rationality related to agency:
‘the motivations and actions of rational agents are guided by and responsive to their
deliberative reflection about what they have reason to do’ (219).4
We therefore see that the subjective-objective reason distinction is not required
in order to assess whether the guidance condition is being met because we have
an alternative distinction, one that does not run into the same problem regarding
normative force of reasons. Further, as argued in Chapter 5, what rationalises an
action are the agent’s motivating reasons. So, if subjective reasons are not required
in order to rationalise action and are not required in order to act reasonably, then
P3, ‘Subjective reasons rationalise action’, is false.
If P3 is false, then it might seem that P4, ‘Having a subjective reason requires
taking the content of one’s state at face value’, is irrelevant since it does not matter
what having a subjective reason requires of us. P4, however, plays an important
role in cashing out what the reason which rationalises an action requires of the
agent, whether the agent needs to judge something to be the case or not. So, even if
we reject that something like subjective reasons are required to rationalise an action,
we might still want to say:
P4* Acting because of a reason requires taking the contents of one’s state at face-
value.
Adopting P4*, Do¨ring’s argument still goes through and this premise, I believe,
is the real force behind her argument. There are two good reasons why we might
suppose that P4* is prima facie true. First, in order to act because of a reason,
we need to be aware of it and have it in mind as a reason. Having a motivating
reason, after all, is having a reason in light of which you see an action as good. It is
4Wallace’s particular focus is on how practical deliberation relates to motivation. I use his guid-
ance principle to structure my subsequent discussion both because it is deliberately neutral between
accounts of how we can be so guided and also because Do¨ring centres her discussion on it.
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through seeing an action as good that we guide what we do and meet the guidance
condition. This may require seeing the reason as true, which is taking the contents
of one’s state at face-value. Second, a reason must be such that it can be used in
reasoning. This may require that having a reason is being in a state whose contents
stand in inferential relations, and being in such a state is taking things at face-value.
If emotions do not involve taking their contents at face-value and if the contents
of emotions do not stand in logical relations, then it will follow that acting from an
emotion is not acting for a reason. By addressing each of these considerations in
the rest of this section, I shall flesh out how, exactly, we can act in light of a reason
when acting on the basis of an emotion.
7.1.2 MEETING THE GUIDANCE CONDITION AND ACTING REASONABLY
To refresh, the guidance condition, as Wallace defines it, is the condition that ‘the
motivations and actions of rational agents are guided by and responsive to their
deliberative reflection about what they have reason to do’.
The guidance condition is most straightforwardly applicable to acting reason-
ably and being subjectively rational because it is a condition for acting coherently
with our judgements about what to do. Suppose that you know that the medicine
is harmful but also that your doctor is trustworthy: you are aware of reasons which
motivate conflicting actions and need to make a judgement about what reason to act
for. The guidance condition only requires that, if you judge that the fact that the
doctor told you to take the medicine is the reason in light of which you ought to act,
then you must respond appropriately. It does not say anything about which reasons
you ought to act for or even what is a reason.
Even so, the guidance condition is still relevant to acting for a reason because,
through deliberation and judgement, we aim to identify the reasons for which we
ought to act in order to act rightly. Further, acting for a reason is having a motivating
reason in light of which you act and is not simply responding to what reasons there
may be: you must have a reason in mind in order to act in light of it. So, we can
understand the guidance condition as applying to what we must do when we have a
motivating reason in light of which we see some action as a good thing to do.
Not all acting in light of a reason will be the result of a deliberative judgement
and the guidance condition does not require that it is. This is because it gives re-
quirements for both deliberation and deliberative reflection. Suppose you do not
deliberate about whether to take the medicine or not, simply because it does not
occur to you to doubt the doctor’s advice. You just take the medicine as she hands it
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over. Afterwards, lying prone in hospital having your stomach pumped, you could
still respond to questions about your action by showing why you so acted, given
your hypothetical deliberations. You might add that, had you known the medicine
was harmful, you would have acted otherwise. Being able to explain your action in
this way is showing how you acted in line with what you had reason to do, given
your hypothetical deliberations and what you were aware of at the time. Indeed,
Do¨ring acknowledges this hypothetical nature of meeting the guidance condition.
She writes:
. . . in order to be rational, an agent must satisfy the condition that he
would so authorize the action, were he asked to do so . . . a motive for
an action such as an emotion must at least be hypothetically authorized
by the agent’s deliberative reflection about what he has reason to do.
(Do¨ring 2010, 295, my emphases)
We thus see that the guidance condition can be met in two ways, either by de-
liberating and acting in line with one’s judgement, or by being able to justify one’s
action by appealing to what one would have hypothetically judged to be a reason
for acting. The latter requires that the agent be aware of the reason as counting in
favour of acting, and that she is able to offer it as a reason that justifies the action
because she would have hypothetically judged it to be a reason in favour of acting.
Clearly, acting purely on the basis of an emotion is not acting as the result of
deliberation and such action will not meet the guidance condition in the first way.
However, acting on the basis of an emotion, I shall now argue, can meet the two
further conditions for hypothetical deliberation, without a mediating belief.
With regards to the first condition, can one have in mind the reason as counting
in favour of acting at the time of acting if one acts on the basis of an emotion? It
is not enough that one simply entertain a thought that happens to be true, like if
we were imagining or wishing that things were so. In order for it to be the agent’s
reason that counts in favour of acting, she needs to be committed to its truth in
some way. Do¨ring takes this to mean that we must take the contents of our state
at face-value, or judge that it is true. Emotions, she claims, do not involve taking
their contents at face-value because it is not incoherent or contradictory to feel fear
despite believing that there is nothing dangerous or frightening to be afraid of. How-
ever, in Chapter 6 I argued that one way in which an emotional experience could fail
to be fully intelligible is if it does not cohere with the agent’s other currently held
beliefs and mental states. After all, we do think that you ought not to feel fear if
you do not believe that something is frightening, indicating that, while there is not
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outright contradiction or incoherence, your experience is still in tension with your
belief.
Further, as I also argued in Chapter 6, the concept of the formal object of an
occurrent emotion is a response-dependent concept with one of its elements an eval-
uative relational property and another of its elements the subject as actively caring.
Together, the formal property, such as the frightening, elicits the relevant emotion.
I argued that the concept of caring is of something that is active and responsive to
the things one cares about being affected. If someone does not respond to her cares
being affected, it is because she no longer cares, is not aware of how she is being
affected, or is apathetic and not moved by the way the things she is supposed to care
about are being affected. So, if the subject experiences an emotion, it is not enough
for her to see her interests as being affected by the things in her environment; she
has to care that she is being affected in that way.
The concept of caring thus involves more than having a list of abstract cares
which may or may not be affected at any given time. If one actively cares, then
one experiences those cares as being affected but, if one experiences those cares
as being affected, then in virtue of actively caring, one is committed to the way
in which they seem to be affected. I can be in other states which are not truth-
attitudes but which have the same kind of content as what an emotion represents,
such as imagining or supposing that there is a dangerous or frightening snake, but
the nature of these states is such that I am not committed to the content in the way
that I am committed to there being a dangerous or frightening snake if I experience
fear. What this means is that an emotional experience is partly a commitment to the
way things appear through having a caring attitude. While such an attitude is not a
truth-attitude and so we do not run into incoherence or contradiction, we can still
pinpoint the tension as arising between actively caring and denying that one’s cares
are being affected.
Finally, if one actively cares about something, then one will see some action
addressing how the care is being affected as good in light of that care as being
affected. So, while this emotional commitment is not a truth-attitude like belief, if
the emotion is accurately representing some evaluative information, we are aware
of and have in mind a reason in light of which we could see some action as good
and in light of which we could act.
With regards to the second condition, can we offer the emotional reason as a
justification for our action because we would have hypothetically judged it to be a
reason for acting?
What form an emotional response can take varies. A fear response may be a
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physiological reaction. It may be an action tendency. And, similar to an action
tendency, it may be a disposition to believe that one is being affected in the way the
emotion represents. You may not currently believe or believe explicitly that things
are as they appear, because emotions are not constituted by beliefs or judgements.
Nevertheless, in the case of an occurrent conscious emotion, where you respond
quickly and intuitively without thereby judging that such-and-such is the case, part
of that response includes a disposition to believe that things are as they appear
because of your emotional commitment through caring.
The claim I am making is not that you have a dispositional belief that things are
as they appear, where a dispositional belief is something like Harry’s dispositional
belief that plaid ties are hideous (Schwitzgebel 2014). Harry’s belief is not often
occurrent and at the front of his mind, but it remains currently true of him that
he believes that plaid ties are hideous. In contrast, even if John is afraid of the
snake, it may be currently false of him that he believes that the snake is dangerous.
Nevertheless, he is disposed to form the belief, other things being equal, in a way
that he is not disposed if he were to imagine or wish that the snake is dangerous.
Unlike imagining or wishing, he is committed to the putative truth that the snake
is dangerous because he experiences it as dangerous through caring about his well-
being.
We should also not understand my claim as the claim that emotions involve
an implicit belief that things are as they appear. On one interpretation of implicit
beliefs, an implicit belief is a belief that can be swiftly derived from what one ex-
plicitly believes (see, for example, Dennett 1987). On another interpretation, most
often discussed in the context of implicit biases and problematic attitudes such as
racist or sexist attitudes, an implicit belief is a belief that one does not explicitly
endorse but which influences one’s behaviour and beliefs.5 Such implicit biases,
however, are not clearly beliefs (Gendler 2008; Schwitzgebel 2010). Nevertheless,
an implicit belief on this latter interpretation is still some kind of implicit attitude
we have towards making certain associations and, because of those associations, a
disposition to behave in ways in line with those associations. We can understand
my claim similarly as the claim that an occurrent conscious emotion is an attitude
that takes things to have certain import and, because of that import, a disposition to
believe that things are as they appear.6
5For an overview of evidence in support of and a defence of the existence of such implicit biases,
see Jost et al. (2009).
6I am not committed to saying that it is permissible to form beliefs on the basis of an emotion,
alone. I will discuss this matter in more depth in section 7.2.1.
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If an occurrent conscious emotion involves a disposition to believe that things
are as they appear, then we are in a position where the emotional reason is available
to us to offer as a reason to justify our action. This is because we could have
hypothetically judged it to be a reason for acting, seeing as we were emotionally
committed to the way things were. So long as we are aware of the emotional content
and would hypothetically endorse it, acting from an emotion can meet the guidance
condition.
7.1.3 ACTING IN LIGHT OF A REASON
The guidance condition applies primarily to acting reasonably, not acting in light of
a reason. Even if the guidance condition is met, I have not yet shown that acting
from an emotion is acting for a reason rather than acting reasonably. More specific-
ally, even if I am right about the way in which we can guide our action via emotions,
I still have not shown that the contents of emotions can stand in inferential relations
with the contents of beliefs, which is a requirement for something to be a reason.
The exact problem is as follows. Reasons are facts. As discussed in Chapter
5, a requirement we might have of reasons is that they can be used in deliberation
and reasoning, and that they stand in inferential relations with each other. Because
of this, we might endorse a view of reasons as true propositions expressing facts.
If that is the case and emotions do not necessarily have propositional content, then
emotions will not provide reasons even though they provide information in a non-
propositional form. The arguments of the previous subsection, however, can be used
to respond to this worry, together with a clarification of what reasons are.
Starting with the clarification, it is important to note that interpreting reasons
as true propositions that express facts is not the only way to interpret reasons as
facts. If reasons are rather what the true propositions represent—the truth conditions
for the propositions—then another form of representation could represent the same
reasons.
Here is why we might favour this understanding of reasons. In Chapter 5, I
argued that not just any proposition can be a reason and argued against interpreting
reasons as propositions which, if true, would favour action. The propositions need
to be true. In Chapter 5 and also briefly in section 7.1.1 of this chapter, I argued
against the subjective-objective reason distinction on the basis that it cannot account
for the normative force of reasons. In order to account for the normative force of
reasons and in order to allow that normative and motivating reasons are the same
kind of thing, a proposition that is a reason must be true. These two arguments show
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that, simply in virtue of being a proposition, something is not a reason. Rather,
it is crucial that the proposition is true; that is, that the truth conditions for the
proposition are met. While simply being true is also not sufficient for a reason to be
an agent’s reason—an agent will not act for a reason unless she has that reason in
mind and acts in light of it—the insufficiency of being true is not due to the nature
of reasons but due to the requirements of being able to act for it. Prima facie, it
therefore seems that it is necessary for things to be the case in order for something
to be a reason but it may not be necessary for the way things are to be expressed as
a proposition in order to be a reason.
It may be necessary for a fact to be expressed as a proposition in order to be a
reason because a reason still needs to be something (i) that we can be aware of and
(ii) that can be a premise in reasoning. So, with regards to (i), can we be aware of
a fact without adopting a propositional attitude? Consider an analogy. Tree rings
represent the age of a tree but they do not do so by forming a proposition. Never-
theless, the same thing that the rings represent, the age of the tree, will be the truth
conditions for the proposition stating the age of the tree. In other words, the tree
rings represent the same fact as the proposition. Similarly, emotions represent how
things are but not by a proposition. The same thing that emotions represent, such
as something as dangerous, something as frightening, or something as frightening
to me, will be the truth conditions for the proposition stating the fact that some-
thing is dangerous, that is is frightening, or that it is frightening to me. In other
words, an emotion can represent a fact, which in turn can be stated in a proposition,
and through an emotion we can be aware of a fact without adopting a propositional
attitude.
Still, (ii) remains: reasons are the kind of thing that can be premises in reason-
ing. We might understandably be hesitant to accept that an emotional representation
can be used as premises in reasoning. Just like tree rings cannot be premises, we
might suppose that neither can an emotional experience or an emotional represent-
ation. As I argued in Chapter 5, mental states, and this would include emotions,
cannot be reasons and so the emotion itself, as a state which is elicited by and rep-
resents the formal object, cannot be a reason. And, while I have argued that emo-
tions involve a commitment to how things are, I have not shown that the contents of
emotions stand in inferential relations with either beliefs or with each other.
However, this is where my arguments in the previous subsection can be called
on. Importantly, whether the content of some state will stand in inferential relations
with the content of another state is a function of what the state is. And, we see,
emotions are states where we are committed to the content. In the previous sub-
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section, I argued that feeling fear and believing that something is not frightening
are in tension. While perhaps not a truth-attitude, we are committed to the way
things appear through caring. Further, the way in which emotions are assessable
for correctness does suggest that emotions involve a commitment to how things are,
else it would not matter if they are accurate or not. Lastly, as I argued in Chapter
6 and have already called on in section 7.1.2, we do think that someone who does
not believe that a situation is dangerous ought not to feel fear, and we can assess
an emotional experience for intelligibility by how it coheres with the agent’s other
currently held mental states. If there were no inferential relation between an emo-
tional representation and the content of a belief in virtue of the kinds of states they
are, then it would not make sense to do either of these things. Taken together, an
emotional representation can stand in inferential relations with the contents of other
mental states like belief.
An emotional representation can also stand in inferential relations with other
emotional representations, in virtue of the kind of state it is. Bennett Helm (2001,
2009) argues that the contents of emotions do stand in inferential relations with
each other, and I find the basic idea compelling. For example, if I love my parents,
it is because they have import for me; that is, I care about them, and it is because I
care about them that I feel love. Because loving something requires that the object
has import for the subject, if someone genuinely loves something, then that person
will experience a range of emotions depending on how the thing with import is
being affected. If I love my parents and they are harmed, then something that has
import for me and which I care about is harmed and I will feel sadness; if I love
my parents and they achieve some goal, then something that has import for me and
which I care about has done something impressive and I will feel elation. If I did not
experience emotions that are in accord with something having import for me, then
we can legitimately question if I really do love what I say I love.7 Indeed, it is often
through our emotions that we realise that certain things have import for us. For
example, on not feeling sad when a formerly close friend cuts ties, you realise that
you no longer love her. The relations between different emotions, I contend, arise
out of what the concept of caring involves, namely being active and responsive. So,
if things have import and you care, then you will be responsive in ways appropriate
to protect those cares, entailing that the content, to which you are committed, will
stand in inferential relations.
7Helm argues that it is a rational failure not to experience the associated emotions. This stronger
claim is not necessary for the basic point I wish to make, which is that the emotional representations
do stand in basic inferential relations with each other.
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Further, I argued in Chapter 1 that an emotional attitude, while not necessar-
ily a disposition to experience the correlative occurrent emotion, is a disposition to
experience other emotions and to have certain patterns of thought. In Chapter 3, I
argued that the explanations in Category B turned on our conception of emotions
as intentional and as having associated beliefs and desires. If emotional represent-
ations did not stand in some kind of inferential relation to each other and to the
content of the beliefs we hold, then this would not be possible.
Emotional representations can stand in inferential relations, but can we use them
in reasoning? My second argument in the previous subsection was that emotions
involve a disposition to believe that things are as the emotion represents them to
be. If so, what emotions represent can be expressed as a proposition and used in
reasoning. If one is not aware of what an emotion represents or aware of it as a
consideration in light of which one can act, one will not form a belief about it and
offer it as a reason to justify one’s action. But that is not the same as not being able
to do so, if one is aware.
We therefore see that the concept of the formal object as response-dependent not
only allows us to individuate between emotions, and assess them for intelligibility,
accuracy and appropriateness, as discussed in Chapter 6, it also allows us to examine
the role of emotions as providing potential reasons for action. Because we actively
care and respond, we are committed to the way things seem to us in a way which
enables us to act in light of considerations to which an emotion gives us access.
And because we are committed, emotionally, to the way things seem to us, acting
for those considerations can be acting in light of a reason when we act on the basis
of an emotion. We therefore see that we can meet the guidance condition when
acting solely on the basis of an emotion, and that we can act in light of a reason
when acting solely on the basis of an emotion without a belief.
7.2 ACTING REASONABLY ON THE BASIS OF AN EMOTIONAL EX-
PERIENCE
Even if we could, in principle, act in light of a reason and guide our action when
acting on the basis of an emotion, it does not follow that we are entitled to act
solely on the basis of an emotional experience. This is because we may fail to be
good rational agents. Perhaps the emotional experience is not suitably linked to the
reason for which we act, some evaluative fact. For instance, we are entitled to act
on the basis of perceptual experiences because perceptual experiences are evidence
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for the perceptual fact and constitute sufficient justificatory reason for assenting to
the perceptual fact.8 Emotional experiences, on the other hand, may lack this kind
of connection. They may fail to be evidence for the evaluative fact and they may
fail to constitute a sufficient justificatory reason for committing to that fact through
action. This is the first problem I shall consider in section 7.2.1.
But even if emotional experiences are evidence or constitute reasons, perhaps
we still are not entitled to act on the basis of them because we are unable to give
the conditions for when an emotional experience would be a defeasible reason and
when not. This is the second problem I shall consider in section 7.2.2.
Both problems have been raised as challenges to perceptual theorists who argue
that emotion has a similar epistemic role to perception in constituting reasons for, or
justifying, belief. Either an emotional experience is not evidence for an evaluative
fact, and an emotion cannot constitute a reason for believing that fact, which is
what Brady (2013) argues. Or, we are do not have prima facie entitlement to assent
to a belief about the evaluative fact because we cannot specify the defeasibility
conditions, which is what Salmela (2011) argues.
In their arguments, both Brady and Salmela engage with perceptual theorists
who argue that an emotional experience by itself constitutes sufficient reason for
a belief, or that an emotional experience by itself is a perception of an evaluative
fact about which we are justified in forming beliefs.9 I am not necessarily endors-
ing a perceptual theory of emotion according to which emotions by themselves are
perceptions of evaluative facts or constitute sufficient reasons—after all, my main
motivation for adopting a perceptual approach was its minimal cognitive commit-
ments and to use it as a working theory—and my focus is on action and not belief.
Nevertheless, these two objections are pertinent to my project. Like the perceptual
theorists, I am defending a role for emotion where acting on the basis of an emotion
could be acting in light of a reason, which requires that acting on the basis of an
emotion is not itself fundamentally problematic. If emotional experiences cannot
constitute reasons for belief, sufficient or not, or if we are not entitled to assent to
8I shall clarify the use of ‘justificatory reason’ as well as ‘sufficient reason’ in section 7.2.1.
9Do¨ring argues that ‘in the rationalisation and justification of other states and actions the emo-
tions play the role of perception, and in that sense, so I claim, they are perceptions’ (Do¨ring 2007,
376). Christine Tappolet writes, ‘. . . emotions are perceptions of values. Thus, fear would consist
in perceiving something as fearsome. . . ’ (Tappolet 2012, 206-7). Julien Deonna aims to defend the
idea that ‘emotion, like perception, is a sensory means of gathering information about our envir-
onment’ (Deonna 2006, 29) and Catherine Elgin argues that ‘[l]ike perceptions, [emotions] afford
epistemic access to a range of response-dependent properties, such as being admirable or contempt-
ible, and provide evidence of response-independent properties that trigger them’ (Elgin 2008, 33).
These theorists argue that an emotion, itself, is the perception of the evaluative fact and is sufficient
to justify a belief, given the right circumstances.
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a belief on the basis of an emotional experience, then why would emotional ex-
periences have a different status in acting? Even though Brady’s and Salmela’s
arguments are not designed to apply to action, they do provide a foil to examine the
validity of acting on the basis of an emotional experience.
7.2.1 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES AS EVIDENCE AND REASONS
Brady (2013) argues that ‘emotional experiences fail to constitute reason or evid-
ence of any kind for evaluative judgements’ (Brady 2013, 68). According to him,
rather than constituting reasons that ‘silence the call for justification’ of a belief,
they demand further reasons and are responses to reasons, not reasons themselves.
In this subsection, I begin by clarifying terminology before seeing how the ideas
behind Brady’s argument could apply to action. In responding to his argument, I
emphasise the difference between reasons and evidence, and argue that an emotional
experience can be evidence for an evaluative fact and can constitute a justificatory
reason for action.
TERMINOLOGY
In section 7.1.1, I distinguished between justifying and rationalising an action or a
belief. Rationalising requires showing that the agent acted (or believed)10 in light
of a reason. Justifying, on the other hand, need not require showing that the agent
acted (or believed) in light of a reason. A belief, for instance, may be justified
so long as it is true, or arises out of a reliable belief-forming mechanism, or it is
suitably connected to what it is about, whatever that ‘suitable’ connection pans out
to be. In this way, experience can non-inferentially justify a belief because of the
kind of thing it is, without the agent inferring anything from it. In epistemology,
it is this kind of justifying role that perceptual experiences are often supposed to
have11 and which perceptual theorists, like Do¨ring, argue that emotional experi-
ences share. When Brady talks of an emotional experience as a reason, we should
therefore understand the relevant reason-role under discussion as what I shall call
here a ‘justificatory reason’, rather than as the agent’s motivating reason. So, by
arguing that emotions do not constitute reasons for evaluative judgements, Brady is
not addressing whether they can be the agent’s reasons but whether they can jus-
tify a judgement or belief about the evaluative fact. When we apply these different
10I have not specifically addressed belief but I take the use of ‘rationalising’ and ‘justifying’ to be
the same for both belief and action.
11For example, in debates about the conceptual content of experience, is is often assumed that
experiences do provide reasons for belief but are not themselves had for reasons.
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reason roles to action, we can distinguish between the agent’s motivating reason and
other reasons which might justify, such as her acting on the basis of a suitable sort
of experience.
A second bit of clarification concerns reasons and evidence. Evidence is evid-
ence of something’s being the case or of some event; or it is evidence for the claim
or fact that something is a certain way or that some event occurs. For instance,
hoof-prints on a forest path are evidence of a deer’s having been here or evidence
of the passing of a deer; they are evidence for the claim or fact that there was a deer
here or that a deer passed through. A reason is a reason for or in favour of acting,
believing (or having the belief), supposing, etc., or a reason why things are a certain
way. What something is evidence of or for need not be the same as what it is a
reason for, in favour of or why. For instance, the fact that there is a bloody knife
lying on the counter may be evidence of a murder having taken place or for the fact
that there has been a murder. It is not a reason, however, for or in favour of a murder
taking place, or a reason why a murder has taken place. It is rather a reason to think,
believe, imagine, assert the claim, etc., that a murder has taken place, or a reason
to act, such as to begin an investigation into the source of the bloody knife. If it
turns out that the bloody knife is the butcher’s knife at the end of a busy day, then
the fact that there is a bloody knife lying on the counter is not, strictly speaking,
evidence for the fact that a murder has taken place although it may nevertheless be
a consideration in favour of making such a claim. But the fact that there is a bloody
knife lying on the counter might still be a reason, albeit a defeasible one, to believe,
etc., that a murder has taken place or to investigate the knife’s source. Evidence and
reason are connected, however. If something is evidence, then it will often also be
a reason because it is evidence.
The claim that emotional experiences ‘do not constitute reasons or evidence for
evaluative judgements’ thus could mean two things in the context of the current dis-
cussion. It could mean that an emotional experience is not evidence of there being
an evaluative fact or for the evaluative fact. It could also mean that an emotional
experience is not a justificatory reason for an evaluative judgement.
THE ARGUMENTS
The first argument which Brady puts forward is that emotional experiences, unlike
perceptual experiences, are not sufficient reason for belief. A sufficient reason is
one that ‘is good enough to justify some action or belief by itself; a sufficient reason
makes action or belief permissible for the subject, we might say’ (Brady 2013, 84).
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Sufficient reasons do not make the belief or action obligatory, nor do they entail that
the action is correct or that the belief is true.
Brady compares a perceptual experience to an emotional experience. In nor-
mal circumstances and absent any defeaters, my perceptual experience of a red car
parked outside constitutes good evidence of there being a red car parked outside or
for the fact that there is a red car parked outside. We are permitted to form beliefs
about the red car on the basis of such an experience, suggesting ‘that perceptual ex-
periences are sufficient reasons for beliefs about external objects and events’ (Brady
2013, 86). The same cannot be said for emotion. Feeling fear on hearing strange
noises in the house, for example, typically motivates us to seek additional evid-
ence of and reasons for believing that there is danger. The emotional experience,
alone, is not a sufficient reason for the belief. ‘We do not, in other words, think
that the demand for justification is silenced, or take the representational content of
our emotional experience as true by default’, Brady writes (87). We require more
justification. Further, in most normal circumstances and with most emotions, we
also think that it is impermissible to form a belief solely on the basis of an emotion.
It therefore seems that emotional experiences at the very least have a weaker justi-
ficatory strength than perceptual experiences (89), and it is wrong to suppose that
the same justificatory story can be given for both.
In discussing the differences between emotion and perception, Brady talks about
emotional experiences as both evidence and reason. We should, however, treat them
separately because something can be evidence of but not a reason for one thing, or a
reason for but not evidence of another. If we treat them separately, three important
points emerge that undermine the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn
from the argument. First, even if an emotional experience does not silence the call
for justification for belief, it does not follow that the emotional experience is not
evidence for an evaluative fact. Second, evidence that constitutes a reason that does
not silence the call for justification for one thing may silence the call for justification
for another. Third, it then follows that, if an emotional experience is evidence for
an evaluative fact then, independent of whether it silences the call for justification
for a belief, it may still silence the call for justification for action; that is, it may
constitute a justificatory reason for action. I shall develop each of these points in
turn.
First, I agree that an emotional experience does not always silence the call for
justification in the case of belief in the same way that a perceptual experience does.
There are, however, two reasons why we cannot conclude from this alone that the
emotional experience is not evidence for the evaluative fact. The first is that the
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examples Brady uses, such as listening for further evidence that there is a prowler
in the house, involve negative emotions like fear. But emotional experiences of
more positive emotions often do silence the call for justification. An emotional
experience of love, for instance, can silence the call for justification for all manner
of beliefs and actions.12 This suggests an alternative explanation for why, when
hearing noises in the house and experiencing fear, we search for further reasons.
The search for further reasons may not so much be answering a call for justification,
as responding to a psychological need to prove oneself wrong or to get oneself out
of the situation in any way possible—and one way is to establish that one is wrong.
Feeling love or another positive emotion, in contrast, is not something we want to
prove ourselves wrong about or a situation we want to get out of, but it is one we
want to encourage, if we do find ourselves searching for reasons.
The second reason why we cannot conclude that the emotional experience is
not evidence for the evaluative belief is that, while evidence can constitute reasons
that silence the call for justification, evidence comes in different degrees and will
not always constitute reasons that silence the call for justification. Take the use
of evidence in the sciences, for example. In epidemiology, statistical correlation
is often evidence for the fact that there is a causal link between some potential
risk factor and some disease. But, so the mantra goes, correlation is not causation.
There are many confounders, often unknown, meaning that the correlation alone is
not enough to show that there is a real causal link. It nonetheless remains evidence
for the fact that there is a causal connection, just weak evidence, and it does not
constitute a sufficient reason by itself to silence the call for justification for the
belief that there is a causal connection.13
Second, something that does not silence the call for justification for one thing
may still silence the call for justification for another thing. The statistical correl-
ation alone, for instance, is not strong evidence for the fact that there is a causal
connection between a potential risk factor and some disease, and it does not con-
stitute sufficient justificatory reason for believing that there is such a connection. It
does, however, constitute a sufficient reason for believing that further study should
be done. What this suggests is that, if a reason does silence the call for justification,
12For instance, Bernard Williams (1981) argues that a moral agent need not be thinking about
what is morally justified and remain impartial all of the time; she can act on an emotion like love.
Thinking about what is morally justified can sometimes be ‘one thought too many’. Susan Wolf
(2012) defends an interpretation of Williams’ ‘one thought too many’ in which situations of love
may even lie beyond justification.
13Thank you to Katherine Furman of the London School of Economics for discussing the use of
evidence in health policy with me.
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its doing so will be dependent on what it is being used for and in what context or,
in other words, what it constitutes a reason for. Therefore, like for the first reason
above, we see that if emotional experiences do not constitute sufficient reason for
a belief, it does not follow either that they are not evidence for an evaluative fact
or evidence of things being a certain way, or that they do not constitute sufficient
reason for something else.
Third, if an emotional experience is evidence of things being a certain way or
for the fact that things are that way, then it may still constitute a justificatory reason
for action, independent of whether it does so for belief. With belief, we aim at the
truth; with action, we aim at getting things right. What is true and what is right are
different spheres of study and the requirements for what is a good reason to believe
or to act can vary. For instance, both a true belief and a right action not only get
things right in terms of believing truly or acting in light of real reasons, but can be
justified or lack justification if they arise in the wrong kind of way. For belief, this
may be something like not believing on the basis of strong evidence or believing as
the result of bad reasoning. For action, this wrong kind of way may be something
like not acting out of the right motivations or having a wrong conception of why the
action is a good thing to do. So, how does an emotional experience as evidence fare
with regards to action?
If an agent acts on the basis of an emotional experience, where the emotional
experience provides her with access to facts because of its intentional nature and the
way it implicitly represents those facts in its intentional content, then the emotional
experience needs to be evidence for the fact. In Chapter 6, I introduced the example
of John who backs away from the snake because he is afraid of it. I identified three
potential facts that could be his reason. These were:
1. How things seem to him: There is a frightening snake (to me).
2. How things are, in terms of what response is merited: There is a frightening
snake.
3. How things are, in terms of what relation holds: There is a dangerous(-to-me)
snake.
For each of these options, we can ask two questions: Can an emotional experience
be evidence for the reason in light of which the agent acts? If so, does it constitute a
justificatory reason for the action? I will answer the first question for each potential
reason, then present Brady’s argument against supposing that the emotional experi-
ence constitutes a reason of any kind (for a judgement). I will question the principle
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guiding Brady’s argument and then illustrate how the emotional experience could
constitute justificatory reasons of varying strengths for acting in light of the three
reasons above.
Let us start with the first question of whether an emotional experience can be
evidence for the reason in light of which the agent acts. With regards to the reason
in 1, the question is whether an emotional experience can be evidence of how things
seem to the agent. The answer is that it can indeed. It is very strong evidence of how
things seem to the agent. If John experiences fear, then his experience is evidence
of something being frightening to him. His fear is in fact constituted by finding
something frightening to him.
The emotional experience is also evidence of the existence of the formal object
in 2. This is because ‘frightening’ is response-dependent, and fear is the kind of
response that is merited. If someone experiences fear, then it is the right kind of
response to have to something frightening, and we expect someone to experience
fear if there is something frightening. This does not yet show that the evidence is
strong, however. Statistical correlation is exactly the kind of thing to expect if there
is a causal link, but it remains weak evidence of a causal link. Nevertheless, if what
is frightening is in part constituted by the agent having certain cares, and if having
those cares also involves responding with fear when those cares are threatened,
then a fear response would be fairly strong evidence for one element of the formal
object, the fact that the agent is caring. A similar thing cannot be said for statistical
correlation because causation is not in part constituted by statistical correlation.
It is less clear whether a fear response is evidence that an evaluative fact ob-
tains.14 Unlike being frightening, being dangerous(-to-me) does not call for a re-
sponse of a certain kind and being dangerous is not in part constituted by the sub-
ject as caring (even though what cares the subject has may constitute what relation
holds). However, being dangerous is still relative to the particular subject, either
as an individual or as a member of a species. If experiencing fear is in part finding
something dangerous, as I argued in Chapter 6, then an emotional experience of fear
can be evidence for the fact that something is dangerous, relative to the subject and
her cares. It just might not be strong evidence, just as statistical correlation is weak
evidence for a causal link.
I have proposed that emotional experiences can be evidence of evaluative facts.
In virtue of being evidence, they could constitute justificatory reasons for action on
the basis of an emotional experience and in light of those evaluative facts.
14Elgin (2008) argues that an emotional experience is evidence for an evaluative fact like this, and
she is one of Brady’s main targets.
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Brady, however, puts forward a second claim, which is that ‘emotional exper-
ience doesn’t, even in normal conditions, provide any kind of reason for evaluat-
ive judgement’ (Brady 2013, 112). The argument in support of this claim is this.
Emotional experiences, unlike perceptual experiences, are responses to reasons. As
Brady notes, we think of recalcitrant emotions as ‘irrational’ because they are not
responding to the reasons of which the agent is aware, and we think that certain
reasons merit certain emotional responses. We do not think the same for percep-
tion. For instance, if I continue to see the stick in the water as bent even though I
know it is straight, then I am not ‘irrational’ as I would be in the emotion case or,
at least, I am not held to normative requirements of what my experience should be
like.15 Nor is there a sense in which seeing the stick as straight is somehow merited.
Brady takes these considerations to illustrate the general point that:
. . . the considerations that constitute good reasons for an emotional re-
sponse are equally good reasons for the relevant evaluative judgement;
and, by the same token, considerations that constitute good reasons for
some evaluative judgement are equally good reasons for the relevant
emotional response. (Brady 2013, 113)
For instance, the rhinkals raising its head to spit at John is both a good reason for
him to feel fear and a good reason to judge that the snake is dangerous. But this,
Brady argues, rules out that emotions can be reasons for evaluative judgements
because ‘such experience would appear to be capable of justifying itself’ (Brady
2013, 113). That is, if feeling fear is a good reason to judge that the snake is
dangerous, then it will also be a good reason to feel fear. The emotional experience
ends up justifying itself, an undesirable commitment to be forced into. This is the
‘bootstrapping’ objection.
The principle guiding Brady’s argument is that, if something is a good justific-
atory reason for one thing, then it will be a good justificatory reason for another.
But as my arguments have aimed to show, this principle must be questioned. As I
have already argued, the strength of the evidence and whether it constitutes a reason
or a good or bad one will depend on what it is a reason for. Even accepting that
an emotional experience does not constitute a good justificatory reason for itself,
it does not follow that the same emotional experience does not constitute a good
15We do hold people to some requirements, however. When pointing out some object to someone
who just cannot see it, we might find ourselves saying, ‘You really should see it! Are you wearing
your contact lenses?’ Or look for other explanations for why the person cannot see it: are they
hallucinating? Are they colour blind? Are they having a stroke? This suggests that we do have some
requirements of what an experience should be like.
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justificatory reason for something else, like a judgement or an action.
With this in mind, let us see how the three potential reasons, outlined in 1-3,
fare and whether an emotional experience can constitute a justificatory reason for
acting in the light of them, which was the second question above.
Starting with the first reason, which is the fact of how things seem to the agent,
we see that an emotional experience does constitute a justificatory reason for acting
on the basis of an emotion because of the way things seem to her, because the
emotional experience is strong evidence of the way things seem to her. The way
things seem to the agent is also a reason to judge that things seem a certain way to
her. So, while in most contexts it may be a very bad kind of justificatory reason, it
is still a reason and can at least explain—if not justify in a strong sense—the action
as intelligible.
Does an emotional experience constitute a justificatory reason for acting on the
basis of an emotion because of a fact about the formal object, the second potential
reason? If being afraid entails that one experiences one’s cares as being affected in
a negative way, and experiencing fear is evidence for the fact that there is something
affecting one negatively then, in the context of action, an emotional experience can
constitute a justificatory reason for action because the experience draws attention to
what cares are at stake which may require quick action. This does not mean that an
emotional experience always constitutes a justificatory reason for action, however.
It will depend on the context, not least on what the action is, just as statistical
correlation may constitute a reason in favour of engaging in further study but not a
reason in favour of releasing a press statement about a new health risk. In particular,
finding something frightening may be a bad justificatory reason for acting if action
is not immediately required. For instance, suppose you find frightening the prospect
of a loved one’s sudden death during an upcoming and risky operation. You call the
local priest to organise last rites solely on the basis of experiencing fear. Such a
case does call for further justification for your hasty and extreme action. But calling
the priest on the basis of finding frightening the prospect of a loved one’s death
during an emergency life-reviving operation does not call for justification to the
same extent, if at all: you needed to act quickly on a matter of deep importance
to you, the import as indicated by your fear. But this is a matter of good and bad
reasons, not a matter of the experience not constituting a reason at all.
Brady (2013, 114) does have something to say about the kind of response-
dependent characterisation of the formal object which makes up the second reason,
however. He argues that, if the characterisation of the formal object as response-
dependent is correct, then an emotional experience cannot be a reason for a judge-
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ment (setting aside action for now). This is because the emotional experience would
be a reason to judge that something is the formal object, which is the same as say-
ing that the emotional experience is merited, and we again run into the issue of the
emotional experience justifying itself.
In order to respond to this argument, it is necessary to point out that, on a
response-dependent picture, whether a certain response is merited can be assessed
according to subject-independent features. Because of this, an emotional experience
does not necessarily constitute a good justificatory reason for itself even though it
could constitute a good reason for believing that an emotional response is merited.
First, I argued in Chapter 6 that there are at least two important elements to our
concept of the formal object. One element is that there is an evaluative relational
property, like being dangerous, and the other element is that the agent actively cares,
which affects how she finds things. This means that an emotional experience can
be merited either because the agent’s cares really are being affected or because the
evaluative relation obtains. Simply because the agent experiences a situation in a
certain way, however, does not entail that the situation is that way and that her re-
sponse is merited. Second, with the particular sentimentalist line, there is also an
agent-independent assessment of when a response is merited, which may be de-
pendent on historical or cultural factors. Together, we see that, while the emotional
experience is fairly strong evidence of the way the subject’s cares are being affected
and hence evidence of the formal object, it constitutes an easily defeasible reason to
believe that the formal object obtains because there are other elements to the formal
object of which the experience is not strong evidence, such as whether the response
is appropriate relative to a context and culture or whether it is suitably grounded
in an evaluative relation. Because of this, an emotional experience can constitute
a justificatory reason for the belief about the formal object, but it does not follow
that it then justifies itself in a problematic way because there are closely-connected
defeating factors which determine whether the emotional experience is merited. It
may ultimately be a bad reason, but it remains a reason nonetheless.
How does the third potential reason fare, the fact of what evaluative relation
holds? I proposed that the emotional experience could be weak evidence for the fact.
Just as statistical correlation is weak evidence for a causal link but does constitute
a justificatory reason for believing that there is one, albeit not a good or sufficient
one which silences the call for justification, an emotional experience could still
constitute a justificatory reason for acting because something is dangerous, just not
necessarily one which silences the call for justification. Further, if we question the
guiding principle of Brady’s bootstrapping objection as I have done, then even if
180
the emotional experience can constitute a justificatory reason for acting in light of
that property or even believing that something has the property, the experience can
be a bad justificatory reason for itself.
We therefore see that emotional experiences can be evidence of evaluative facts.
In virtue of being evidence, they can constitute justificatory reasons. Whether they
are good or bad reasons will depend on the context and what they are reasons for,
but they can even sometimes be good justificatory reasons for action. Unlike the
perceptual theorists, I do not require that the emotional experience should be suffi-
cient reason or always a good reason, only that it can constitute a reason some of
the time and, sometimes, even be a good reason.
Having discussed how an emotional experience can be suitably linked to the
agent’s reason for acting, I now turn to the second line of objection to our acting
reasonably on the basis of an emotional experience.
7.2.2 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES AS PROVIDING PRIMA FACIE ENTITLEMENT
TO ACT
A different line of objection does not focus on emotions as reasons, but more on our
entitlement to believe—or act—on their basis. Even if an emotional experience can
be evidence of an evaluative fact, and even if an emotional experience can constitute
a justificatory reason, it may still be the case that we are not entitled to act on the
basis of an emotional experience.
This is the line pursued by Salmela (2011), who argues that we are not entitled
to believe on the basis of an emotional experience in the same way as we are entitled
to believe on the basis of a perceptual experience.16 The core of his argument is this.
The faculty of perception can get things wrong and so a perceptual experience is a
defeasible reason for the perceptual belief. Nevertheless, we are entitled to believe
on the basis of a perceptual experience because we can still specify conditions for
when a perceptual experience will be defeasible as a reason or would not be evid-
ence for the perceptual fact. In other words, we can establish when a perceptual
experience gets things right and when it gets things wrong and, because we can do
so, we are entitled to believe on the basis of the perceptual experience. The same is
not true of emotional experiences, Salmela argues. We cannot give the conditions
for when an emotional experience is accurate or inaccurate.17 If we cannot specify
16Like Brady, his particular targets are the strong perceptual theorists who argue for an epistemic
role for the emotional experience alone.
17As Salmela notes, not many have tried to give conditions or detailed conditions. Deonna (2006)
stands out as giving the most comprehensive attempt, and it is thus with Deonna that Salmela is
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what those conditions are, then we cannot establish when an emotional experience
is evidence for an evaluative fact and we lack the prima facie entitlement to form a
belief on the basis of the experience alone.
Salmela accepts the claim that perception gives us access to perceptual facts and
emotions give us access to evaluative facts, and he accepts that both kinds of facts
are relative to the agent’s particular perspective. That perspective will determine
what the conditions are and when an experience is defeasible as a reason. So why
does he argue that we cannot give conditions for when an emotional experience is
accurate or inaccurate? And how would this kind of objection apply to action?
The answer to the first question lies in how the perspectival nature of emotions
and perception are different. The kind of perceptual fact that I become aware of
through perception is perspectival because it is relative to my standpoint, in terms
of my location and in terms of my physical constitution. We can specify what an
agent’s physical constitution and location are and how that affects the truth of the
perceptual information they are receiving. Doing so is providing what we might
call, following Deonna (2006), a ‘frame of reference’. Using a frame of reference,
we can identify what the defeaters for a perceptual experience as a reason will be,
such as there being damage to the visual system, the mechanism being unreliable
in a given context, or there being obstruction in the field of vision. Because we can
identify conditions for when a perceptual experience will not track genuine inform-
ation and is defeasible as a reason for assenting to the apparent information, we are
entitled to rely on perceptual experiences in the cases where the conditions are in
favour of the experience being correct. In terms familiar to my present discussion,
we are entitled to believe on the basis of a perceptual experience because we can
give the conditions for when the perceptual experience will be evidence for the fact
and when it will not.
The relevant evaluative facts for emotion are also perspectival. They are relative
to the agent’s perspective, in terms of her location and to her capacities, but also
in terms of her particular set of interests and background. However, the influence
of the agent’s cares and background on the evaluative facts make the emotional
perspective substantially different to the perceptual perspective, and giving a frame
of reference harder. Deonna has developed a frame of reference and it is this that
Salmela challenges.
For Deonna, the frame of reference for an emotion’s evaluative fact will be
defined by species-relative facts as well as by individual-relative facts. For emo-
primarily concerned.
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tion, unlike perception, the individual-relative facts will be dominant and include
longstanding evaluative tendencies of the agent, such as being a racist or Chris-
tian, as well as her character traits or temperaments, such as being shy or irritable.
If someone is a racist, for instance, then the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn’s
winning seats in the European Parliament presents a tangible and immanent good
for her, and is exciting. If she is shy, then public speaking is a danger to her well-
being, and is frightening. Defeaters for emotion will include false beliefs, phobias,
traumas, etc.
Salmela argues, however, that our evaluative tendencies and character traits do
not provide a frame of reference. This is because, in order to use them to estab-
lish an emotion’s accuracy, we need to know if they already reflect evaluative facts
about ourselves. Unlike facts about an agent’s constitution and location, facts about
evaluative tendencies and character require establishing that the agent herself en-
dorses them: the defeaters for emotion ‘go deeper in the psychology of the specific
individual than the defeaters of perceptual experience’ (Salmela 2011, 20). This re-
quires what Salmela, following Deonna, calls a ‘mastery of defeasibility’ dependent
on a degree of self-knowledge. As Salmela argues:
My internalized character traits and longstanding values are obviously
facts about (the present) me, but without an advanced ‘mastery of de-
feasibility’, these facts cannot provide a frame of reference for emo-
tional responses that track evaluative facts for me. (Salmela 2011, 21)
If we cannot give a frame of reference for emotion, then we cannot identify when an
emotional experience is evidence for an evaluative fact and when it is not; therefore,
we are not entitled to believe on the basis of the experience alone.
Salmela’s focus is on belief but he raises important worries for action. If we
cannot specify under what conditions an emotional experience is evidence, regard-
less of whether it constitutes a reason when it is evidence, we are not entitled to act
on the basis of the emotion alone. Nevertheless, it is not the case that we need a
frame of reference as stringent as Salmela proposes for belief and this makes the
worries less forceful.
To see this, let us go through how the reasons 1-3 I identified above fare, and
see whether we are entitled to act in light of them on the basis of an emotional
experience. We can set aside cases of the first kind of reason at the outset. These
are facts about how something seems to the agent. We can set them aside because
they are uninteresting and we can specify the conditions for their being evidence:
the agent experiences the situation as being the way she experiences it.
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Turning to the other two potential reasons, I shall argue that, contrary to what
Salmela suggests, we can in fact provide enough of a framework to generate a prima
facie entitlement. Salmela’s target is the dimension of assessment of an emotion as
accurate or inaccurate and I shall argue two points. First, even if we cannot give
comprehensive conditions for accuracy of an emotion, we can give some conditions
to develop a frame of reference and, second, there are other ways an emotional
experience can fail to give entitlement. Taken together, we have a robust picture of
when we can be entitled to act on the basis of an emotional experience.
Starting with the first point, which is that we can still give some conditions
for accuracy and a frame of reference. The role of the frame of reference is to
identify conditions which will affect the accuracy of the experience; its role is not
of something to be used before one is entitled to do anything on the basis of the
experience, or something to consult before going ahead with a belief or an action.
This means that we can give some basic conditions for the accuracy of an emotional
experience which allow us to specify when an experience is not accurate even if
the agent is unaware at the time whether those conditions hold or not. Doing so
is sufficient to generate entitlement. For instance, Deonna proposes using other
people’s judgements about ourselves as a way of establishing whether we are acting
or believing in a way that is consistent with our evaluative tendencies and character
traits. If someone who sees herself as shy is excited by the prospect of giving an
address to a large crowd, it may be the case that her excitement is getting things
wrong. However, if her peers judge her not to be shy, then her excitement may in
fact be accurate and, indeed, she may learn something about herself through her
experience. We can also establish what those evaluative tendencies and character
traits are by giving counterfactual or hypothetical conditions, as Jones (2003) does.
She argues that it is sufficient that:
. . . the agent’s disposition to reflective self-monitoring are such that
she would not rely on that first order sub-system [such as emotion
or perception] were it reasonable for her to believe that it failed to
reason-track. That is, her conscious reflective capacities exert regu-
lative guidance over the first-order mechanisms, stepping in when ne-
cessary to discount those mechanisms, and where possible, to recalib-
rate them into reason-tracking mechanisms through habituation. Some-
times this guidance may remain ‘virtual’—that is, revealed in how the
agent would behave in various counterfactual circumstances (were she
to have evidence that they are unreliable, for example, but evidence she
never gets since they are reliable). (Jones 2003, 195-96)
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We therefore do have ways to establish what evaluative facts are true of the sub-
ject, such as through other people’s judgements about us or our own reflective self-
monitoring. The subject need not be aware of the conditions at the time of believing
or acting and may not herself have mastery of defeasibility, but she still has ways
to assess her experience for accuracy. In this way, we can give less stringent con-
ditions for when an emotional experience does accurately provide access to facts
about the formal object or the evaluative relational property, the second and third
potential reasons.
Even if these ways of establishing what facts are true of the subject are not
sufficient to generate entitlement based on whether an emotion is accurate or not,
there are other ways in which an emotional experience can fail to give entitlement
to act. This is the second point.
The first way, in addition to establishing accuracy conditions, is to assess an
emotion for appropriateness, which was one of the dimensions of assessment I dis-
cussed in Chapter 6 and applies especially to the second potential reason, a fact
about the formal object characterised as response-dependent. If the formal object is
understood as response-dependent, then some of our conditions for accuracy will be
conditions regarding when such a response is merited. This will include conditions
for whether the evaluative relation which makes up one element of the concept of
the formal object obtains; conditions for when the emotion is elicited in the right
kind of way, such as through the subject actively caring rather then responding to
a chemical injection; and conditions about the social and cultural context the agent
is in. In particular, the last we can establish without a mastery of defeasibility be-
cause the conditions for the appropriateness of an emotion are not ‘deep within
the psychology of the individual’. If the racist experiences fear when she encoun-
ters someone of a different ethnicity, for instance, regardless of whether the person
really is a threat to the racist’s particular commitments and whether the racist finds
her frightening, she is not entitled to believe or act because the person does not
merit fear and is not actually frightening.
This level of assessment is open to emotions because, unlike perception, emo-
tions are responses to reasons and do have a normative element, as Brady points out
and I mentioned in section 7.2.1. Our entitlement to believe or act on the basis of an
emotional experience is thus unlike the entitlement for perception because it is not
limited to whether the experience is accurate or not. It is also dependent on whether
the emotion is one the agent ought to have. And this is true even if, for example,
the racist who acts on his inappropriate fear ultimately does good in terms of what
the action brings about, because his motivation will be wrong. Someone who is not
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prone to reflective self-monitoring may also have less entitlement to act on the basis
of her emotional experience because it is inappropriate on an epistemic level for her
to do so.
Further, we can assess an emotion for intelligibility with regards to both the
second and third potential reasons, facts about the formal object and about the eval-
uative relation. If the emotional experience is not intelligible, then it may be defeas-
ible. For instance, if the emotional experience is in conflict with other beliefs that
the agent holds, then one of those mental states is not providing her with a reason, or
they all provide reasons but one of them will be defeasible. For instance, Clare the
agoraphobe experiences fear when in open spaces but also believes that the situation
is not frightening and that it is not dangerous. If she is to be subjectively rational,
she needs to weigh up her considerations in order to assess which are and are not
reasons or good reasons, and thus she is not entitled to act in light of the reason
that the situation is frightening or that it is dangerous on the basis of the emotional
experience alone. However, as discussed in section 7.2.1, we will sometimes need
to act promptly and in such cases a lack of conflict is sufficient to generate an enti-
tlement to act on the basis of the emotional experience.18 The kind of entitlement is
independent of the emotion’s accuracy and the frame of reference.
We therefore see that intelligibility and appropriateness set up some basic con-
ditions for entitlement and that we can give some general conditions for a frame of
reference for both the second and third potential reasons. The kind of entitlement to
act on the basis of an emotional experience is not the same as the kind of entitlement
for perceptual experience, but there is entitlement nonetheless.
In summary, I have used my three potential reasons to assess the objections that
emotional experiences do not provide evidence for an evaluative fact or constitute
sufficient justificatory reasons for an action, and the objection that we are not en-
titled to act on the basis of an emotional experience alone. We have seen that each
of the potential reasons has its own nuances, strengths and weaknesses, but that it
is nevertheless the case that an emotional experience can be evidence and can con-
stitute a justificatory reason, and that we can have prima facie entitlement to act on
the basis of an emotional experience.
18Patricia Greenspan (2011) in fact argues that the emotional experience provides a critical (or
normative) reason to act and has an important role in helping us to act timeously.
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7.3 CONCLUSION
I have argued that the intentional nature of emotions gives rise to three potential
reasons for which the agent could act. All three reasons are evaluative facts, al-
though the first one, concerning how things appear to the agent, is ultimately un-
interesting. It is not usually the reason an agent would cite to explain her action
except perhaps as a last resort to show how her action was intelligible. Because of
this, I have not given it much attention and shall now set it aside completely.
I have argued that, by being committed to the way things appear through caring
and by being disposed to believe the putative fact that an emotion presents the agent
with, we can act in light of that fact, which is the reason, when experiencing an
emotion without first forming a belief about the evaluative fact. Lastly, I have argued
that emotional experiences can be evidence for the evaluative facts, can constitute
justificatory reasons for acting on those facts, and that we are prima facie entitled
to do so.
What is left is to return to the examples of Category E where the emotion
provides the agent’s reason, but not as a state to be addressed. The first two re-
maining examples involve love:
• Richard bought flowers for Katherine because he loved her.
• Natasha pulls her life together out of love for her mother.
While the love in the first example could be an attitude, I shall interpret it as a
moment of occurrent love: Richard thinks of Katherine with a surge of fondness
and buys her flowers. He acts on the basis of an experience of love.
What would be his reason? The formal object of love could be cashed out as
being affection-inspiring, and the evaluative relation would be something like being
value-giving or being a source of great value in one’s life. So, Richard buys flowers
for Katherine because she is affection-inspiring or because she is the source of great
value in his life. By feeling love, he is committed to her being of value to him and
he acts on the basis of that commitment.
His experience of love is evidence for the fact that she is affection-inspiring,
because one of its elements is the subject actively caring and because it merits that
kind of response. It is evidence for the fact that she is of great value to him because
part of loving is valuing. Because it is evidence, it does constitute a justificatory
reason for his action. Is it a good or a bad justificatory reason? On one hand,
it is not conclusive evidence. But on the other hand, it could still be sufficient
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evidence. As mentioned in section 7.2.1, it is striking that positive emotions tend
not to have the same call for justification as negative emotions: the explanation
that Richard bought flowers for Katherine because he loves her does not call for
further justification. In fact, if one were to say, but why does he love her? and push
for further reasons, I would think that the person inquiring was being particularly
obtuse or I would become curious about her history with Katherine, suspecting that
there was some bad blood between them which makes her think that Katherine is
particularly unloveable. Finally, Richard is prima facie entitled to act on the basis
of his experience of love. Indeed, if he were to form other beliefs about Katherine’s
value and what he should do, we might even think that his action is poorer for not
being a direct expression of his love. His motivation would be wrong.
This first example helps illustrate the way in which an attitude can also provide
access to an agent’s reasons, as with Natasha’s love for her mother in the second
example. Natasha is distraught over the death of Prince Andrey. She becomes ill
and loses all purpose to her life. However, her love for her mother ‘unexpectedly
showed her that the essence of life—love—was still active within her’ (Tolstoy
2001, 933). Through her love for her mother, Natasha starts to pull her life together.
She is neither avoiding or encouraging the state, nor expressing it. Yet, it is true to
say that she acts as she does because she loves her mother, where the love explains
more than that she has a particular attitude.
In both of these examples, the agent’s reason will be the loved one as affection-
inspiring or the loved one as a source of great value. Even if Natasha does not
experience an occurrent state of love as she pulls her life together, she nevertheless
is committed to the value that her mother brings her, as is seen in her other attitudes
and beliefs, as well as her desire to be better, perhaps in order to be worthy of her
mother’s love or more capable herself of participating in an affectionate relation-
ship. She therefore does act in light of either the fact that her mother is affection-
inspiring or the fact that her mother is value-giving.
Further, her attitude towards her mother is evidence, not necessarily sufficient
evidence, for the fact that her mother is loveable and value-giving in her life; if her
mother were not that way, then we would expect her attitude to be different.
Again, as a reason to pull her life together, while not an experience of love,
her attitude of love does constitute a justificatory reason for why she does what
she does. Indeed, like Richard’s love, acting on the basis of love is acting out of
worthy motivations. We can see this in a kind of converse case where someone’s
love is not a strong enough reason to carry on with things. A common criticism
of a suicide is that the act is selfish because it leaves behind the person’s friends
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and family who love her. The underlying thought to such a criticism seems to be
something like, if she really loved her friends and family, then she would not have
done what she did. But if this is a criticism of such action, then presumably carrying
on despite one’s own debilitating condition but on the basis of one’s love for others
is a sufficient justificatory reason for doing so. Even rejecting that an action like
suicide is selfish, the case still brings out how love for one’s friends and family can
constitute a justificatory reason for acting in light of the reason that there is value
in one’s life which, in the case of suicide, is either overlooked or not strong enough
to count in favour of carrying on. Cases where it seems that the agent ought to act
on the basis of love for others, or where her not doing so is somehow distressing,
illustrate that sometimes, like Natasha, one is prima facie entitled to act on the basis
of love.
The next example is closely related to the love examples:
• Huck Finn does not turn Jim over to the authorities because he feels compas-
sion for Jim.
Huck Finn does not form other beliefs about Jim or what he ought to do, he simply
acts out of his compassion. His reason would be grounded in the relation that Jim
stands to him, as Jim needing kindness that Huck can give. He is committed to the
plight of Jim through caring, and could offer it as a reason for why he goes against
what he thinks he should do, even while he happens to think that it is a bad reason.
Feeling compassion is evidence that Jim needs kindness, because Jim’s situation
is such that it generates a merited response. Again, the evidence may not constitute
a sufficient justificatory reason depending on the context and what it is a reason for.
Because someone who needs compassion may often need it immediately, the exper-
ience could easily be a good justificatory reason for helping that person. And, like
with the examples of love, acting on the basis of compassion rather than prudence or
expedience is acting with the right kind of motivation and he is prima facie entitled
to act on the basis of his compassion. Unlike love, there would potentially be more
defeaters to the entitlement because compassion is not just about someone who is
valuable, but about someone who needs kindness. It is more complex, allowing
more scope for error.
The next example involves a more negative emotion:
• Alice challenges her boss because she is morally indignant at the injustice.
Alice challenges her boss because she feels moral indignation about the injustice
he has committed by not giving her colleague a deserved payrise. Here, her reason
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is that there has been an injustice, understood as meriting a moral response, or an
unfairness. She is committed to the way there has been an injustice or an unfairness
through caring, and can offer it as a reason for why she challenges her boss.
So long as her moral compass is suitably tuned, her indignation is evidence that
the boss’s action was unjust. Unlike the cases of love and compassion, however, her
moral indignation, alone, is a bad justificatory reason for her action of challenging
her boss. An emotion like moral indignation is cognitively complex and dependent
on a moral code that will be independent of Alice’s more direct cares and interests.
Her direct care would be to do what is right, but what is required in order to do
what is right goes beyond her and is contestable. Her emotional experience thus
would have many defeaters, and defeaters that do not apply directly to her emotion
but directly to her system of values. Nevertheless, so long as her emotion is not
in conflict with her other beliefs, it is in line with her evaluative tendencies and
character traits as well as with what is just and unjust, and it is appropriate given
that an injustice has happened, she is entitled to act on the basis of her emotion.
Finally, the last example:
• Emily quits the PhD programme because she is sad and ill-motivated.
Emily, a PhD student in chemistry, finds herself feeling sad and ill-motivated in
her endeavours, despite having always believed that she should pursue a PhD. She
sees the feelings that make her want to leave the programme as groundless even
though, unknown to her, they are triggered by factors that would be good reasons
not to be doing the PhD. She eventually leaves the programme on an emotional
impulse and judges herself to be acting irrationally. When she looks back years
later, however, she views her persistence as irrational and takes as her reasons for
acting the reasons behind her emotional state (Arpaly 2000, 504). Emily seems to
act akratically. Nevertheless, she acts in light of a reason, which was that the PhD
programme was creating disvalue in her life. In the example as originally described,
she does not originally think that she has acted for a reason. However, the reason
dawns on her over time (Arpaly 2000), which can be interpreted as indicating that
she was aware of her reason but on a subconscious level. Assuming that such an
interpretation of the example holds up, it is not a case that she constructs a reason
to explain her action and gives a post-hoc rationalisation. She genuinely did act in
light of a reason.
Her sadness is also evidence of the disvalue the PhD creates in her life, although
it is evidence that she fails to appreciate or which she ignores. Her emotional exper-
ience, because it is evidence of the disvalue, does constitute a justificatory reason.
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However, she is not entitled to act on the experience alone because it is in conflict
with her other beliefs and mental states.
Working through the examples in this way, we see the variety of ways in which
an emotion can provide access to a reason, how an agent can act in light of a reason
when acting on the basis of an emotional experience, how the emotional experience
can be evidence for an evaluative fact, how it can constitute a justificatory reason,
and how we can be entitled to act on the basis of the experience. With these different
ways of assessing an action on the basis of an emotion, such actions cannot be
dismissed out of hand as not fully rational. Moreover, an explanation in terms of
an emotion can be an explanation alluding to the agent’s motivating reason, and
in that way, an explanation which shows how the agent was acting rationally and
reasonably.
CONCLUSION
In the Introduction, I set up my project in this thesis as bridging part of the gap
between our understanding of the functional role of emotions and our conception
of rational action. In particular, I aimed at showing how, if emotions function in
a way whereby they provide us with information about how things are, we can act
rationally when acting on the basis of them. By arguing that acting rationally is
acting in light of a reason and by focusing on explanations of action, I have argued
that we can act in light of a reason when acting on the basis of an emotion: a reason
provided by an emotion in virtue of its intentional nature. I divided my argument
into three parts.
In Part I, I argued that there is conceptual space for emotions to have a reason-
giving role in action and in explanations of action. In Chapter 1, I developed the
claim that our concept of emotion is of something rich and diverse. In Chapter 2, I
introduced five categories of different ways in which we explain action by citing an
emotion. Taking these two claims together, we saw that, even if an emotion plays
one kind of role in one kind of explanation, it need not play the same role in all
explanations. In Chapter 3, I illustrated how, despite the variety of potential roles,
emotions have traditionally been relegated to only one or perhaps two roles. I argued
that limiting the roles in this way cannot accommodate the differences between the
categories of examples of explanation of Chapter 2 and that, if we properly embrace
the intentional nature of emotions, the conceptual space for acting for a reason when
acting on the basis of an emotion is opened up.
In Part II, I covered important background commitments regarding what emo-
tions are, where I argued in Chapter 4 that we should adopt a weak cognitive account
of emotions such as a perceptual account, and regarding rational action, where I ar-
gued in Chapter 5 that acting for a reason is acting in light of a fact. I concluded
Part II by describing more formally what the differences between the categories
of explanation are. I stated more precisely how emotions could plausibly provide
access to the agent’s motivating reason because of their intentional nature, as well




In Part III, I developed the details of my view. In Chapter 6 I examined in detail
the concept of the formal object of an emotion in order to establish what reasons
an emotion could provide in virtue of its intentional nature, and showed how these
reasons were facts in light of which we could act. Finally, in Chapter 7, I argued that
we could act reasonably when acting solely on the basis of an emotional experience
and that we could act in light of a reason when acting solely on the basis of an
emotion.
There are several further avenues of research which my arguments and claims
in this thesis open up or to which they could contribute. I shall close by mentioning
five of them.
The first avenue of research is to explore a potential objection to my argument
that we can act in light of a reason when acting from an emotion. This is an objection
based on the idea that, in order to act for a reason, we must have knowledge of that
reason (see, for example, Hyman 1999; Hornsby 2007). It is a potential objection
because I have said nothing about whether we know the reasons emotions provide
us with, and it may well turn out that we do not know those reasons.19 If so, then
we could not act in light of a reason when acting on the basis of an emotion. It
is not currently clear to me to what extent we would need knowledge in order to
act for a reason, and whether we could have knowledge of the reasons even if, say,
emotional experiences do not provide good reasons for belief. In order to explore
this objection, I would need to examine in detail the arguments that we must have
knowledge of a reason in order to act for it, and see how my proposal is affected.
The second avenue of research is to extend my focus on emotions beyond just
occurrent emotion states. While my focus in this thesis has been necessarily narrow,
some of my claims and arguments could shed light on the relation between action
and emotional attitudes, action and moods, and even action and emotionally-based
character traits.
For example, in Chapter 3 I argue that acting out of an emotion as a motive-
proper is acting with a certain spirit. This could be drawn on to examine character
traits in more detail and the proposal that explaining an action as being done out of a
particular character trait reflects a ‘spirit’ with which we act. Or, if emotions involve
a commitment to the way things appear, as I argue, then an emotional attitude would
also involve a commitment to how the things one cares about are being affected.
This could be put to use in other areas of philosophy, such examining more closely
19The case of Emily the PhD student whose reasons ‘dawn on her’, for instance, does not clearly
know the fact that the PhD is bad for her.
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how and what reasons interpersonal relationships, such as ones of love, provide us
with.20
The third avenue of research is closely related to this latter idea. I have examined
emotions as they relate to the agent’s motivating reason, but a more thorough invest-
igation of emotions as they relate to normative reasons is needed. Could an emotion
provide a normative reason for action? Patricia Greenspan (2011) argues that emo-
tions provide what she calls critical reasons for action in virtue of their discomfort.
I do not think that her arguments are successful because she fails to distinguish sat-
isfactorily between the cases in Category D of my examples, cases where we act to
address the physical manifestation of an emotion and cases where we act to address
an emotion as an intentional state.21 I would like to examine more closely whether
there are times when an emotion, in itself, provides a normative reason to act. Per-
haps an attitude of love, for example, provides normative reasons to protect loving
relationships. This will feed into whether we are indeed entitled to act on the basis
of an emotional experience, as discussed in Chapter 7.
The fourth avenue of research is to explore the consequences of my view of the
concept of the formal object as a response-dependent concept with one of the ele-
ments an evaluative relational property and another element the subject as actively
caring. For example, in their recent book on emotions, Julien Deonna and Fabrice
Teroni (2012) argue that emotions are not about their formal object and argue in
favour of a view where emotions are a kind of attitude. It is in virtue of the kind of
attitude that an emotion is, they argue, that the formal object provides the correct-
ness conditions for the experience. It is not because emotions are about the formal
object, where the emotional content is what has correctness conditions.
The kind of view I am proposing is, on the one hand, in conflict with what
Deonna and Teroni propose because I allow that emotions can be about evaluative
properties; on the other hand, it centres around a similar idea to theirs, namely the
idea that the formal object is a property of the emotional experience rather than
what the emotion explicitly represents. One further avenue of research which I
would like to pursue is a more detailed examination of Deonna and Teroni’s view in
order to see how my understanding of the formal object fits in. Nevertheless, their
view is a recent move-away from the popular perceptual accounts. I am attracted
to it superficially, and believe that my examination of the formal object could help
20Thank you to Sandy Koll of Johns Hopkins University for discussing her work on reasons and
relationships with me and making me think about this potential avenue.
21I have argued against her view in papers presented at two conferences, Open Minds VII at
the University of Manchester in June 2012 and the British Postgraduate Philosophy Society annual
conference in September 2012.
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adjudicate the conflicting accounts of emotions.
The fifth avenue of research is to focus more exclusively on explanations. In
Chapter 5, when discussing expressive action and the example of the man who
rolls around in his dead wife’s clothing out of grief, I argued that the man’s emo-
tion, grief, provides a desirability characterisation of his action. And in Chapter 3
when discussing objections to belief-desire accounts of emotions, I quoted Andrea
Scarantino:
. . . being motivated to get away from a snake while fearing it is insep-
arable from representing it as dangerous and not freely employable in
practical inferences, as the desire to get away from a snake would be.
(Scarantino 2010, 361)
Taking these two ideas, a proposal I would like to explore in more depth is the
proposal that an explanation citing an emotion is fundamentally different from an
explanation citing a belief because the emotion, but not the belief, provides both
the agent’s reason in favour of acting, as well as the desirability characterisation
for why she saw those considerations and action in that way. Very loosely put, the
agent runs away because the snake is frightening, but she sees running away as
a good thing to do because the snake is frightening—not because of some separate
desire, such as a desire to get away. If this idea could be developed, then an emotion
explanation would be a very distinct kind of action explanation.22
These avenues of research, together with the other contributions I identified in
the Introduction, illustrate the significance of this thesis project. But perhaps the
most important contribution is that it acknowledges our emotional nature and con-
tributes towards a robust conception of rational agency which is able to incorporate
emotions into an account of how we do act in many of the cases when we act ra-
tionally.
22I begin to explore this idea in a paper presented at the Georgetown University Philosophy Con-
ference on Reasons and Reasoning in April 2013 and the Berkeley-London Graduate Conference in
May 2013, where I explore an analogy with John McDowell’s (1979) arguments about virtue as the
virtuous agent’s reason for acting.
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